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President Clinton's policy priorities, particularly his commitment to
abortion rights and neglect of rights to basic welfare, are becoming entrenched
in the American legal system. These priorities are mirrored by the past twenty-
five years of Supreme Court precedent and increasingly shared by liberal
constitutional theorists. Whereas Clinton's priorities may simply reflect political
opportunism, this Article questions liberal constitutional theorists who similarly
support the findamental rights grounding of Roe and abortion rights, yet fail to
consider either similar or varied arguments that promote the right to basic
welfare. The Article is a clarion call to liberal constitutional theorists to take a
step back from the prevailing Clintonification and reconsider the question of
welfare and its place as a priority in liberal constitutional philosophy and the
American legal system.
President Clinton's decision to endorse conservative welfare policies by
signing the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 19961 angered most liberals. 2 Marion Wright Edelman, a former close
associate of the Clinton family, declared that the President's "signature on this
pernicious bill makes a mockery of his pledge not to hurt children." 3
Christopher Dodd, the chairperson of the Democratic National Committee,
described the new federal anti-poverty policy as an "unconscionable retreat." 4
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1 Pub. L. No. 104-93, 110 Stat. 2105 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 1305).
2 See Francis X. Clines, Clinton Signs Bill Cutting Welfare, N.Y. Tmss, Aug. 23,
1996, at Al.
3 Ann Scales, Clinton to Sign Welfare Bill into Law, BosToN GLOBE, Aug. 22, 1996, at
A23. Edelman added that Clinton's decision to sign the welfare bill "will leave a moral blot
on his presidency ... that will never be forgotten." Id.
4 Clnes, supra note 2.
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Several prominent liberals in the Clinton administration resigned in protest after
the welfare bill became law.5 More ominously from a left wing perspective,
President Clinton's willingness to cooperate with the Republican Congress on
welfare policy seems part of a broader administration effort to end the
Democratic Party's traditional association with the poor and labor.
"Mhroughout his term," the distinguished columnist E.J. Dionne observes,
"Clinton has been more worried about the reactions he got from Wall Street
bond traders than from trade unionists." 6 Many Clintonians, eager to curry
favor with the business community, 7 publicly identify themselves as
Eisenhower Republicans rather than as Great Society Democrats.8 The label
may fit. After reviewing the President's political priorities, Dionne concluded
that Clinton is "the most powerful representative of old-fashioned liberal
Republicanism in America." 9
Commentators who note that Clinton's promises do not "last long" and
"sound... Republican," 10 however, fail to recognize that President Clinton
has demonstrated a remarkable steadfastness on abortion issues. When he
campaigned in 1992, Clinton promised to keep abortion legal." He has. Less
than a week after taking office, Clinton issued orders rescinding the gag rule,
permitting abortion in military hospitals overseas, and facilitating the
importation of the abortifacient RU-486.12 Clinton promised to appoint pro-
5 See Alison Mitchell, Two Clinton Aides Resign to Protest New Welfare Law, N.Y.
Tuvms, Sept. 12, 1996, at Al (resignations of Mary Jo Bane and Peter B. Edelman); Barbara
Vobeja, HHS Official Resigns in Protest of Decision to Sign Welfare Bill, WASH. PosT, Aug.
18, 1996, at A18 (resignation of Wendell A. Primus).
6 E.J. Dionne, Jr., Clinton Swipes the GOP's Lyrics, WASH. Posr, July 21, 1996, at
C1.
7 See, e.g., Susan B. Garland, Clinton Cozies Up to Business, Bus. WK., Sept. 12,
1994, at 70 (discussing the connection between Clinton democrats and big business).
8 See BOB WOODWARD, THE AGENDA: INSIDE THE CLINTON WHrIE HOUSE 165 (1994)
(indicating that Clinton sarcastically referred to all Democrats as Eisenhower Republicans).
9 Dionne, Jr., supra note 6.
10 Susan Molinari, Speech Delivered to the G.O.P. Delegates by Representative
Molinari, printed in N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 14, 1996, at A18.
11 See Felicity Barringer, Clinton and Gore Shift on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, July 20,
1992, at A10.
12 See Ann Devroy, Clinton Cancels Abortion Restrictions of Reagan-Bush Era, WASH.
PosT, Jan. 23, 1993, at Al; see also James Bennet, Abortion-Rights Backers Win High-Level
Support, N.Y. TImEs, Jan. 23, 1997, at A14 ("Mrs. Clinton made clear that efforts
supporting abortion rights were a priority for the Administration."). For the text of President
Clinton's orders, see Admin. Order, The Title X "Gag Rule", 3 C.F.R. 723 (1993); Admine
Order, Privately Funded Abortions at Military Hospitals, 3 C.F.R. 722 (1993); Admin.
Order, Importation of RU-486, 3 C.F.R. 724 (1993).
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choice Justices to the Supreme Court.13 He has. His two judicial appointees,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer, were both on record, before their
nominations, as supporting abortion rights. 14 President Clinton even adopts and
maintains pro-choice positions when doing so is politically unpopular. In early
April 1996, he vetoed a bill banning partial birth abortions, 15 even though
opinion polls suggest that most Americans supported that legislation.1 6
President Clinton's policy preferences are remarkably congruent with the
dominant pattern of Supreme Court decisions during the past twenty-five years.
Seemingly anticipating Clinton's pro-choice commitments, the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts have consistently ruled that the right to terminate a pregnancy
is a fundamental freedom protected by the due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 17 Likewise, just as Clinton promises to "end welfare
as we know it," 18 so the Justices have abandoned favorable citations to "the
new property" as Warren Court liberals knew it.19 In a series of decisions
13 See Baringer, supra note 11.
14 See Linda Greenhouse, On Privacy and Equality, N.Y. TIMEs, June 16, 1993, at Al;
Gwen Ifill, White House Welcomes Court Nominee, N.Y. TIms, May 17, 1994, at A14.
Ginsburg had, on several occasions, declared that she fully supported the result, though not
the reasoning, of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in
a Juicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1185, 1199 (1992) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Speaking];
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade,
63 N.C. L. REv. 375, 381-83 (1985) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Thoughts]. Breyer, as a Circuit
Court Judge, voted to strike down the "gag" law, which forbade doctors at federally funded
clinics from discussing abortion with their patients. See Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health
& Human Servs., 899 F.2d 53 (1st Cir. 1990).
15 See Todd S. Purdum, President Vetoes Measure Banning Type of Abortion, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 11, 1996, at Al.
16 Te Roper Center reported that, at the time the bill was vetoed, Americans favored a
ban on partial birth abortions by a margin of 57%-39%. See Roper Center at the University
of Connecticut, Public Opinion Online, June 12, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
RPoll File. President Clinton has indicated that he might sign a ban on partial birth abortions
that contained a broader health exemption. See Alison Mitchell, Cinton, in Emotional Terms,
Explains His Abortion Veto, N.Y. Tim, Dec. 14, 1996, at Al.
17 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 846 (1992). Supreme Court Justices have sustained abortion regulation provisions that
President Clinton would have likely vetoed. See id.; Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991);
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
18 Robert Pear, A Guide to Where the Candidates Stand, N.Y. TIMs, Nov. 3, 1996, at
A38.
19 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970); Charles Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 785-86 (1964) [hereinafter Reich, New Property] (arguing that
benefits like unemployment compensation, public assistance, and old age insurance should be
regarded as rights); see also Charles Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The
1997]
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beginning with Dandridge v. Wiliams,20 Supreme Court majorities have
consistently ruled that government officials have no constitutional obligation to
ensure that all persons in their jurisdictions are provided with certain basic
necessities.21 Several Justices continue to conduct rear-guard operations against
judicial solicitude for abortion rights.22 No Justice on the present court,
however, even hints that the Constitution might protect welfare rights.
Moreover, no jurist who supports constitutional welfare rights is likely to be
appointed to the Court in the near future. 23
More remarkably, many mainstream liberal constitutional theorists share
the President and Supreme Court's belief that the Constitution protects abortion
rights but not rights to basic necessities. Constitutional defenses of welfare
rights went out of fashion sometime during the 1970s. Contemporary legal
liberals now devote themselves primarily to developing one defense after
another of the result in Roe v. Wade.24 Ronald Dworkin and Laurence Tribe,
the two most prominent mainstream liberal thinkers in the legal academy, have
each written books defending a constitutional right to legal abortion.25 Pro-
choice constitutional arguments play major roles in other constitutional law
treatises authored by leading liberal law professors and political scientists. 26 On
Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965) (noting that government welfare
entitlements are no longer regarded as gratuities but as essentials).
20 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
2 1 See infra Part ll.B.
22 See, e.g., Casey, 833 U.S. at 979-1002 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).2 3 For a discussion of Clinton's priorities when appointing Supreme Court justices, see
infra notes 296-99 and accompanying text.
24 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
25 See RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993); LAURENCE H. TRmE, ABORTION: THE
CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990).
26 See H.N. HiRsCH, A THEORY OF LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTION AND MINORrIIES 29-
30, 92-96 (1992); KENNE L. KARsr, LAW's PROMIsE, LAw's ExPRESsiON: VIsioNs OF
POWER IN Ti POLncS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION 50-57 (1993); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
THE PARTIAL CoNsrrTIUnON 270-85 (1993); HARRY H. WELuNGTON, INTERPRETiNG THE
CONSrrnTON: THE SUPREtME COURT AND THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 96-123 (1990);
Guido Calabresi, Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accouttability (What the
Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REv. 80, 95-97, 141-49 (1991). Although he
does not discuss Roe, Bruce Ackerman defends the right to privacy at length in his magnum
opus, We the People. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 150-59 (1991).
Some liberals suggest that the Court went too fast in Roe, but still insist that the Constitution
protects the right to abortion. See, e.g., Ginsburg, Speaking, supra note 14, at 1198-99;
ROBERT A. BURT, Tim CoNsTrrTnoN IN Corrpucr 346-52 (1992). Michael Perry is the only
clear example of a liberal constitutional theorist not wholeheartedly committed to the result in
[Vol. 58:731
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the other hand, significant welfare rights cases like Goldberg v. Kelly,27
Shapiro v. Thompson,28 Dandridge v. Williams,29 and San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez30 are, by comparison, barely cited, much less
discussed by mainstream legal liberals.
Worse, the sparse analysis of welfare rights in recent works is often not
very favorable to the cause of poor people. Cass Sunstein maintains that "[n]o
one should be deprived of adequate police protection, food, shelter, or medical
care," 31 but adds that "courts are not to guarantee this form of liberty."32
Dworkin and Tribe go further. When defending themselves against the charge
that they import their own view of just public policy into the Constitution, both
Tribe and Dworkin point to redistributive programs as an example of just public
policies that they do not believe are constitutionally mandated. 33 Good
constitutional theorists, these liberal law professors apparently believe,
recognize that privacy rights are in the Constitution and that welfare rights are
Roe. See MIcHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTTUTION IN THE CouRTs: LAW OR PoLITIcs? 179-89
(1994) (suggesting that legislatures should have the power to ban some, but not all abortions);
see also ROGERS M. SMrrH, LiBERALIsm AND AMERICAN CONSTrlrnONAL LAw 237 (1990)
(not specifically including abortion on a list of fundamental freedoms that would be protected
by a court committed to rational liberty). John Hart Ely is the obvious example of a political
liberal who rejects the result in Roe. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) [hereinafter Ely, Crying WolJ]. Ely does
so, however, by rejecting the substantive understandings of due process that are central to
much liberal constitutional theory. See JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRusr: A
THEORY OF JUDIcIAL REvIEw 43-72 (1980) [hereinafter ELY, THEORY]; see also id. at 164-
70 (offering a far more narrow interpretation than most liberal constitutional theorists of the
equal protection rights of women).
27 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that a state could not terminate welfare benefits without
a prior hearing).
28 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (striking down state residency requirements for welfare
eligibility) overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
29 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding a state regulation that placed a ceiling on the amount
of benefits given under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program regardless of
the size of the family receiving the benefits).
30 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (upholding a state school financing system that relied on local
property taxes, and declaring that education is not a fundamental right).
31 SuNSrEIN, supra note 26, at 138.
32 Id. at 139. Sunstein also suggests that "courts, for institutional reasons, ought to play
a minor role" in efforts to improve and equalize public education. Id. at 140.
33 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONsTrTrrlON 16
(1991); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAw 36 (1996). But see HIRSCH, supra note 26, at
15 n.56, 25 (citing various constitutional theorists who "derive substantive welfare rights
from the equal protection clause").
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not.34 Indeed, the only constitutional right to welfare that many liberals are
presently willing to defend at any length seems to be the right to a state-
financed abortion. 35
This Article examines the Clintonification of American law and liberal
constitutional theory. Part I documents how liberal law professors have become
enamored with abortion or privacy rights while downplaying, if not
abandoning, previous liberal commitments to the constitutional rights of the
poor. Part II demonstrates that these priorities cannot be fully justified within
liberal constitutional theory unless contemporary liberals no longer think that
persons have a fundamental human right to be provided with certain basic
necessities or, more likely, believe that, for doctrinal or strategic reasons,
liberal constitutional theory must accommodate those political and judicial elites
who think that persons have no fundamental human or constitutional right to be
provided with certain basic necessities. Part Ill questions the doctrinal and
strategic reasons that best explain why liberal constitutional theorists presently
place greater emphasis on abortion rights than welfare rights, and suggests that
by adhering too strictly to recent judicial precedent, Dworkin, Tribe, and others
may unconsciously be participating in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts'
subversive effort to convert the federal judiciary into an institution that serves
elite interests rather than public values. Finally, Part IV asks liberal
constitutional theorists to take a second look at their constitutional priorities.
Good liberal reasons may exist for judicial decisions keeping abortion legal, but
liberal constitutional theorists should emphasize why the constitutional
principles that support the result in Roe also justify far greater judicial solicitude
for the rights of poor persons than either present judicial practice or present
liberal constitutional theory suggests.
The following analysis of abortion and welfare rights in American
constitutional law issues two jurisprudential challenges to liberal constitutional
theorists. First, Dworkin, Tribe, and others insist that their approach to
constitutional interpretation does not constitutionalize every fundamental human
34 Recent anthologies devoted to critical race and feminist theory similarly pay little
attention to welfare rights, even though women and persons of color constitute a
disproportionate percentage of the poor in the United States. See APPUCATIONS OF FEMINI
LEGAL THmoRY TO Womi's LIVEs (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1996); FEmN LEGAL
THEORY: FOUNDATIONS (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993); CRmcAL RACE THEORY: THE
CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995); see also Ed Sparer, Fundamental Hwnan
Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal
Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REv. 509, 553 (1984) (complaining that "[n]either lawyers
nor political activists receive much enlightenment from Critical legal theory with regard to
their actual work").
35 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 25, at 206-07; DwoRKIN, supra note 25, at 174-76.
[Vol. 58:731
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right. Their claim that welfare rights are a good example of a fundamental
human right that is not a fundamental constitutional right, however, seems to be
a mistaken application of their theories. Liberals who maintain that abortion is a
fundamental constitutional right and that welfare is a fundamental human right
cannot, I believe, consistently deny that welfare is also a fundamental
constitutional right. The jurisprudential logic underlying liberal (and liberal
feminist) defenses of Roe should compel persons, who believe that the provision
of certain basic necessities is a fundamental human right, to conclude that the
provision of those basic necessities is also a fundamental constitutional right.
This limited claim, of course, hardly constitutes a full-fledged justification of
constitutional welfare rights. That would require both a defense of a
fundamental human right to certain basic necessities (which I endorse) and a
defense of the jurisprudential logic underlying liberal defenses of Roe (which I
question). 36 No such arguments appear in this paper. I merely note the
ascendancy in liberal constitutional theory during the past twenty-five years of
abortion rights at the expense of welfare rights, and question whether liberals
whose pro-choice convictions are considerably stronger than mine should
maintain their present constitutional priorities.37 If Dworkin, Tribe, and others
wish to exclude some fundamental human rights from the American
constitutional universe, they must offer stronger reasons to justify that exclusion
than the reasons they give for ruling out a judicially enforceable constitutional
right to welfare.
Second, the following pages also challenge the liberal concern with this
exclusion problem, namely the perceived need for constitutional theories to
establish strong barriers against the constitutional incorporation of all
fundamental human rights. Good reasons exist why the federal judiciary should
not abruptly announce broad constitutional guarantees without establishing
precedential support for such rulings.38 These reasons, however, should not
inhibit constitutional commentators from urging courts to begin moving toward
constitutionalizing what they believe to be basic human rights. Constitutions that
cannot be easily amended will not remain viable in the long run if they cannot
36 See MARK A. GRABER, RETHINKMG ABORnON: EQUAL CHOICE, THE CONSTrrUnON,
AND REPRODUCTIVE PoImcs 26-29 (1996) (questioning the jurisprudential logic underlying
the liberal defenses of Roe).
37 For a similar kind of argument, see Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding
Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools, 104 HARv. L. REv. 989 (1991) (questioning
whether persons who believe the Constitution requires government to fund abortions for poor
women can consistently deny that the Constitution also requires government to fund religious
education for poor children).38 See infra notes 373-85 and accompanying text.
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be interpreted as protecting rights that many citizens regard as fundamental. 39
Thus, conservative proclamations to the contrary, liberal constitutional theories
actually suffer far more from inclusion than exclusion problems. By permitting,
for doctrinal or strategic reasons, recent precedent to establish an absolute bar
to judicially enforceable welfare rights, Tribe, Dworkin, and others may be
building unnecessary barriers to the constitutional incorporation of a
fundamental human right.
This essay uses "liberal" in a popular rather than a philosophical sense.
Liberals, for present purposes, are people who say that they are liberals when
asked whether they are liberals, conservatives, or moderates. Such people tend
to support more federal spending for the poor and a more progressive tax code.
They tend to oppose increased spending for defense and state regulation of
consensual adult sexual behavior. Legal liberals prefer the Warren Court to the
Rehnquist Court.40 They tend to admire the jurisprudence of Justices Brennan
and Marshall, and criticize the jurisprudence of Justices Scalia and Thomas. 41
Cass Sunstein, a republican thinker,42 and Michael Sandel, a communitarian, 43
are political liberals. Richard Posner and Richard Epstein, two classical
philosophical liberals, 44 are not political liberals.
I. FROM POVERTY TO ABORnON
Long, long ago in a galaxy far, far away, expanding the rights of poor
people was a central goal of liberal constitutional theory. Young law professors
achieved academic stardom by publishing, in the most prestigious law reviews,
arguments justifying judicial protection of welfare rights. Two articles proved
particularly influential: Charles Reich's, The New Property,45 and Frank
Michelman's, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment.46 Reich's essay maintains that the liberal aspirations of American
constitutionalism can be realized under modem economic conditions only if
39 See infra notes 368-72 and accompanying text.
40 See HiRscH, supra note 26, at 4.4 1 See, e.g., SormIos A. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CoNsrrtfmoN MEANs 7 (1984)
(stating that his proposals and positions are closer to Justice Marshall's position).42 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539
(1988) (exploring the implications of Republicanism for modem public law).
43 For an example of Sandel's views, see MICIAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY's
DiscoNTENT (1996).
44 For examples of their views, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
(1977); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985).
4 5 Reich, New Property, supra note 19.
46 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969).
[Vol. 58:731
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welfare beneficiaries enjoy the constitutional rights traditionally associated with
more conventional forms of property. "The grant, denial, revocation, and
administration of all types of government largess," he insisted, "should be
subject to scrupulous observance of fair procedures" as those procedures are
defined by the safeguards of the Bill of Rights. 47 Reich argued that the
government was constitutionally obligated to provide the services impecunious
citizens needed to survive. He maintained that those forms of "largess" which
are closely linked to status must be deemed to be held as of right, and that
"[t]he concept of right," in his view, "is most urgently needed with respect to
benefits like unemployment compensation, public assistance, and old age
benefits. "48
Michelman's effort to "elaborat[e] [the] constitutional rights pertaining to
the status of being poor" focused more explicitly on state obligations to provide
various necessities to needy individuals. 49 All persons, his writings proclaim,
have a constitutional right to "minimum protection against economic hazard." 50
As spelled out in later articles, Michelman interpreted "minimum protection" as
requiring "constitutional rights to provision for certain basic ingredients of
individual welfare, such as food, shelter, health care, and education." 51
Other influential essays similarly attempted to "transform the widely held
notion of welfare as a privilege into a right." 52 Edward Sparer, "the welfare
law guru," 53 led the call for constitutional scholarship that would interpret "the
equal protection clause ... [as] impos[ing] a governmental obligation to sustain
the lives of those who would otherwise perish."'54 Jacobus tenBroek, Thomas
47 Reich, New Property, supra note 19, at 783.
48 Id. at 785.
49 Michelman, supra note 46, at 16. For other parts of this doctrinal project, see Frank
I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WAsH. U. L.Q. 659
(1979) [hereinafter Michelman, Welfare Rights] (defending his welfare rights thesis against
various criticisms); Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due
Process, in DUE PROCESS: NOMOS XVIII 126 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman
eds., 1977); Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of
Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 962 (1973) [hereinafter Michelman, Pursuit].
50 Michelman, supra note 46, at 13.
51 Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 49, at 659.
5 2 JACK GREENBERG, LITIGATION FOR SOCIAL CHANGE 25 (1974).
53 MARTHA F. DAviS, BRTrrAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, 1960-1973, at 22 (1993).
54 Edward V. Sparer, The Right to Welfare, in THE RIGHTs OF AMERIcANS 91 (Norman
Dorsen ed., 1971) [hereinafter Sparer, Right]; see also Edward V. Sparer, The Role of the
Welfare Client's Lawyer, 12 UCLA L. REv. 361, 362-66 (1965) [hereinafter Sparer, Role]
(analyzing the implications of characterizing welfare benefits as either a right or a charity);
DAvis, supra note 53, at 37 (discussing Sparer's views on welfare benefits).
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Grey, and the young Laurence Tribe were among the prominent law professors
who answered by urging federal courts to require state governments to provide
basic services to poor people.55 Tribe, in 1977, for example, called on the
federal judiciary to recognize "constitutional rights to... the basic human
needs of physical survival and security, health and housing, employment and
education." 56 As late as 1986, Charles Black declared that he would spend the
rest of his life "arguing ... the case for the proposition that a constitutional
justice of livelihood should be recognized." 57
Prominent liberal organizations dedicated themselves to fighting for these
constitutional rights.58 As Susan Lawrence and Martha Davis ably document,
the Legal Services Organization and Sparer's Center on Social Welfare Policy
were able, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, to place the rights of poor
people on the agenda of the Supreme Court and win several important
victories.59 The 1968 Biennial Conference of the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) demanded that the federal government guarantee poor people a
minimum income. 60 Various rights of poor people were discussed at length in
the ACLU's 1971 anthology, The Rights of Americans.61 Litigation campaigns
5 5 See JACOBUS TENBROEK, FAMILY LAw AND THE POOR: ESSAYS BY JACOBUS
TENBROEK (Joel F. Handler ed., 1971); Thomas C. Grey, Procedural Fairness and
Substantive Rights, in DUE PROCESS: NOMOS XVIII, supra note 49, at 182; Laurence H.
Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to
Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1977); see also Kenneth L. Karst,
Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1, 62
(1977); Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection,
and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969) (suggesting increased judicial concern with
the housing rights of the poor).
56 Tribe, supra note 55, at 1066.
57 Charles L. Black, Jr., Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1113 (1986) [hereinafter Black, Jr., Reflections]; see also
CHRLS. L. BLACK, JR., A NEw BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND
UNNAMED 131-39 (1997) (defending constitutional welfare rights).
58 The original goals and strategies of the legal movement for welfare rights are clearly
set out in Edward V. Sparer, Social Welfare Law Testing, PRAC. LAw., Apr. 1966, at 13.
59 See DAVIS, supra note 53 (describing the efforts of the Center on Social Welfare
Policy and Law to argue welfare rights cases before the Supreme Court); SUSAN E.
LAWRENCE, THM POOR IN COURT 8-9 (1990); see also GREENBERG, supra note 52, at 23-31
(describing strategies of the Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law for getting welfare
rights cases before the Supreme Court).
6 0 See SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE
ACLU 313 (1990); see also Norman Dorsen, Introduction to THm RIG=S OF AMERICANS,
supra note 54, at xiii-xvi.
61 See Frank I. Michelman, The Right to Housing, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, supra
note 54, at 43-64; Sparer, Right, supra note 54, at 65-93; Leonard B. Boudin, The Right to
[Vol. 58:731
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for welfare rights were one of five case studies that Jack Greenberg, then
director of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, thought to be of sufficient
importance to detail in his casebook, Judicial Process and Social Change.62
Today, the place of pride in liberal constitutional thought is occupied by
abortion, an issue of far less importance than welfare to mainstream liberal
lawyers during the 1960s and the first years of the 1970s.63 Hardly a month
goes by during the 1990s without some "new" defense of abortion coming out
in a law review.6a New books providing alternative grounds for Roe clutter
bookshelves and bookstores. 65 Most significantly for present purposes, abortion
and privacy rights play prominent roles in grand constitutional theory, the
central enterprise of the contemporary legal academy. As Michael Perry notes,
"Roe v. Wade has been the principal text (or subtext) of constitutional theory
Travel, in THE RIGHTS OF AMEICANS, supra note 54, at 381-98.
62 JACK GREENBERG, CASES AND MATERimAlS ON JUDICIAL PROCESS AND SOCIAL
CHANGE: CONSTrrUTONAL ITIGATION 237-326 (1977).
63 Abortion rights were barely mentioned in Greenberg's casebook, see id. at 400, and
only briefly defended in the ACLU's 1971 anthology, The Rights of Americans, see Charles
Lister, The Right to Control the Use of One's Body, in THE RIGHIS OF AMERICANS, supra
note 54, at 358-62. The chapters in The Rights of Americans devoted to gender and privacy
rights do not discuss abortion. See Kent Greenawalt, The Right of Privacy, in THE RiGmS OF
AMERICANS, supra note 54, at 299-325; Pauli Murray, The Rights of Women, in THE RIGHTS
OF AMERICANS, supra note 54, at 521-23.
64 For some recent examples, see Erin Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty,
Equality, and the New Rhetoric of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 77
(1995) (arguing that equal protection arguments should be integrated into the existing due
process framework as a means of approaching the abortion debate); Robert D. Goldstein,
Reading Casey: Structuring the Woman's Decisionmaking Process, 4 WM. & MARY BILL OF
RTS. J. 787 (1996) (analyzing the limits that Casey places on a state's ability to regulate
abortion); Julia E. Hanigsberg, Homologizing Pregnancy and Motherhood: A Consideration
ofAbortion, 94 MICH. L. REV. 371 (1995) (discussing how neither side of the abortion debate
adequately addresses the fundamental concerns of the opposing side); Donald P. Judges,
Taking Care Seriously: Relational Feminism, Sexual Difference, and Abortion, 73 N.C. L.
REv. 1323 (1995) (discussing the concept of relational feminism and the support it provides
for abortion rights); Susan E. Looper-Friedman, "Keep your laws off my body". Abortion.
Regulation and the Takings Clause, 29 NEw ENG. L. REv. 253, 257 (1995) (arguing that
"there is a property interest in the human body and that abortion restrictions may result in
unconstitutional takings of such property"). For a rare piece that combines a defense of
abortion with a defense of welfare rights, see Susan Frelich Appleton, Standards for
Constitutional Review of Privacy-Invading Welfare Reforms: Distinguishing the Abortion-
Funding Cases and Redeeming the Undue-Burden Test, 49 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1996).
65 For recent examples, see GRABER, supra note 36; EILEEN L. MCDONAGH, BREAKING
THE ABORTION DEADLOCK: FROM CHOICE TO CONSENT (1996); KATHY RuDY, BEYOND PRo-
LIFE AND PRO-CHOICE: MORAL DIVERSITY IN THE ABORTION DEBATE (1996).
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for the last twenty years." 66
With the clear exception of John Hart Ely, and the possible exception of
Perry,67 liberal grand constitutional theorists spend much energy demonstrating
that Roe has strong constitutional foundations. Cass Sunstein derives abortion
rights from the general constitutional ban on legislation that "turn[s] morally
irrelevant characteristics-most conspicuously race and sex-into systemic
sources of social disadvantage." 68 Dworkin derives abortion rights from the
general principle that "government treat everyone subject to its dominion with
equal concern and respect." 69 Tribe offers a third variation on these egalitarian
themes. "Laws restricting access to abortion," he claims, "place a real and
substantial burden on women's ability to participate in society as equals." 70
Prominent liberal theorists think that the result in Roe should be obvious to any
intelligent American constitutionalist. "The right of procreative autonomy,"
Dworkin writes, "follows from any competent interpretation of the due process
clause and of the Supreme Court's past decisions applying it." 71
Welfare rights, by comparison, play very little role in grand constitutional
theory. 72 The major works of that genre do not discuss the rights of poor
people at length. Many do not even mention such cases as San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez73 or Goldberg v. Kelly.74 Although
liberal constitutional theorists proclaim their support for more egalitarian
economic policies, influential works suggest that significant institutional and
constitutional limits exist on the judicial capacity to facilitate such policies.
Sunstein proclaims that courts should protect abortion rights in order to prevent
"morally irrelevant characteristics" from becoming "systemic sources of
66 PERRY, supra note 26, at 180; see DWORKIN, supra note 33, at 41
("[A]bortion ... has dominated constitutional argument... for decades.").
67 See PERRY, supra note 26.
68 SUNSrmN, supra note 26, at 258.
69 DwoRKIN, supra note 33, at 73.
70 TRiE., supra note 25, at 105. More recently, Tribe and Michael Doff have derived
privacy rights from "a fundamental right of individuals to structure their family interactions as
they see fit." TRIBE& DoRF, supra note 33, at 52.
71 DWORKIN, supra note 25, at 160; see also id. at 168 ("[Any competent interpretation
of the Constitution must recognize a principle of procreative autonomy .... ."); see also
GRA R, supra note 36, at 123-24, 130-31.
72 See Mark Tushnet, The Bricoleur at the Center, 60 U. Cm. L. REv. 1071, 1074-75
(1993) (noting that contemporary liberal constitutional theorists are abandoning a
"traditionally 'left' position" which "focused importantly on the reduction in severe disparities
in material well-being"(emphasis omitted)).
73 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
74 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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disadvantage." 75 He maintains, however, that courts can do little when
legislation in effect turns poverty, presumably a morally irrelevant
characteristic,76 into a systemic source of social disadvantage.77 Tribe
(implicitly recanting his 1977 defense of welfare rights)78 and Dworkin
explicitly assert that the Constitution does not protect welfare rights. "[It is
quite impossible to read our Constitution," Tribe and Doff recently declared,
"as including... provision[s] guaranteeing decent housing and employment
for every person. "79 Although Dworkin "defend[s] a theory of economic justice
that would require substantial redistribution of wealth in rich political societies,"
he "insist[s] that integrity would bar any attempt to argue from the abstract
moral clauses of the Bill of Rights, or from any other part of the Constitution,
to any such result."80 Lest the reader be unclear as to the target of Dworkin's
scorn, he specifically cites Michelman's Harvard Law Review article, On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment,81 as an example of a
defense of poverty rights that, in Dworkin's view, violates constitutional
integrity. 82
Liberal law professors do fight hard for the rights of the poor. Law school
clinics attract many students committed to helping the less fortunate, and the
adventures of legal clinicians fill up the law reviews. 83 A recent essay
75 SuNmr, supra note 26, at 259.
76 See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-85 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring)
("The mere state of being without funds is a neutral fact-constitutionally an irrelevance, like
race, creed, or color.").
77 See SUNTMEN, supra note 26, at 138-40 (suggesting that "the role of courts... will
be limited" in realizing such constitutional concerns as "freedom from desperate conditions,"
"opposition to caste systems," and "rough equality of opportunity"). For similar concerns,
see ELY, THEORY, supra note 26, at 162 (noting that because laws disadvantaging poor
people can typically be justified using "constitutionally innocent terms," courts will not be
able to protect welfare rights).
78 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
79 TRME & DoRpF, supra note 33, at 16.
80 Dwow, supra note 33, at 36; see also RONALD DwoRmN, LAw's EMPIRE 382
(1986) [hereinafter DwoiN, EwmE] ("The Constitution cannot seriously be read as
demanding that the nation and every state follow a utilitarian or libertarian or resource-
egalitarian or any other particular conception of equality... for pursuing the general
welfare.-).
81 Michelman, supra note 46.
82 DwoRKIN, supra note 33, at 36, 351 n.26.
83 For a sampling of the literature, see Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Deconstructing
Reconstnctive Poverty Law: A Practice-Based Critique of the Storytelling Aspects of the
Theoretics of Practice Movement, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 889 (1995); Anthony V. Alfieri,
Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YAIE LJ.
2107 (1991).
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comments that "legal scholars have shown renewed interest in the theory and
practice of poverty law." 84 Even an article defending the constitutional rights of
the poor appears occasionally.8 5 Most importantly, even those liberal
constitutional theorists who do not think that the Supreme Court should promote
greater economic equality maintain that such policies ought to be promoted by
the legislature.8 6 No liberal law professor explicitly or implicitly defends
President Clinton's decision to sign the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.
Still, the status of poverty rights in legal scholarship has changed
dramatically during the past thirty years. Poverty law may be a hot topic in the
law reviews, but the articles' primary concern is "the relationship between
poverty lawyers and their clients," 87 not the constitutional rights of the poor.
An occasional article calling for the judiciary to protect constitutional rights to
welfare does appear, but those articles are no longer at the cutting edge of legal
scholarship. The most prestigious enterprise in the contemporary legal academy
is grand constitutional theory, and the rights of the poor play almost no role in
that undertaking. In liberal grand constitutional theory, abortion or privacy is
typically thought to be the paradigmatic constitutional right that the judiciary
must protect. Rights to livelihood are mentioned, if mentioned at all, as either
the paradigmatic constitutional right that courts should not protect or the
paradigmatic just policy that is not constitutionally mandated.
II. ABORTION AND WELFARE IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT
Three considerations may explain why liberal constitutional theorists
presently work harder to secure abortion rights than welfare rights:
constitutional norms, strategic concerns, and moral values. Liberal
constitutional theorists may make greater efforts to defend abortion rights than
welfare rights because they believe that abortion rights have stronger
constitutional foundations than welfare rights. Alternatively, liberal law
professors may vigorously defend the result in Roe88 while muting their
criticisms of the result in Dandridge89 (and related cases)90 because they believe
84 Matthew Diller, Poverty Lawyering in the Golden Age, 93 MtcH. L. REV. 1401,
1402 (1995).
85 See, e.g., Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U.
PA. L. REv. 1277 (1993); Appleton, supra note 64 (advocating constitutional challenges to
privacy-invading welfare reforms).86 See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
87 Diller, supra note 84, at 1402; see also supra note 83.
88 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
89 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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liberals are more likely to persuade the present federal judiciary to reaffirm
precedent protecting abortion rights than to overrule precedent rejecting welfare
rights. Finally, the public priorities of Dworkin, Tribe, and other pro-choice
constitutionalists may reflect their belief that persons have a fundamental human
right to terminate a pregnancy but no fundamental human right to be provided
with those basic necessities that they cannot otherwise secure for themselves.
These constitutional, strategic, and moral explanations of liberal practice
are not mutually exclusive. Constitutional theorists may not believe that "the
Constitution is what the justices say it is,"91 but most legal commentators
regard doctrinal arguments based on past precedent as one legitimate method of
interpreting that text.92 "The elaboration of constitutional values," Tribe
insists, "proceeds mostly from prior decisions." 93 Dworkin similarly maintains
that judges must "always try to connect the justification [they] provide[ ] for an
original decision with decisions that other judges or officials have taken in the
past." 94 Liberals who believe that past precedent constrain present constitutional
choices may therefore use recent judicial practice in abortion and welfare cases
both to predict what rights the Supreme Court will protect and to evaluate what
rights the Supreme Court should protect.
Liberal constitutional theorists also insist that moral values should influence
constitutional interpretation. Dworkin and Tribe vigorously maintain a
distinction between constitutionality and justice,95 but each insists that
90 See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
91 CHARLEs EvANs HUGHES, Speech Before the Elmira Chamber of Commerce,
ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF CHARLES EvANS HUGHES, GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK, 1906-08,
at 139 (1980).
92 See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBriT, CONSiTrtrONAL FAT 39-58 (1982) (describing the
approach of deriving principles from precedent or from judicial or academic commentary on
precedent).
93 TRmE & DORF, supra note 33, at 71.
94 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 112 (1978) [hereinafter DwonmsN,
TAKCNG RIGHrs]; see also id. at 110-15 (describing the use of precedent in judicial
decisionmaking); DwoRiN, EMPIRE, supra note 80, at 225-75 (1986) (arguing that legal
claims are interpretive judgments that combine both precedential and forward-looking
elements); DwORKin, supra note 33, at 199 (noting that, in the context of the First
Amendment, "[c]ontemporary lawyers and judges must try to find a political
justification... that fits most past constitutional practice, including past decisions of the
Supreme Court").
95 See TRmE & DORF, supra note 33, at 14-16; DwomaN, supra note 33, at 10-11; see
also SUNMEN, supra note 26, at 7-8 (noting that the Constitution should not mean whatever
a judge thinks it ought to mean); James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive
Constitution, 72 TEx. L. REV. 211, 218, 280, 290, 302 (1993) (positing a theory of
constitutional interpretation that is distinct from a "theory of constructing a perfectly just
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constitutional decisions inevitably require value choices. Dworkin "encourages
lawyers and judges to read an abstract constitution in light of what they take to
be justice." 96 Although Tribe is somewhat more restrained, 97 he agrees that
"[c]onstitutional value choices cannot be made... without recourse to a system
of values that is at least partly external to the constitutional text. "98 Thus, within
liberal theory, arguments demonstrating that some abortion or welfare policy is
just may be used to explain why that policy is constitutionally mandated.
Dworkin concludes that it is "unlikely that anyone who believes that free and
equal citizens would be guaranteed a particular individual right will not also
think our Constitution already contains that right, unless constitutional history
has decisively rejected it. "99
Unfortunately, no liberal constitutional theorist explains at any length why
constitutional history has decisively rejected the right to livelihood but not the
right to terminate a pregnancy.100 Without giving any reason for his conclusion,
Dworkin flatly asserts that no constitutional right to welfare exists. 101 Tribe's
recent discussions of the constitutional rights of poor people briefly observe that
the Constitution is "not [an] altogether egalitarian document," 102 point out that
Constitution").
96 DwoRKIN, supra note 33, at 37; see also id. at 2-4, 319 (advocating a moral reading
of the Constitution).
97 See TRiBE & DoRP, supra note 33, at 17 (explicitly advocating a theory of
interpretation less sweeping than Dworkin's).98 Id. at 67. For similar views, see SUNsTmN, supra note 26, at 8 (noting that even
though interpretation of the Constitution is not value-neutral, it is not subjective); Erwin
Chemerinski, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REv. 43, 47, 90, 95-104
(1989) (arguing that judicial value choices are both desirable and inevitable in deciding
constitutional issues).
99 DwoRKN, supra note 33, at 73. Dworkin added, "any moral right as fundamental as
the right of procreative autonomy is very likely to have a safe home in the Constitution's
text." Id. at 104.
100 Several commentators have sought to explain in political rather than jurisprudential
terms why the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have offered more protection for abortion than
welfare rights. See Mark Tushnet, "... And Only Wealth Will Buy You Justice"-Some
Notes on the Supreme Court. 1972 Term, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 177 (1974) (arguing that a
majority of the Court during the 1972 term was only willing to find constitutional violations
when people like themselves would be benefitted); Martin Shapiro, Fathers and Sons: The
Court, the Commentators, and the Search for Values, in Tim BURGER COURT: THE
COuNTER-REVOLUTMON THAT WASN'T 218-33 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1993) (discussing how
social and political factors influenced the Warren and Burger Courts). Such explanations will
be discussed below. See infra notes 393-97 and accompanying text.
101 See DwomiN, supra note 33, at 36.
102 LAuREcE H. TRmE, AmRCAN CoNSITETONAL LAw 1672 (2d ed. 1988).
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the Constitution clearly recognizes some private property rights, 103 and note a
constitutional "tilt against redistribution. " 104 Nowhere does Tribe explain why
the Constitution's commitment to a market economy' 05 compels constitutional
commentators or authorities to reject all constitutional welfare rights. A not
altogether egalitarian document that recognizes private property and tilts
against redistribution might nevertheless guarantee all persons a right to a bare
minimum, while forbidding government programs that directly reduce wealth
inequalities more substantially. Moreover, Tribe never explains why the same
not altogether egalitarian document that fails to protect welfare rights is
sufficiently egalitarian to guarantee women the procreative rights necessary for
them to compete as equals in the workplace. Tribe's readers may also wonder
why what seems to be a not altogether libertarian document 06 nevertheless
protects the privacy rights of homosexuals.' 07
These current liberal priorities do not follow from the general approaches
that liberal constitutional theorists take when interpreting the Constitution. The
broad constitutional principles that liberals use to derive the right to terminate a
pregnancy are used by social democrats to derive rights to livelihood.
Assertions that the Constitution requires that "government treat everyone
subject to its dominion with equal concern and respect,"1 08 for example, do not
explain why liberal law professors spend so much energy defending Roe and so
little energy criticizing Rodriguez or Dandridge.109 The central historical
weaknesses of the constitutional case for the right to livelihood correspond to
the central historical weaknesses of the constitutional case for the right to
terminate a pregnancy. Rights to a survival income may lack strong roots in the
specific words of the constitutional text and in the specific intentions of the
persons responsible for the Constitution, 110 but abortion rights have no stronger
roots in the specific words of the constitutional text or in the specific intentions
103 See TRm& DoP.F, supra note 33, at 22, 70, 77, 110.
104 LAURENcE H. TRiBE, CONsrrmONAL CHOICES 165 (1985).105 See Stephen L. Elldn, Madison and After: The American Model of Political
Constitution, 44 PoL. STUD. 592, 592-93 (1996) (noting that Americans, through their
Constitution, have left control of productive assets in the hands of the private person).106 The Federalist Papers, in particular, places much more emphasis on empowering
government than on protecting individual liberties. See THE FEDERALST No. 23, at 153-57
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); id. No. 84, at 512-14; see also What the
Anti-Federalists Were For, in 1 TiE COMPLET ANn-FEDERALsT 71 (Herbert J. Storing ed.,
1981); Elkin, supra note 105, at 592.
107 See TRIBE& DoRF, supra note 33, at 116-17.
108 DwoluIN, supra note 33, at 73; see also id. at 75 ("The Constitution guarantees the
rights required by the best conceptions of the political [ideal] of equal concern.").109 See infra notes 137-202 and accompanying text.
110 See infra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
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of the persons responsible for the Constitution."'
The constitutional priorities of contemporary liberal constitutionalists are
best explained by contemporary political and legal trends. Liberal constitutional
theorists may not believe that abortion rights are constitutionally or morally
more fundamental than welfare rights, but crucial federal judges and their
political sponsors apparently do.112 The Burger and Rehnquist Courts have
demonstrated far more solicitude for abortion rights than for welfare rights. n3
Politically influential senators and interest groups are far more eager to ensure
that new judicial appointments will be pro-Roe than anti-Dandridge. Writing in
this political and legal environment, liberal constitutional theorists committed
both to precedent and to securing favorable rulings may see themselves as
forced to incorporate into their theories the constitutional preferences of Justices
Powell, Kennedy, and O'Connor. Thus, because federal courts in the late
twentieth century have afforded and will afford more protection for abortion
than welfare rights, significant doctrinal and strategic considerations seem to
have compelled liberal constitutional theorists to adjust their theories to
accommodate those troubling priorities.
A. The Constitutional Status of Welfare and Abortion Rights Before
Dandridge and Roe
For over one hundred and fifty years, Americans found neither abortion
nor welfare rights in their Constitution. This failure was probably less a
consequence of any constitutional constraint than the result of there being no
prominent political movement during the nineteenth or early twentieth centuries
dedicated to either legal abortion or the right to be provided by the government
with certain basic necessities. Influential American politicians and lawyers have
always devised ingenious arguments purporting to demonstrate that the
Constitution, properly interpreted, supports their preferred policies. This
interpretive phenomenon explains why students of public law are professionally
obligated at some point in their career to publish an article that quotes Alexis de
Tocqueville's aphorism that "[s]carcely any political question arises in the
United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question."" 4
111 See infra notes 117, 120 and accompanying text.
112 See infra notes 303-06 and accompanying text.
113 See infra notes 282-85 and accompanying text.
1141 ALEXIS DE TocQuEvuIE, DEMocRAcY IN AMERICA 280 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
1945). Even such matters as whether Congress was authorized to pass a protective tariff,
which never became a judicial question, were resolved into a constitutional question. See 1
WILLIAM W. FREEHiNG, THE RoAD TO DmsUNION: SECESSiONISTS AT BAY, 1776-1854, at
275 (1990); DANmL FEL , THE PUBIC LANDS IN JACKSONIN POLmCS 64, 89, 140, 161
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Given the relative ease with which nineteenth century proponents of slavery and
abolitionism found constitutional sanction for their preferred policies, 115 little
reason exists for doubting that a nineteenth century pro-choice or welfare rights
movement would have reached the conclusion that the antebellum Constitution
guaranteed legal abortion or the right to a survival income.
Americans could easily overlook the possible existence of reproductive or
livelihood rights because neither abortion nor welfare is specifically mentioned
in the constitutional text or was a clear concern of the constitutional Framers.
Not surprisingly, persons who claim to be strict textualists or strict
originalists"1 6 maintain that no constitutional rights to abortion or welfare exist.
"Mhe Constitution," Justice Scalia asserted, "says absolutely nothing about
[abortion], and.., the longstanding traditions of American society have
permitted [abortion] to be legally proscribed."" 7 Henry Monaghan maintains
that "[t]he relevant history simply cannot be read to support a claim that the
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to require affirmative state responses to
private claims to governmental services." 118 Liberal constitutionalists concede
this point. "The framers," Peter Edelman admits, "surely did not contemplate
any constitutional right to any degree of redistribution, however modest." 119
Tribe recognizes that "[t]he word 'privacy' is not in the text of the
(1984) (discussing how many southerners, who were opposed to the tariff, declared it
unconstitutional).
115 See, e.g., SALMON PORTLAND CHASE & CHARLES DEXrER CLEVELAND, An-
SLAvERY ADDRESSES OF 1844 AND 1845, at 99 (1867) (promoting the Constitution as
antislavery, they declared, "[a]gainst this influence, against these infractions of the
Constitution... we solemnly protest."(emphasis in original)); 4 JOHN C. CALHOUN, THE
WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 343-48 (Richard K. Cralle ed., 1861) (promoting the
Constitution as proslavery).
116 What strict textualism and strict originalism entail is contestable. Liberal
constitutional theorists reject claims that a strict originalist or a strict textualist would regard
as constitutional only those particular rights specifically mentioned by name in the
Constitution or specifically on the minds of the Framers when the Constitution was ratified.
See DwoRKiN, supra note 25, at 136-38. Still, liberal constitutional theorists do not label
themselves as strict textualists.
117 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEM, G OF AMERuCA 111-16
(1990).
118 Henry Paul Monaghan, The Consatution Goes to Harvard, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 117, 128 (1978); see Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal
Protection Clause, 1972 SuP. Cr. REv. 41, 86-89 (1973); Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility
of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 695, 695-98 (1979).
119 Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to
the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 5 (1987).
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Constitution," 120 and that no tradition exists "protecting the particular right to
choose an abortion."' 2 '
Still, originalists' obsessions with specific constitutional phrases and the
precise intentions of the Framers do not trouble liberal constitutional theorists.
They categorically reject assertions that all constitutional claims must be
explicitly grounded in the constitutional text or history. That "the right to a
decent livelihood... is not named in the Constitution," Charles Black
confidently declares, "is not even close to dispositive of the question whether
such a right can validly be derived in the American system." 122 Justice William
Brennan similarly condemned those who "requir[e] specific approval from
history before protecting anything in the name of liberty.' 2 3
Following Dworkin's pathbreaking discussion in Taking Rights Seriously,
proponents of abortion and welfare rights believe that contemporary jurists
should respect the general concepts of the Framers, but not their specific
conceptions.' 24 The Eighth Amendment in liberal constitutional theory, for
example, forbids all cruel and unusual punishments, and not just those
punishments that the persons responsible for the Constitution thought were cruel
and unusual. 125 Being a contentious lot, liberal constitutional theorists dispute
how general constitutional principles should be and what constitutional
principles are best. Tribe and Doff complain that Dworkin defines
constitutional principles too abstractly 126 and that Bruce Ackerman fails to
sufficiently respect the written constitutional text.127 Cass Sunstein thinks Tribe
120 TRiBE, supra note 25, at 83.
121 Id. at 100.
122 Black, Jr., Reflections, supra note 57, at 1108; see id. at 1111; Michelman, Welfare
Rights, supra note 49, at 679-80 (discussing the basic similarities between the opposite
definitions of protected rights).
123 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1992) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see
Frank I. Michelman, Super Liberal: Romance, Community and Tradition in William J.
Brennan, Jr. 's Constitutional Thought, 77 VA. L. REv. 1261, 1316-20 (1991) (discussing the
division between Justice Scalia writing for the majority and Justice Brennan writing in dissent
in Michael H. over the concept of tradition).
124 See DwoRmN, TAKNG RIGs, supra note 94, at 133-36; TRmE & DoRF, supra
note 33, at 110 ("The Framers of our Constitution understood that this is not a perfect world,
and thus, like it or not, judges must squarely face the task of deciding how to define our
liberties abstractly."); Edelman, supra note 119, at 4 n.9.
125 See DWORXN, supra note 25, at 135-36.
126 See TRIBE & DORF, supra note 33, at 17 ("[T]he enterprise that we are or should be
about when we advance an argument in the Constitution's name must be more bounded than
Dworkin's enterprise.").
127 See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-
Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1223 (1995).
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and Dorf's proposals are too formalistic, 128 and that Dworkin shows insufficient
respect for elected officials. 129 James Fleming maintains that Cass Sunstein's
emphasis on deliberative democracy "gives remarkably little attention to
substantive liberties such as privacy and autonomy."'130 Nevertheless, Dworkin,
Tribe, and other liberal constitutionalists agree that constitutional provisions
should be understood as incorporating general principles and not specific
practices, particularly when the constitutional provision in question speaks in
general language. 131
Liberal constitutional theorists do believe that history is relevant to
constitutional analysis. 132 What they reject is Justice Scalia's claim that courts
may look only "to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition
protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified."1 33
Instead, liberal constitutional theorists think courts must first identify "an
interest that has historically received [judicial] attention and protection," and
then determine "whether the specific [claim] under consideration is close
enough to the interests that [courts] already have protected to be deemed an
aspect of 'liberty' as well." 134 History should "inform the meaning of the text,"
Sunstein writes, "especially if the pertinent constitutional goals can be described
at a relatively high level of generality." 135 Thus, Tribe and other liberals think
that because courts have traditionally protected the parent-child relationship, an
adulterous father might have a constitutional right to visit his child even though
the child's mother was married to another person when the child was conceived
and born. 136
128 See SUNS=EI, supra note 26, at 105-06 (arguing that Tribe and Dorfs analysis of
the Constitution's structure could work against their goal as well as work toward it, because
their inquiry does not take sufficient account of discretion that is involved in making
inferences from the Constitution).
129 See Cass R. Sunstein, Earl Warren is Dead, THE NEw REPUBUC, May 13, 1996, at
35.
130 Fleming, supra note 95, at 217.
131 See Dworkin, supra note 25, at 135-36 (arguing that if the Framers had intended to
codify their own convictions about the abstract ideas included in the Constitution, then they
would have done so); DwowauN, supra note 33, at 110.
132 See, e.g., SUNsrw, supra note 26, at 120 ("[A]ny conception of constitutional
meaning should make our history relevant.").
133 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128 n.6 (1989).
134 Id. at 139, 142 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see TRIE & DORF, supra note 33, at 102-
12; DWORMN, EMiRE, supra note 80, at 46-53, 361-63.
135 SUNSTEIN, supra note 26, at 121.
136 See TRIBE & DORF, supra note 33, at 111; Michael H., 491 U.S. at 136 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
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1. General Principles
General principles do not explain the different status of abortion and
welfare in liberal constitutional theory. The same general principles that liberals
maintain justify abortion rights are commonly employed to justify welfare
rights. Numerous liberal philosophers derive rights to basic necessities from the
same governmental obligation to "treat everyone subject to its dominion with
equal concern and respect" that Dworkin uses to derive abortion rights.137 John
Rawls claims that "citizens... viewing one another as free and equal" 138
would adopt "measures assuring all citizens... adequate all-purpose means to
make intelligent and effective use of their liberties and opportunities."1 39 These
means, he emphasizes, include "[a] decent distribution of wealth," "[s]ociety as
employer of last resort," and "[b]asic health care assured all citizens." 140
Michael Walzer, a more communitarian political liberal than Rawls, insists that
the principles "underlying equality of membership" entail that "every political
community must attend to the needs of its members as they collectively
understand those needs." 141 In the United States, Walzer believes, political
equality requires that "the market... [be] pre-empted by the welfare state." 142
Government in societies committed to our understanding of equal citizenship,
he declares, must guarantee all citizens adequate legal, medical, and educational
services. In Walzer's view, these "needed goods cannot be left to the whim, or
distributed in the interest, of some powerful group of owners or
practitioners. "143 Prominent liberal philosophers fear that a society marked by
gross disparities of wealth will develop Jim Crow-like institutions based on
wealth as "the affluent evacuate public spaces, retreating to privatized
communities defined largely by income level." 144 Michael Sandel points out
that, in addition to violating individual rights to welfare, policies that result in
"severe inequality undermine[ ] freedom by corrupting the character of both
137 DWORIUN, supra note 33, at 73.
138 JoHN RAWLS, PorICAL LIBEZAISM xliv (1996).
139 Id. at xlviii.
14 0 Id. at lix. Cf. Michelman, supra note 46, at 14-15 (using Rawls to derive a
constitutional right to basic necessities). Dworldn in 1977 urged constitutional theorists to
consider how Rawls's work might be incorporated into their arguments. See DwoRKiN,
TAKING RiGHTs, supra note 94, at 150-83.
141 MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JusncE: A DE-_NsE OF PLuRIAUSM AND EQUAI.rY
84 (1983).
142 Id. at 89.
14 3 Id. See generally Edelman, supra note 119, at 19-23 (noting the different ways in
which liberal moral philosophers justify subsistence rights).
144 SANDEL, supra note 43, at 331.
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rich and poor and destroying the commonality necessary to self-
government."1 45
Rights to basic necessities may also be derived from the general principles
that many feminists use when they defend abortion rights. Just as "[l]aws
restricting access to abortion thereby place a real and substantial burden on
women's ability to participate in society as equals,"' 146 policies that restrict
access to adequate food, shelter, medical care, and job opportunities place an
even greater burden on the ability of poor people to participate in society as
equals. Kenneth Karst's influential discussion, Equal Citizenship Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, relies on this egalitarian principle, calling "for judicial
intervention when economic inequalities make it impossible for a person to have
'a fully human existence.'"'147 The young, in particular, need basic necessities if
they are to develop the capacities necessary to participate as equals in society.
Thomas Grey points out that "in order to have a fair start children [must] be
assured a decent minimum of food, clothing, shelter, and medical care." 148 "To
be bom poor," Mark Tushnet adds, "is to have severely restricted life chances,
to run substantially greater risks of private and public violence, to have narrow
educational options, and the like." 149 The New Jersey Supreme Court, for these
reasons, declared unconstitutional state policies which forced students living in
poor districts to attend substantially inferior schools. 150 "'[I]t appears,"' the
New Jersey Supreme Court asserted, "'that the disadvantaged children will not
be able to compete in, and contribute to, the society entered by the relatively
advantaged children. '"151
Welfare is at least as strong a candidate as abortion for meeting the
Supreme Court's test for fundamental freedoms, rights without which "neither
liberty nor justice would exist. " 152 If, as Justice Benjamin Cardozo claimed in
145 Id. at 330-33 (discussing the polarizing effects that arise from unequal economic
status).
146 TpME, supra note 25, at 105; see Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 1107-09, 1014-17 (1984); Ginsburg, Thoughts, supra
note 14, at 382-83.
147 Karst, supra note 55, at 62; see Edelman, supra note 119, at 33-34; Loffredo, supra
note 85, at 1327-28.
148 Thomas C. Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive
Justice, 28 STAN. L. REv. 877, 892 (1976).
149 Tushnet, supra note 72, at 1094.
1-0 See Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990) (Abbott II).
151 Id. at 372 (quoting Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376, 390 (N.J. 1985) (Abbott 1)); see
id. at 392-94; Michelman, supra note 46, at 58 ("[1]n a market-oriented and technological
society justice demands minimum educational assurances.").
152 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937) overrded by Baton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784 (1969).
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Palko v. Connecticut, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
protects the "freedom of thought, and speech" because free speech "is the
matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom, 1 53
then from a liberal perspective, rights to livelihood should qualify for similar
constitutional recognition. Numerous proponents of constitutional welfare rights
point out that persons who have no material resources lack the means to
exercise any constitutional freedom. Jacobus tenBroek observed that "[p]overty
entails constitutional no less than social degradation. Financial, physical, and
mental well-being," he continued, "are thus prerequisites to constitutional
rights."1 54 Poor persons are particularly vulnerable to social policies that
require them to surrender privacy and other rights in order to secure the goods
necessary for bare survival. "Welfare implies dependence, " 155 Reich and
Sparer note with respect to laws that make consent to warrantless searches the
price for receiving state aid. "And dependence," they add, "means that people
may more easily be induced to part with rights which they would ordinarily
defend.' 56 Given the importance of basic necessities to a fully human life,
some commentators conclude that welfare rights are the most important rights
persons have. Charles Black "would like to look Cardozo straight in his gentle
eyes and ask him whether the rights to freedom from gnawing hunger and from
preventable sickness may form 'the matrix, the indispensable condition, of
nearly every other form' of freedom."157
No general principles or unique institutional concerns explain why courts
should protect constitutional rights to abortion but not constitutional rights to
basic necessities. If, as Sunstein maintains, justices should strike down
legislation that "turn[s] morally irrelevant characteristics.., into systemic
sources of social disadvantage," then justices should strike down policies that
turn poverty, presumably a morally irrelevant characteristic into a systemic
source of social disadvantage.'58 Justice Jackson noted more than fifty years
ago that "[t]he mere state of being without funds is a neutral fact-
153 Id. at 326-27.
1 54 TENBROEK, supra note 55, at 211.
155 Charles A. Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YAL
L.J. 1347, 1359 (1963).156 Id. at 1359; see Sparer, Role, supra note 54, at 367; Reich, supra note 155, at 1355;
Joel F. Handler, Editor's Introduction to TENBRoEK, supra note 55, at xvii ("[U]nless the
indigent and unemployed have at least the bare minimum for existence, they are incapable of
exercising constitutional rights.") (citing Rothstein v. Wyman, 303 F. Supp. 339, 346-47
(S.D.N.Y. 1969)).
157 Black, Jr., Reflections, supra note 57, at 1110.
15 8 See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
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constitutionally an irrelevance, like race, creed or color." 159
Judicial solicitude for welfare rights follows from liberal claims that courts
should provide "special protection to those who have been deprived of their fair
share of political influence."1 6o Feminists call on courts to declare
unconstitutional bans on abortion because they believe such policies reflect the
gross underrepresentation of women in American politics.' 6 1 "[Plolitical
marginalization due to poverty," proponents of welfare rights note, "is [also] an
undemocratic phenomenon that ought to negate or at least undermine the usual
presumption of constitutionality." 162 Peter Edelman asks, "[h]ow can anyone
participate effectively in America's democratic processes... without some
minimum amount of education?" and continues, "[i]f education is fundamental
to participation in a democratic society, surely a 'bare minimum income' is at
least as fundamental." 163 "To be hungry, afflicted, ill-educated, enervated, and
demoralized by one's material circumstances of life," Michelman similarly
points out, "is... to be personally disadvantaged in competitive politics."' 64
159 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-85 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring); see
TENBROEK, supra note 55, at 212-13 (analogizing the status of the poor to that of African
Americans denounced in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and warning
that the poor could also find the American system separate but unequal); Thshnet, supra note
72, at 1093-95 (discussing whether poverty should be considered a suspect classification).
160 Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715
(1985). This democratic process theory of judicial review is rooted in the famous footnote
four of United States v. Carolene Products, which calls for "more searching judicial inquiry"
when "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities... tends.., to curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities." United States v.
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). For subsequent elaborations on that
theme, see ELY, THEORY, supra note 26, passim; Calabresi, supra note 26, at 96, 118; LouIs
LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT?: A COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME COURT'S POWER TO REVISE
Tm CONSnTUt=ON (1975); Ackerman, supra; GRABER, supra note 36, at 96-101, 114-15.
16 1 See RUTH COLKER, ABORTION & DIMLOGUE: PRO-CHOICE, PRO-LIFE AND
AMERICAN LAW xvii, 124, 161 (1992); Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion
Politics: Writing for an Audience of One, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 119, 137, 151-52 (1989);
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281,
1309, 1324, 1327-28 (1991).
162 Loffredo, supra note 85, at 1286-87; see id. at 1293, 1305, 1323-24, 1367, 1374,
1379 (discussing how the Court has ignored the different ways poor people engage in political
participation); Michelman, supra note 46, at 21-23 (noting a hostility by the 1969 Court
towards de facto "discrimination against the poor"); Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note
49, at 675; Ackerman, supra note 160, at 745.
163 Edelman, supra note 119, at 33-34.
164 Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 49, at 678; see id. at 675-78; Peter B.
Edelman, Mandated Minimum Income, Judge Posner, and the Destruction of the Rule of
Law, 55 AL. L. REv. 633, 635-36 (1992) [hereinafter Edelman, Mininuan Income];
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Social science studies document the myriad ways in which economic
inequalities get translated into political inequalities. The poor are less likely to
vote and otherwise participate in politics than other Americans. 165 Indeed,
poverty seems a greater handicap than gender in the political process. Women
occasionally win seats in the Senate and the House of Representatives, but
people on welfare lack the basic resources to run for local political offices. The
poor are particularly disadvantaged because of their inability to make large
political donations to friendly candidates. 166 No one should confuse Emily's
List with the Chamber of Commerce. Still, pro-choice political groups
contribute far more to political campaigns and, as a result, have greater
influence on elections than those organizations interested in securing basic
necessities for all citizens. 167 Given the overwhelming evidence of how
politically inefficacious poor people are, a judiciary committed to protecting the
rights of groups that lack political power would give at least as much scrutiny to
economic policies harming the poor as that given to the reproductive policies
that burden women.
a. Positive and Negative Rights?
The distinction between positive and negative rights provides the most
plausible principled grounds for liberal claims that the Constitution protects
abortion, but not welfare rights (or that judges should protect constitutional
abortion rights, but not constitutional welfare rights). Constitutional rights are
typically understood as rights to be free from hostile government interference
and not as rights to demand friendly government support. Judge Richard
Posner, a prominent libertarian, insisted that "[t]he men who wrote the Bill of
Rights were not concerned that Government might do too little for the people
but that it might do too much to them. The Fourteenth Amendment sought to
protect Americans from oppression by state government, not to secure them
basic government services. ' '168 Judges and professors who think the
Edelman, supra note 119, at 2, 34; Loffredo, supra note 85, at 1327-28.165 eeRAYMOND E. WOLFINGER & STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTs? 13-36
(1980); SIDNEY VERBA Er AL., VOICE AND EQuALrY 186-227 (1995).
166 See VERBAETAL., supra note 165, at 187-204.
167 See Elsa Brenner, The Voice of Women in Politics, N.Y. TIMs, Sept. 15, 1996,
13WC, at 1; see also'GRABER, supra note 36, at 131-32.
168 Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983); see David P. Currie,
Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CH. L. REv. 864, 890 (1986); see also
Tilden v. Hayward, No. 11297, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 140, at *43-48 (New Castle Sept. 10,
1990) (rejecting claim that state family services agency is required to assist in finding housing
for those trying to reunify their families).
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Constitution "is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties" 169 may
believe that government cannot constitutionally interfere when women seek to
terminate their pregnancies, 170 but they agree that a Constitution of negative
rights does not compel state officials to provide all citizens with basic
necessities.
Even if positive constitutional rights exist, the federal judiciary may be
authorized to protect only negative constitutional rights. Constitutional and
institutional barriers unique to welfare rights might bar judicial solicitude for the
positive constitutional rights of poor people. "The enforcement of affirmative
duties upon the Federal government," David Currie asserts, "would pose
particular problems: the executive cannot be ordered to spend money that
Congress has not appropriated, and Congress cannot be ordered to make an
appropriation.' 7 ' Currie further notes that constitutional welfare rights must be
enforced, if enforced at all, by elected officials. Courts cannot guarantee
welfare rights, in his opinion, because no judicially manageable standards exist
for determining how to implement any constitutional right to basic
necessities. 172 Remarkably, some proponents of welfare rights concede that
constitutional rights to basic necessities cannot be fully implemented by the
judiciary. Michelman believes courts are authorized to expand and restructure
existing welfare programs. 173 He confesses, however, that because of
"judicially inappropriate questions of definition or problems of
enforcement,"1 74 "minimum protection is likely to demand remedies which
cannot be directly embodied in judicial decrees. " 175
Michelman's admission of judicial incompetence in welfare cases is
surprising. Liberal constitutional theorists writing on other constitutional
subjects largely abandoned those traditional limitations on judicial remedies that
might inhibit a court from recognizing welfare rights. Courts cannot by
themselves win the war on poverty. 176 Nonetheless, the problem of developing
169 Jackson, 715 F.2d at 1203 (citation omitted).
170 See RCiCARD A. POSNER, SEx AND REASON 324-50 (1992).
171 Currie, supra note 168, at 889 n.129.
172 See id. at 889.
173 See Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 49, at 684-85.
174 Id. at 679.
175 Michelman, supra note 46, at 39; see Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 49, at
679, 684-85. Declarations of positive rights in European constitutions tend not to be judicially
enforceable. See Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U. Cm.
L. REv. 519, 527-29 (1992) (comparing the constitutional protection of welfare rights in the
United States with the constitutional provisions in other countries).
176 See Black, Jr., Reflections, supra note 57, at 1107 ("The courts probably cannot do
very much herein."); Michelman, supra note 46, at 39; Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra
note 49, at 684-85.
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judicially manageable standards in welfare cases seems no more difficult than
the problem of developing judicially manageable standards in abortion cases
and other areas of constitutional law where liberal constitutional theorists have
urged novel judicial action. Many welfare rights cases that go uncommented
upon in liberal constitutional theory only require conventional judicial remedies.
The petitioners in Shapiro177 insisted that they had a constitutional right to
receive the same welfare benefits that the state paid to established residents. The
petitioners in DandridgeI78 claimed that welfare laws should not discriminate
against large families. Determining what goods people need to survive is, of
course, more complicated than adding people to the welfare rolls. A
constitutional requirement for the provision of basic necessities, however,
would present no more judicially inappropriate questions of definition than the
present constitutional law of abortion. If courts deciding reproductive rights
cases can develop judicially manageable standards for determining when a fetus
is viable179 and when health reasons require abortions to be done in
hospitals, 8 0 then courts in welfare cases would seem to have the capacity
necessary to determine what a survival income is.181 Certainly the factors
necessary to determine basic human needs are no more intricate than the factors
progressive activists for the past thirty years have asked courts to consider when
reorganizing school systems, state hospitals, prisons, and other public
institutions. 182 Writing in 1977, Donald Horowitz observed that:
In just the past few years.... [flederal district courts have laid down elaborate
standards for food handling, hospital operations, recreation facilities, inmate
employment and education, sanitation, and laundry, painting, lighting,
plumbing, and renovation in some prisons; they have ordered other prisons
closed. Courts have established equally comprehensive programs of care and
treatment for the mentally ill confined in hospitals. They have ordered the
equalization of school expenditures on teachers' salaries, established hearing
procedures for public school discipline cases, decided that bilingual education
177 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651 (1974).
178 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
179 See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160-64
(1973).180 See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983)
overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
181 See Tushnet, supra note 72, at 1090, 1095-96; Edelman, supra note 119, at 50-52
(suggesting one way for judges to calculate a survival income).182 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.




must be provided for Mexican-American children, and suspended the use by
school boards of the National Teacher Examination and of comparable tests for
school supervisors. They have eliminated a high school diploma as a
requirement for a fireman's job. They have enjoined the construction of roads
and bridges on environmental grounds and suspended performance
requirements for automobile tires and air bags. They have told the Farmers
Home Administration to restore a disaster loan program, the Forest Service to
stop the clear-cutting of timber, and the Corps of Engineers to maintain the
nation's non-navigable waters.183
Unless liberals are prepared to recant their support for such judicial decisions
(many of which were decided on constitutional grounds), proponents of Roe
should be deemed to have constructively abandoned any claim that courts
somehow lack the competence necessary to determine the scope and nature of
the right to basic necessities.184
Liberals who claim that poor women have a judicially enforceable
constitutional right to a state funded abortion185 are not well positioned to deny
that poor women (and men) have a judicially enforceable constitutional right to
state funded basic necessities. Claims that states must pay for abortion only
because they are already paying for childbirth fail for several reasons to cordon
off abortion rights from welfare rights. Critics of Supreme Court decisions
sustaining state bans on abortion funding' 86 recognize that courts do have the
power to order a legislature to spend additional funds when expanding the
scope of an existing welfare program is necessary to vindicate constitutional
rights. Liberals spent most of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s making
constitutional claims that, when accepted, required substantial legislative
funding.187 No reason exists why welfare should be singled out as the one area
of constitutional law where, for institutional considerations, liberal constitutional
theorists must refrain from asking courts to order financing for constitutional
rights. Legislatures may not obey judicial orders to spend additional funds, but
18 3 DONALD L. HoRowrz, THE COURTS AND SociAL Poucy 4-5 (1977).
184 See generally Edelman, Minimum Income, supra note 164, at 638 ("IJ]f there is a
fundamental right to life, liberty, and property, it is not shocking to characterize the right to
receive enough income to subsist in contemporary America as a positive right.").
185 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
186 See Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that the state is not required to
provide funding for abortions, even for those that are deemed medically necessary); Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding a Connecticut regulation that requires a certificate of
medical necessity before the state will assist in paying for the abortion).
187 See HOROWrrZ, supra note 183, at 4-5 (quoted above); GREENBERG, supra note 52,
at 30 (noting that "commutative welfare rights decisions such as the man in the house,
residency and fair hearing decisions had foreseeable distributive effects").
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non-compliance is a potential problem whenever the judiciary makes any
controversial decision. 188
Any competent liberal law professor living in a welfare state will have no
difficulty finding an existing state program that can be used to justify imposing
a constitutional obligation on elected officials to insure that all citizens living in
their jurisdiction obtain at least a survival income (or certain basic necessities).
Existing welfare policies are one place to start. All states provide some
assistance to some needy people. The Equal Protection Clause may, thus, be
violated when other equally needy persons are excluded from such programs
for reasons other than their need.189 States also provide an extensive array of
welfare benefits to some affluent citizens, benefits that are typically provided on
more generous terms than the benefits provided to poorer persons. 190 Hence,
on the assumption that states will not abandon all public assistance programs
(for rich or poor people), 191 those who oppose sustaining state bans on abortion
funding should recognize that the present welfare system has created
constitutional obligations to provide basic necessities to all needy people.
More generally, following a line of argument first laid down by the legal
realist Robert Hale, liberal theorists have firmly rejected the jurisprudential
foundations underlying the distinction between positive and negative rights. "In
the post-New Deal regime," Louis Seidman and Mark Tushnet state, "the
Court can no longer talk convincingly of the distinction between [state] acts and
omissions, or of a natural and preexisting private sphere not constituted by
public decisions. '"192 States are responsible for all economic inequalities
188 See GE ALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HoLLow HOPE (1991). Many school districts did
not obey judicial bans on school prayer, even though compliance did not require any public
expenditures. See KENNETH M. DoERn & P=iU' E. HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER
DEcIsIONs (1971). Indeed, elected officials have been at least as willing to implement liberal
welfare rights decisions as other liberal judicial rulings not requiring public spending. See
infra notes 323-33 and accompanying text.
189 See United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (invalidating
federal regulations that conditioned receipt of food stamps on proof that the beneficiary
resided in household where all occupants were related); United States Dep't of Agric. v.
Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (invalidating federal regulations that excluded from the food
stamp program any household that had a member who, although 18 years or older, was
claimed as a dependent of someone not living in that household); Tribe, supra note 55, at
1080, 1084; TRmE, supra note 102, at 1646.
190 See LINDA GORDON, PUnED BUT NOT ENiTLED 2 (1994) (listing a number of state
and federal programs that could be perceived as welfare to the affluent); see TENBROEK,
supra note 55, at 3-4.
191 See Currie, supra note 168, at 882.
192 LouIs MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TuSHNEr, REMNANTS OF BETEF 68 (1996);
see id. at 26-31, 65-68; J.M. Balldn, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist
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because those inequalities are created and exacerbated in part by state policy. 193
States create jobs directly. States make policies that determine how private
parties create jobs. State monetary policies influence the value of the wages that
workers receive, and state educational policies affect the distribution of skills
necessary for success in the contemporary economic marketplace. 194 As a
result, state policies are partly responsible for unemployment,
underemployment, and other causes of poverty. As Edelman notes, "[t]he state
has helped put people in a position of being unable to find work and unable to
perform available work.' 95 Many legal realists insist that states are implicated
in any economic inequality. Reich and others maintain that "property is created
by law" and "owes its origin and continuance to laws supported by the people
as a whole." 196 "iW[ e learned long ago," the young Laurence Tribe explained,
"that, even when government 'merely' establishes and enforces rules of
contract, property, and corporate law, it is in fact acting affirmatively to bring
about a discernible social distribution of benefits and burdens."' 197 Persons who
treat economic inequality as a natural phenomenon rather than as a consequence
of state policy, Sunstein maintains, commit the deadly sin of "status quo
neutrality." 198 Hence, given that government is already acting to enrich many
citizens, a liberal interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment should, at a
minimum, require states to ensure that no one remains utterly impoverished. 199
Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DuKE L.J. 375, 415-17 (1990) (arguing that
although individuals can be accurately described to have free choice, that free choice is
bounded by the legal regime that assures its existence); SuNsEN, supra note 26, at 50-60
(discussing the judicial activism that occurred after the New Deal and how the argument for
laissez-faire failed).
193 See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State,
38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923); Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43
COLUM. L. REv. 603 (1943) (discussing how government regulations can circumscribe the
choices available for an individual to meet his economic needs).
194 See Edelman, supra note 119, at 45-48 ("[A] whole series of governmental policies
have contributed to the intensification of poverty. Governmental decisions that have shaped
the location of people in relation to those jobs are a good example.").
195 Id. at 48.
196 Reich, New Property, supra note 19, at 778; see Edelman, supra note 119, at 43-45
("Our entire system of legal rules shapes wealth and poverty in the United States."); Frank I.
Michelman, Property and the Politics of Distrust: Liberties, Fair Values, and Constitutional
Method, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 91, 98 (1992) [hereinafter, Michelman, Property]; Frank I.
Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 IOwA L.
REV. 1319, 1335 (1987); SuNSnN, supra note 26, at 3-6, 50-60, 69-71.
197 Tribe, supra note 55, at 1085; see id. at 1085-89.
198 See SuNSrTEi, supra note 26, at 70.
199 Proponents of welfare rights do not demand absolute economic equality. Rather, they
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In short, liberal constitutional theorists maintain that the distinction between
positive and negative constitutional rights is "mistaken" or "unhelpful," 20 0
particularly in a welfare state. They regard "the question of liberty [as]
inseparable from the question of distribution." 201 The central issue that welfare
rights cases present is, thus, not whether government should provide some
special benefit to the poor. Rather, because government in the late twentieth
century routinely provides a wide array of jobs, financial benefits, and other
services to most citizens, the issue is whether government may nevertheless fail
to guarantee basic necessities to some citizens. Proponents of welfare rights
maintain that such refusals violate constitutional rights to equal concern and
respect. "If government policy has created conditions which have helped some
to prosper mightily and left others in a state of total and absolute deprivation,"
Edelman writes, "it has denied the latter the equal protection of the laws, and
steps must be taken to remedy that denial." 20 2
b. A Caveat
These arguments from general principles hardly clinch the case for welfare
rights. At most, they demonstrate that liberal constitutional theorists who
endorse the claim in Rodriguez that when government provides an important benefit like
education to some people, government must not absolutely deprive any citizen of a like
benefit. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 25 (1973). "[A] duty to
extend protection against certain hazards," Michelman points out, "need not entail or suggest
any 'equalization' of treatment .... "Michelman, supra note 46, at 11; see id. at 18, 35, 42,
58-59; Edelman, supra note 119, at 33, 48-52; TRINE, supra note 102, at 1655, 1671-72;
Tribe, supra note 55, at 1082-83. But see Michelman, supra note 46, at 58 (suggesting with
respect to education that "the minimum is significantly a function of the maximum and to that
extent calls for equalization").
200 SUNSE , supra note 26, at 70; see also Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the
Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. Ray. 295, 304-07 (1991) (noting that any positive right can
be translated into a negative right).
201 Michelman, Property, supra note 196, at 91 n.*; see id. at 96-99.
202 Edelman, supra note 119, at 25. The young Tribe similarly claimed that:
[W]hen the regimes of private and public law combine to bring about a situation in
which some can afford elaborate private educations and advanced medical care while
others are relegated to ill-equipped classrooms and untreated disease, an individual who
suffers grievous harm from the resulting distribution of benefits and burdens has been
wronged by government and need not preface a claim of constitutional violation with an
allegation that government has established specific public programs from which that
individual has been arbitrarily excluded or expelled.
Tribe, supra note 55, at 1088 (citation omitted).
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already believe that persons have a fundamental human right to basic necessities
should also think that persons have a fundamental constitutional right to basic
necessities. Jurists who reject the interpretive principles central to liberal
constitutional theory frequently conclude that neither abortion nor welfare are
fundamental constitutional rights.203 Moreover, commentators who accept
liberal constitutional principles may nevertheless reject welfare rights, abortion
rights, or both. Libertarians who "fear[ ]. .. the implications of a coerced
redistribution for the economic well-being of the society and the freedom of its
citizens" 20 4 do not think a government that treated all citizens with equal
concern and respect would guarantee to all persons certain basic necessities. 205
Persons who are convinced that unborn genetic humans have a right to life may
insist that bans on abortion follow from the principle of equal concern and
respect or the government obligation to make sure that all citizens have the
capacities necessary to participate in society as equals. 206
The point is simply that liberals who believe that abortion is a fundamental
right and liberals who believe that welfare is a fundamental right derive their
support from the same general principles. Hence, liberal constitutional theorists
who maintain that the federal judiciary should protect abortion but not welfare
cannot claim that the Constitution protects the general principle underlying
abortion, but not welfare. Dworkin, Tribe, and other pro-choice
constitutionalists must either reject past liberal claims that welfare rights can be
deduced from those constitutional principles, reject liberal understandings of the
role of the federal judiciary, or believe that history has decisively refuted
welfare but not abortion rights.
2. History
No reason exists for thinking that constitutional history, even broadly
construed, discredits welfare rights more than abortion rights. Neither abortion
nor welfare have strong specific roots in the American constitutional
tradition. 207 Liberal constitutional theorists, however, "look[] to history and
tradition, not to enshrine practices familiar to the constitutional framers, but to
illuminate the principles that the framers held and sought to embody in the
constitutional text." 208 From this perspective, American political and legal
203 See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
204 W'nter, supra note 118, at 62.
205 Id. at 61-62.
206 JoHN T. NOONAN, JR., A PRIvATE CHoICE 178-88 (1979).
2 07 See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
208 Peggy Cooper Davis, Neglected Stories and the Inmfidness of Roe v. Wade, 28
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 303 (1993).
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practices offer more generalized support for abortion rights than conservative
originalists suspect. 209 Still, analogous political and legal practices offer at least
the same degree of generalized support for welfare rights. Indeed, American
political and legal practices from the New Deal to the Great Society provide far
greater and more particularized foundations for constitutional rights to basic
necessities than for any constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy. Leading
political actors during the mid-twentieth century spoke of the "freedom from
want,"'210 the United States signed international agreements declaring welfare a
fundamental human right,21' and Supreme Court opinions rejected the idea of
welfare as "mere charity. '212 The public rhetoric of privacy in 1970, by
comparison, was largely confined to rights associated with marital sexuality.
The persons responsible for the post-Civil War Constitution did not believe
abortion or welfare were fundamental rights, but they endorsed certain basic
principles from which abortion or welfare rights might be derived. The
Framers of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments specifically intended to
protect what they believed were the fundamental rights of families and the poor.
"[A]nti-slavery advocates," Peggy Cooper Davis's fine study indicates, "were
explicit in their determination that all Americans would be protected against the
family violations that characterized slavery." 213 Senator Henry Wilson of
Massachusetts spoke for many of his peers when he asserted that "the hallowed
family relations of husband and wife, parent and child, will be protected by the
[proposed Thirteenth Amendment]."2 1 4 Leading Reconstruction Republicans
similarly insisted that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment would outlaw both wealth and race classifications. "By the equality
of man," Wilson informed his fellow Senators, "we mean that the poorest man,
be he black or white.., is as much entitled to the protection of the law as the
richest and proudest man. "215 Wilson and other members of the Reconstruction
209 See infra notes 213-46 and accompanying text.
210 Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Annual Message to Congress, January 6, 1941, in 9
THm PuBuc PAPERS OF FRANKLN D. ROSEvELT 672 (compiled and collated by Samuel J.
Rosenman 1941) [hereinafter ROOSEvELT PAPERS].
211 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in HUMAN RiGHTS (A. I. Melden ed.,
1970).
212 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970) ("Public assistance, then, is not mere
charity, but a means to 'promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity.'").
213 Davis, supra note 208, at 309.
214 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1324 (1864). For similar comments, see
Davis, supra note 208, at 379-86; Peggy C. Davis, Law, Science, and History: Reflections
upon In the Best Interests of the Child, 86 McH. L. REv. 1096, 1113-18 (1988).
215 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1866). For similar comments, see
GRABER, supra note 36, at 81-82.
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Congress were primarily committed to guaranteeing poor persons and persons
of color the same rights to marriage, family, property, and alienation of labor
that were enjoyed by affluent white citizens in the United States. 216 Still, to the
extent that liberals interpret the above general references to family rights as
supporting the right to terminate a pregnancy,217 liberals should interpret the
above general references to the rights of the poor as supporting rights to basic
subsistence. Abortion is certainly no more privileged than welfare by the words
the Framers of the post-Civil War Constitution chose to express their intentions.
If anything, interpreting the phrase "equal protection" as encompassing welfare
rights seem more natural English usage than interpreting the phrases "equal
protection" or "due process" as encompassing abortion rights.
a. Tradition
Most proponents of Roe place more emphasis on American political
practices than on statements made on the floor of the 38th and 39th Congresses.
Liberal constitutional theorists highlight early nineteenth century state cases that
they think demonstrate that American law at the time of the Constitution's
ratification did not prohibit abortion until quickening. 218 "The privacy right Roe
recognized," Reva Siegel and other pro-choice constitutionalists proclaim,
"protects a liberty available to women at common law."219 Antebellum
Americans, however, did not think this legal permission to terminate a
pregnancy was grounded in a more fundamental freedom.220 When every state
2 16 See HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILIAM M. WM=CK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW:
CONsTrrUTIoNAL DEVELOPMENT 1835-1875, at 317, 321, 393 (1982); ERIC FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICAN'S UNFNSHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at 28-29 (1988);
GRABER, supra note 36, at 80.
217 See Davis, supra note 208, at 392-94. Davis stated, "[tihe promise of emancipation
and Reconstruction was more than freedom of ownership by a master. It was freedom to live
as morally responsible agents, able to mark the social fabric." Id. at 394.
2 18 See Brief of 250 American Historians as Amici Curiae in Support of Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania at 5, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992) (Nos. 91-744, 91-902) [hereinafter Historians' Brie]]; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
132-41 (1973); JAMES C. MoHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: TIm ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF
NATIONAL Poucy, 1800-1900, at 3-6 (1978); Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Abortion
Revisited, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1774, 1780-82 (1991).
2 1 9 Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv. 261, 278 n.64 (1992); see
Roe, 410 U.S. at 140; Siegel, supra, at 281-82; DwORxIN, supra note 25, at 111-12; TRIBE,
supra note 25, at 28-29.
220 Te Brief of 250 American Historians in Casey asserts that "abortion was tolerated"
before the Civil War, but presents no evidence that anyone thought abortion was a
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moved to ban abortion at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, no
one asserted that any fundamental human or constitutional right was being
violated.221
Twentieth century policies towards human reproduction reflect this
ambiguous status of abortion in American political consciousness. Legal
prohibitions on the books of every state never accurately described actual
political practice in the United States. While American black letter law before
Roe was anti-abortion, women who were willing to run the medical risks were
usually permitted to terminate their pregnancies without legal complications. As
a result of innumerable official decisions not to interfere with competent
abortionists, increasing numbers of affluent white women probably enjoyed a
de facto right to a safe abortion on demand during the years following the end
of the Second World War.222 Nevertheless, few Americans before Roe openly
professed their belief that reproductive choice was a fundamental human
liberty. The claim that "abortion was a woman's right," Kristin Luker points
out, was not made "[p]rior to 1967."223
A significant number of prominent Americans during the 1960s were,
however, claiming that persons had a fundamental right to basic necessities. To
the extent that the New Deal altered the American constitutional universe, the
"constitutional triumph of the activist welfare state" 224 strongly supports
various subsistence rights. New Dealers self-consciously understood themselves
as developing policies that would provide all Americans with the necessities of
life. Franklin Roosevelt maintained that "freedom from want" was one of "four
essential freedoms," and insisted that among "the basic things expected by our
people of their political and economic systems" were "jobs for those who can
work" and "security for those who need it." 225 The Supreme Court in 1941
fundamental human or constitutional right. See Historians' Brief, supra note 218, at 1.
Nineteenth century courts explicitly affirmed legislative power to alter the common law's
permissive attitude towards early abortion. "If the good of society requires that the evil [of
abortion] should be suppressed by penal inflictions," one state judiciary maintained, "it is far
better that it should be done by legislative enactments than that courts should, by judicial
construction, extend the penal code or multiply the objects of criminal punishment." State v.
Cooper, 2 Zab. 52, 58 (N.J. 1849); see MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH:
LAw AND TBm FAMILY IN NH ENTH-CENTuY AMERICA 163 (1985).
221 See MOHR, supra note 218, at 200-25.
222 For a detailed study of the differences before Roe between abortion law in books and
abortion law in action, see GRABER, supra note 36, at 39-64; LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN
ABORTION WAS A CME: WOMEN, MEDICINE AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1973
(1997).
223 KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION & T.lE PoMCS OF MOTEMRHOOD 92 (1984).
224 ACKRMAN, supra note 26, at 40.
225 Roosevelt, supra note 210, at 671-72; see Franklin D. Roosevelt, New York State
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pointed out that "the theory of the Elizabethan poor laws no longer fits the
facts." 226 Under modem conditions, the Court declared, "the duty to share
['the task of providing assistance to the needy'] has been recognized not only by
state government, but by the federal government as well." 227 The United States
officially acknowledged welfare rights seven years later when signing the
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.228 Article 25 of that
document put all signatory nations on record as recognizing that:
[elveryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and
medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the
event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack
of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control' 229
Nineteenth century political practice also offers some support for welfare
rights. Historians recognize that "American public welfare has a very old
history."230 Most states statutorily provided some sustenance, albeit a meager
one, for the poor. Significantly, these benefits may have been understood as
matters of right rather than legislative grace. The first legal treatise published in
the United States declared that "[elach town... [is] obliged to take care of and
Takes the Lead in the Relief of the Unemployed. A Message Recommending Creation of
Relief Administration. August 28, 1931, in 1 RoosEvELT PAPERS, supra note 210, at 459
("[A]id" to "unfortunate citizens... must be extended by government, not as a matter of
charity, but as a matter of social duty."); see also SuNsrEN, supra note 26, at 60.226 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 174-75 (1941).
227 Id.
228 Universal Declaration of Hwnman Rights, G.A. Res. 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
229 Id. art. 25. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights also declared that persons
had rights "to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favorable conditions of work
and to protection against unemployment," id. art. 23.1, "to just and favourable remuneration
ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented,
if necessary, by other means of social protection," id. art. 23.3, "to rest and leisure, including
reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay," id. art. 24, and "to
[free] education." Id. art. 26. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not
specifically mention abortion or birth control. That document does, however, assert that "[no
one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence," id. art. 12, and that "[m]en and women of full age, without any limitation
due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family." Id. art. 16.
Thus, while the United States explicitly acknowledged rights to basic necessities when signing
the Universal Declaration, this act merely recognized certain general principles from which
abortion rights might be deduced.
230 Ic Am B. KATz, IN THE SHAnow oF THE PooRI-ousE xiii (1986).
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maintain their own poor.... The selectmen are bound to provide necessaries
for all the inhabitants of the town, who are incapable of supporting
themselves. ' 231 Jesse Root, a member of the Connecticut bench during the
early nineteenth century, similarly observed that, "[i]t is the duty of every
government to protect and to provide for the poor." 232
Indeed, Biblical injunctions, common law understandings, and American
practice when the Constitution was ratified support welfare rights at least to the
degree that Justice Blackmun's similar analysis in Roe supports abortion
rights.233 "From the beginning of recorded time," Walter Trattner's influential
history of social welfare policies observes, "people have shown a concern for
others; individually and collectively they have tried to deal with insecurity and
human need and to help those fellow men found unable to meet the minimum
requirements of society." 234 Western religious traditions emphasize communal
obligations to provide for the poor. As Trattner notes, Judaism and Christianity
"assume[ ] that need arose as a result of misfortune for which society, in an act
of justice, not charity or mercy, had to assume responsibility.... [Ihe needy,
231 1 ZEPHANiAH Swnmr, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CoNNEcnCUT 119
(1972); see Moore v. Ganim, 660 A.2d 742, 796 (Conn. 1995) (Berdon, J., dissenting);
Newland v. Child, 254 P.2d 1066, 1070 (Idaho 1953) ("The granting of aid to its needy aged
is a well recognized obligation of the state."); People ex rel. Wayland v. Allied Hotels Corp.,
46 N.E.2d 48, 49 (Ill. 1943) ("Since 1874 it has been the duty of towns to relieve and support
all lawfully resident paupers."); Bullock v. Whiteman, 865 P.2d 197, 202 (Kan. 1993)
("universally recognized state duty"); Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 745 P.2d 1128,
1130 (Mont. 1987) (noting that the state judiciary and constitution have historically recognized
that "[t]he care of the state for its dependent citizens is ... a measure of its civilization");
County of Merrimack v. Derry, 219 A.2d 703, 705 (N.H. 1966) ("[P]rovision for relief and
support at public expense of persons unable to support themselves has long been part of our
public law."); Williams v. Dep't of Human Servs., 561 A.2d 244, 248 (N.J. 1989) ("Relief
of the poor has been considered an obligation of government since the organization of our
State."); Jiggetts v. Grinker, 553 N.E.2d 570, 575 (N.Y. 1990) (noting "that New York has a
long history of protecting children in the home"); Sioux Valley Hosp. Assoc. v. Bryan, 399
N.W.2d 352, 354 (S.D. 1987) ("Every county has a duty to relieve and support poor and
indigent persons who reside within its boundaries."(citation omitted)); Sarah Ramsey & Daan
Braveman, "Let Them Starve": Government's Obligation to Children in Poverty, 68 TEMP. L.
REV. 1607, 1631 (1995) ("Each state has a longstanding tradition of providing special
protection for children."); Daan Braveman, Children, Poverty and State Constitutions, 38
EMORY L.J. 577, 606 (1989).
232 JESSE ROOT, Observations upon the government and the laws of Connecticut, in 1
ROOT's REPORTS xxviii (1898).
233 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129-41 (1973).
234 WALTER I. TRATrNER, FROM POOR LAw TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF
SocIAL WELFAE iN AMERICA viii-ix (1974).
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had a right to assistance, and those better off had a duty to provide it."235
Trattner further points out that although Elizabethan Poor Laws were harsh in
many respects, common law policy towards the poor rested on the "assumption
that the state had a responsibility to supplement ordinary efforts to relieve want
and suffering and to insure the maintenance of life."'236 Finally, Trattner
asserts, American settlers accepted their inherited obligation to provide for the
less fortunate among them. "[C]olonial assemblies," he states, "quickly
acknowledged public responsibility for those unable to care for themselves,
making the taxpayers of each locality responsible for their support."237 As a
result, when the Constitution was ratified, Americans seemed "more interested
in providing good treatment for the poor than they were in economizing on
welfare costs. " 238
Prominent constitutional Framers recognized this societal obligation to
ensure that all persons had a meaningful opportunity to acquire basic
necessities. "The Revolutionaries," Drew McCoy's study of Jeffersonian
political economy documents, "believed that every man... was entitled to
autonomous control of the resources that were absolutely necessary to
survive." 239 Leading antebellum American politicians sought to realize this
welfare right by advocating and adopting policies that guaranteed a homestead
to all enterprising citizens. 240 John Adams insisted that republican governments
made "the acquisition of land easy to every member of society."241 Jefferson
informed Madison that:
[W]herever there is in any country, uncultivated lands and unemployed poor, it
is clear that the laws of property have been so far extended as to violate natural
right.... If, for the encouragement of industry, we allow it to be
appropriated, we must take care that other employment be furnished to those
excluded from the appropriation. If we do not the fundamental right to labour
the earth returns to the unemployed.... [lt is not too soon to provide by
every possible means that as few as possible shall be without a little portion of
235 Id. at 4; see id. at 2-4.
236 Id. at 11; see id. at 6-12.
237 Id. at 17; see id. at 15-19.
238 Id. at26.
239 DREW R. McCoy, THE ELusIVE REPUBLIC: PoLmcAL ECONOMY IN JFERsONIAN
AMERICA 68 (1980).
240 See id. at 51, 62, 67-68, 126-28, 152, 186, 189, 194, 236-37, 248-49; HowARD
GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BEsIEGED: THE RIs AND DEMIE OF LOCHNER ERA PoucE
POWERS JURIsPRUDENCE 13, 21, 25-26, 43-44 (1993).
241 Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan, May 26, 1776, quoted in McCoy, supra
note 239, at 68.
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land.242
From Jefferson's perspective, the Louisiana Purchase was best conceptualized
as an antipoverty program that secured to future generations the land necessary
to earn a living.24 3
There are far more "depressing" readings from a liberal perspective of the
American social welfare tradition.244 Nonetheless, little doubt exists that two
hundred and fifty historians committed to welfare rights could easily produce an
amicus brief as persuasive as the brief that two hundred and fifty historians
produced in Casey on behalf of abortion rights.245 That welfare brief would
probably provide a more optimistic interpretation of American policies towards
the poor than scholarship warranted, but the same is probably true of the briefs
historians have produced in support of abortion.246 That welfare brief would
also no more convince proponents of laissez-faire that the Constitution protects
welfare rights than the historians' briefs in Casey and Webster convinced pro-
life advocates. Nevertheless, if Tribe, Dworkin, and other pro-choice
constitutionalists regard the historical briefs produced in abortion cases as
providing adequate grounding for Roe, then welfare rights advocates are likely
to have little difficulty putting together a brief that meets the historical standards
of liberal constitutional theory.
b. Precedent
The liberal historical case for abortion rights rests primarily on several
Supreme Court decisions which offered crucial precedential foundations for
242 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, October 28, 1785, quoted in 8 TIm
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 682 (Julian Boyd ed., 1953); see letter from Thomas Jefferson
to Jean Baptiste Say, February 1, 1804, quoted in 11 T)HE WRrnNGs OF THOMAS JmERSON 1
(Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903). No proponent of abortion rights has ever discovered a
similarly explicit quote from a prominent Framer supporting the right to terminate a
pregnancy.
243 See McCoy, supra note 239, at 196-208.
244 See KATz, supra note 230, at xii (noting "the depressing past that characterizes
American welfare").
245 Compare TRATrNER, supra note 234, at 2-21, with Historians' Brief, supra note
218. 246 See Roundtable: Historians and the Webster Case, PuB. HISTORIAN, Summer 1990,
at 9; Gerald W. Bradley, Life's Dominion: A Review Essay, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329,
348 n.81 (1993) (discussing discrepancies between the historians' brief in Webster and the
scholarship of an influential signatory, James Mohr); Michael W. McConnell, How Not to
Promote Serious Deliberation About Abortion, 58 U. Cm. L. REV. 1181, 1183 n.4 (1991).
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Roe.247 However, before 1970, only five cases supported a general right of
privacy in family matters.248 None of these cases even hinted that abortion
might be another instance of that fundamental right. Judicial opinions
highlighted the right to marry,249 the right of marital intimacy,250 the right not
to be sterilized,251 and the right to direct the upbringing of one's children. 252
Griswold v. Connecticut now appears to be the precursor of Roe, but the actual
majority opinion in that case limited the Court's decision to the right of married
persons to use contraception. Bans on the use of birth control by husbands and
wives were unconstitutional, Justice Harlan stated, because such "statute[s]
allow[ ] the State to enquire into, prove and punish married people for the
private use of their marital intimacy. 253 The majority opinions in Griswold and
247 Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53; see TRIBE, supra note 25, at 92-95; DWORKaN, supra note
25, at 106-07; DWORKIN, supra note 33, at 50.248 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (freedom to many); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to marital privacy in use of contraceptives); Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate protected); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925) (parents' right to teach own children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923) (right to teach foreign language); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969) (explaining that the Constitution protects possession of obscene materials in one's
house); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (interpreting the Fourth Amendment as
protecting some privacy rights); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); id. at 497 (-Iarlan, J., dissenting); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-
66 (1944) (recognizing a right to raise one's children, but rejecting the application of that right
to child labor laws).
249 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 ("The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one
of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.");
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486; id. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring); Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541;
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
250 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486; id. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("TIhe right of
privacy in the marital relation is fundamental and basic."); id. at 502-03 (White, J.,
concurring) ("the right.., to be free of regulation of the intimacies of the marriage
relationship"); Poe, 367 U.S. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[]t is difficult to imagine what
is more private or more intimate than a husband and wife's marital relations.").
251 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 496 (Goldberg, J., concurring); Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536
([D]escribing "the right to have offspring" as "basic to the perpetuation of the race.").
252 See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 ("the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control"); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399
(endorsing the right "to marry, establish a home and bring up children"); see also Prince, 321
U.S. at 165-66.
253 Poe, 367 U.S. at 548 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Every judicial opinion in Griswold and
Poe that supported birth control rights explicitly limited the right to married couples. See
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486; id. at 486, 494-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring); id. at 502 (White,
J., concurring); Poe, 367 U.S. at 515 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 539, 546-55 (Harlan,
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Poe repeatedly affirmed state power to regulate any expression of non-marital
sexuality254 and state power to ban contraception altogether, as long as the
regulation did not permit "the police [to] investigat[e] the intimacies of the
marriage relation. ' 255 Only in 1972, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, did the Supreme
Court first rule that "the right of privacy" encompassed "the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child." 256 Feminist defenses of abortion lacked even
this limited doctrinal foundation. No case decided before 1970 supported claims
that bans on abortion violated the equal protection rights of women. When
confronted with gender inequalities, the Supreme Court had for the previous
one hundred years consistently ruled that laws discriminating against women
did not present any constitutional problems. 257
The precedential case for a right to basic necessities, by comparison, was
quite strong by 1970. The Court handed down far more decisions supporting
the constitutional rights of poor people than the right to privacy. Several cases
seemed best explained by an inchoate understanding that persons had a right to
the resources necessary to survive. During the 1950s, 1960s, and early months
of 1970, the Supreme Court ruled that poor people had constitutional rights to
an attorney during every "critical stage" of the criminal process in felony
cases258 (including any mandatory appeal),259 to be provided with the
J., dissenting); see also id. at 509 (Brennan, J., concurring).
254 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (Griswold "in no way
interferes with a State's proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or misconduct."); id. at 504
(White, J., concurring); Poe, 367 U.S. at 546 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Laws... confining
sexuality to lawful marriage, form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social
life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that basis."); id. at 547, 553.
Justice Harlan specifically pointed to abortion as a matter that states could constitutionally
regulate. See id. at 547 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
255 Poe, 367 U.S. at 522 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see id. at 547-48, 553-55 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
256 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
257 See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (excluding women from juries unless they
volunteered); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding a law prohibiting women
from bartending unless "the wife or daughter of the male owner"); Muller v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding a statute regulating the working hours of women); Minor v.
Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) (upholding a provision of the state constitution that denied
women the right to vote); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (upholding a state law
denying a woman the right to practice as an attorney in the state's courts).
258 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970); see Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128,
134 (1967) ([T]he Constitution guarantees the right to counsel at sentencing because
"appointment of counsel for an indigent is required at every stage of a criminal proceeding
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transcripts and other materials necessary to make an effective appeal of any
criminal sentence260 (as well as having any fees waived which are related to
filing appeals and habeas corpus petitions),261 to vote without paying a poll
where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected."); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967) (declaring a right to counsel at post-indictment line-up); White v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 59 (1963) (declaring a right to counsel at preliminary hearing); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (holding that the Constitution guarantees the right to
counsel during a felony trial because the "noble ideal [of equality before the law] cannot be
realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist
him"); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (declaring a right to counsel at
arraignment).
259 See Douglas v. Califomia, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) ("[W]here the merits of the one
and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of counsel, we think an
unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor."); see Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967) (declaring that a state cannot deny an appeal merely because appointed
counsel declares that petitioner's claims have no merit).260 See Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42 (1967) (holding that a state must provide a
transcript of a preliminary hearing because "differences in access to the instruments needed to
vindicate legal rights, when based upon the financial situation of the defendant, are repugnant
to the Constitution"); Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192, 194 (1966) (holding that
a state must provide a transcript to a petitioner appealing an adverse habeas corpus ruling
because the Giffln "rule applies to protect an indigent against a financial obstacle to the
exercise of a state-created right to appeal from an adverse decision in a post-conviction
proceeding"); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 496 (1963) (holding that a state must
provide a free transcript even when the trial judge concludes an appeal would be frivolous
because "the State must provide the indigent defendant with means of presenting his
contentions to the appellate court which are as good as those available to a nonindigent
defendant with similar contentions"); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (holding that a
state must provide a transcript in post-conviction proceedings, even when a public defender
says the case has no merit); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles,
357 U.S. 214 (1958) (explaining that state law authorized providing an indigent defendant
with a free stenographic transcript of the trial when the judge felt that such an act would
promote the interests of justice); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (holding that a
state must provide indigents with a free transcript when failure to do so "effectively denies the
poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all who have money enough to pay the costs in
advance"); see also Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962) (interpreting the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure to require free transcripts and waiver of fees whenever such
policies are mandated by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
261 See Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709 (1961) (declaring unconstitutional a state
law requiring petitioner to pay a filing fee in order to make a habeas corpus claim because "to
interpose any financial consideration between an indigent prisoner of the State and his
exercise of a state right to sue for his liberty is to deny that prisoner the equal protection of the
laws"); Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 258 (1959) (holding that a state cannot require a fee to
file a second appeal because "indigents must ... have the same opportunities to invoke the
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tax262 in any election in which they had an interest, 263 to run for office, 2 6 4 to
not have their wages garnished or welfare benefits cut off without notice and a
prior evidentiary hearing,265 to live in the state of their choice,266 to enjoy full
welfare benefits upon establishing residence,267 and to have their financial
circumstances considered when establishing bail.268 In addition, "[l]ines drawn
on the basis of wealth or property," the Court declared in Harper v. Virginia
Board of Elections, "like those of race.., are traditionally disfavored." 269
The language and logic in many of these decisions seemed to point towards
a constitutional right to basic necessities. In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme
Court declared that persons had a constitutional right to an attorney in felony
trials because "lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries." 270 Two
weeks before handing down Dandridge, the Justices declared that:
Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring within
the reach of the poor the same opportunities that are available to others to
participate meaningfully in the life of the community.... Public
discretion of the [state supreme court]").
262 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (finding that
states cannot "make[ ] the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral
standard").
263 See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v.
City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
264 See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 363 (1970) ("It cannot be seriously urged that
a citizen in all other respects qualified to sit on a school board must also own real property.").
265 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (holding that a state must conduct
an evidentiary hearing before terminating public assistance payments because "termination of
aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the
very means by which to live while he waits"); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969) (holding that state's prejudgment garnishment procedure violates principles of due
process).
266 See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (holding that a state law that made
it illegal to knowingly transport an indigent person across state lines into the state was
unconstitutional).
267 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (holding that states cannot deny
welfare benefits to new residents because "the purpose of inhibiting migration by needy
persons into the State is constitutionally impermissible"), ovemded in part by Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
268 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (holding that bail must be reasonably
calculated to assure the presence of a defendant at trial).
269 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966); see McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'ns, 394 U.S.
802, 806 (1969).
270 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
[Vol. 58:731
CLINTONIFICATION
assistance... is not mere charity, but a means to "promote the general
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity." 27 1
Even sharp critics of egalitarian social policies recognized that the doctrinal
foundations for broad constitutional rights were in place by 1970. "A fair
evaluation of... the existing caselaw," Ralph Winter acknowledged in the
early seventies, "would be that the law is well along the road toward
substantive equal protection as a vehicle of income redistribution. 272 Relying
heavily on Shapiro, one lower federal court in 1969 ruled that state policies
denying welfare benefits pass constitutional muster only if they satisfy the strict
scrutiny standard. 273
3. Constitutional Law in 1970
It is not surprising, given the state of American law and political practice in
1970, that scholars on the cutting edge of liberal theory and practice argued for
welfare rights rather than for abortion.274 Both rights could be deduced from
the same general principles, but recent political and legal precedent pointed far
more clearly towards rights to basic necessities than broad privacy or gender
rights.275 This is not to claim that the state of welfare law in 1970 should have
compelled federal judicial rulings that all persons had a constitutional right to
basic necessities. Persons who disagreed with the jurisprudential foundations of
Roe and Griswold, or did not believe in subsistence rights had good
constitutional reasons for rejecting the argument for constitutional welfare
rights. The point is simply that in 1970, constitutional commentators and
authorities could reject the argument for constitutional welfare rights only by
rejecting either the jurisprudential foundations of Roe or the claim that persons
have a fundamental human right to subsistence. Liberals who rejected neither
claim had no principled basis upon which to claim that the Constitution
protected the right to terminate a pregnancy but not the right to basic
necessities. Pro-choice constitutionalists who think that persons have a
fundamental human right to basic necessities should have insisted in 1970 that
persons also had a constitutional right to basic necessities, a right that could at
271 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970); see Edwards, 314 U.S. at 174-75.
2 72 Winter, supra note 118, at 58; see Tribe, supra note 55, at 1078-90 (claiming that as
of 1977, case law supported a constitutional right to certain basic necessities); Michelman,
Welfare Rights, supra note 49, at 660-65.
273 See Rothstein v. Wyman, 303 F. Supp. 339, 346-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
274 See supra notes 45-62 and accompanying text.
275 See supra notes 248-73 and accompanying text.
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least be partly protected by the Supreme Court.
B. The Constitutional Status of Welfare and Abortion Rights After
Dandridge and Roe
The relative constitutional status of welfare and abortion rights looks quite
different at the present time. Two weeks after handing down Goldberg v. Kelly,
the Supreme Court in Dandridge v. Williams sustained state policies that
provided no additional benefits for those persons on state assistance who had
more than two children.276 Justice Stewart's majority opinion did not explicitly
reject claims that persons had a constitutional right to basic necessities.
However, he did find "no basis for applying a different constitutional standard"
in cases "involv[ing] the most basic economic needs of impoverished human
beings" than in cases "involv[ing] state regulation of business or industry." 277
Both state policies, the Court ruled, would only be required to satisfy a
traditionally toothless "reasonable basis" test.278 In the opinion of the
Dandridge majority, "the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical
problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the business
of this Court. "279 Remarkably, the Court three years later decided that the
intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by
abortion are the business of the Court. The "right [to] privacy," Justice
Blackmun ruled in Roe, "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." 280 In sharp contrast to welfare
policies, the Roe majority ruled that elected officials could regulate abortion
only when such measures passed a demanding "compelling state interest"
test.281
For the past two decades, the Court has created one extensive body of
precedent that, with some exceptions, supports conventional liberal defenses of
abortion,282 another extensive body of precedent that, with some exceptions,
276 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
277 Id. at 485.
278 Id.
279 Id. at 487.
280 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
281 Id. at 155.
282 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (reaffinning the
"essential holding" of Roe); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (declaring an informed consent law unconstitutional);
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Asheroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (striking down requirement that
second trimester abortions be performed in hospitals); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (siriking down hospitalization, consent, notification, and
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supports a more feminist defense of abortion fights, 283 and a third extensive
body of precedent that, with increasingly fewer exceptions, is hostile to welfare
rights.284 "[O]ur cases," the Court now confidently declares, "have recognized
waiting period requirements), overrded by Casey, 505 U.S. at 833; Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622 (1979) (striking down parental consent statute); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379
(1979) (striking down fetal protection statute); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976) (striking
down parental consent measure); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)
(striking down fetal protection measure).
The Supreme Court has sustained laws limiting governmental funding for abortions or
requiring short waiting periods, informed consent, and parental notice before an abortion can
be performed. See Casey, 505 U.S. 833; Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Ohio v.
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490 (1989); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977). From 1973 to the present, however, the Court has never let elected officials prevent a
private physician from granting an abortion to a consenting adult.
2 83 At present, "classifications... between males and females" will be sustained by the
Supreme Court only if they "serve important governmental objectives and [are] substantially
related to [the] achievement of those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
More recently, the Court has insisted that "parties who seek to defend gender-based
government action must demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification.'" United States
v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274 (1996); see J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 142 n.12
(1994); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Kirchberg v.
Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142
(1980); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234
(1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210
(1977). For cases decided between 1971 and 1975 using heightened scrutiny to evaluate
gender based classifications, see Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-58 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1971).
Significantly, Justice Blackmun in Casey cited both Hogan and Boren in support of a
woman's right to abortion. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 927-28 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
A Supreme Court decision based on the feminist defense of abortion rights would have to
explicitly or implicitly overrule (or substantially narrow) a previous judicial ruling that laws
excluding pregnancy and childbirth from disability programs do not discriminate on the basis
of gender. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 495 (1974); see also Rostker v. Goldberg,
453 U.S. 57 (1981) (holding that gender differences justify requiring only males to register for
the draft); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 476 (1981) (holding that gender
differences justify punishing only underage males for statutory rape).
284 Judicial decisions until 1975 were a mixed bag. For cases supporting the
constitutional rights of poor people, see United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528 (1973) (invalidating provision of Food Stamp Act of 1964 that required all members of a
household be related to receive benefits); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S.
508 (1973) (holding that a parent's tax deduction is not a rational measure of need for a
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that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to
governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty,
or property interests." 285 Enjoying substantial support from the first two bodies
of precedent, liberal constitutional theorists defending abortion rights merely
have to explain why the Supreme Court should not overrule Roe. When
defending welfare rights, liberals must ask the Court to distinguish, narrow, or
overrule numerous recent precedent. Given that liberal constitutional theorists
regard precedent as an important source of constitutional meaning,286 Supreme
Court practice over the past two decades probably explains why contemporary
liberals think the Constitution protects abortion rights, but not welfare rights.
Nonetheless, the present status of abortion and welfare rights in liberal
household); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (invalidating
statute limiting benefits of "Assistance to Families of Working Poor" on equal protection
grounds); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (invalidating filing fee requirement for
Texas elections); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (invalidating a Florida statute that
permitted repossession without a hearing); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)
(holding that an indigent could not be refused a divorce solely due to inability to pay court
fees); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (upholding an indigent's right to counsel
for petty offenses); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (holding that a state may not
hold a prisoner beyond his or her sentence because of indigency).
For cases rejecting such claims, see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973) (upholding unequal school funding due to disparities in property values);
Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (upholding a $25 filing fee as a requirement to
receive welfare benefits); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (holding that there is no
constitutional right to discharge one's debts in bankruptcy); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S.
535 (1972) (upholding percentage reduction factor in calculation of AFDC benefits to persons
without outside income); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (upholding provision of
California Constitution requiring approval of majority of voters in a community before low-
rent housing could be built); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (upholding home
visitation law in connection with the AFDC program).
After 1975, the Supreme Court almost always rejected claims that some governmental
practice violated the constitutional rights of poor people. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub.
Schs., 487 U.S. 450 (1988) (holding that states are not required to provide free bus service to
public schools); Lyng v. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and Agric. Implant
Workers, 485 U.S. 360 (1988) (holding that the federal government may deny food stamps to
striking workers); Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S.
841 (1984) (holding that the federal government may condition financial assistance to college
students on their registering for the draft); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (holding that a
state is not required to pay the expenses for nontherapeutic abortion for indigent women);
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (upholding the termination of disability benefits
before an evidentiary hearing).
285 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Sent., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989).
2 86 See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
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constitutional theory remains troubling. No liberal constitutional theorist
explicitly claims that recent precedent explains why the Constitution affords
more protection to abortion than welfare. Dworkin, in particular, implies that
Michelman's defense of welfare rights was wrong when first published in
1969.287 Moreover, precedent in other areas of law does not seem to play as
powerful a role in liberal constitutional theory. Liberals demand that the Court
overrule decisions denying poor women the funds to purchase an abortion or
permitting states to ban homosexual sodomy.288 This stridency might be
justified on the grounds that the judicial rulings in question are inconsistent with
the general principles the Court is presently articulating in privacy and gender
cases.289 Still, welfare seems the only broad area of law in which liberal
constitutional theorists accord constitutional standing to Burger and Rehnquist
Court decisions. Dworkin, for example, exhibited little feeling for precedent
when he recently maintained that "even if Buckley remains, we should feel no
compunction in declaring the decision a mistake, and in attempting to avoid its
consequences through any reasonable and effective device we can find or
construct." 290 Why do the same principles not apply to Dandridge or
Rodriguez? At the very least, liberal constitutional theorists should explain more
clearly whether precedent provides the constitutional distinction between
abortion and welfare rights, and why precedent seemingly plays such a
uniquely strong role in welfare cases.
Even if twenty-five years of conservative decisions explain why liberals
now think the Constitution provides more protection for abortion rights than
welfare rights, past precedent cannot explain why during the 1970s the centrist
judges on the Burger Court were more solicitous of abortion than welfare
rights. In the years before Dandridge and Roe, the textual, historical, and
precedential case for the right to basic necessities was at least as strong, if not
stronger, than the textual, historical, and precedential case for the right to
terminate a pregnancy. 291 The only constitutional basis available during the
1970s for judicial decisions providing more protection for abortion rights than
welfare rights seems to be an inchoate belief, never articulated in any judicial
decision, that the right to terminate a pregnancy is more fundamental than the
right to certain basic necessities. No other form of constitutional logic explains
the different directions the Supreme Court took in abortion and welfare cases
after 1970.
287 See supra note 80-82 and accompanying text.
2 88 See supra notes 35, 99 and accompanying text.
2 89 See supra notes 282-83.
290 Ronald Dworkin, The Curse of American Politics, N.Y. REv. BooKs, Oct. 17,
1996, at 19, 24.
291 See supra Parts II.A.1-2.
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Thus, liberal constitutional theory is accepting, on the basis of recent
judicial decisions, an unexplained distinction between abortion rights and
welfare rights that makes no sense in liberal moral theory or a liberal theory of
human rights. The centrist justices on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
apparently think that abortion is a fundamental human right and that sufficient
basis in constitutional history and theory exists to justify declaring this human
right a fundamental constitutional right. The same centrist justices do not,
however, think that persons have a fundamental human right to receive basic
necessities from the State. Hence, they are not interested in taking advantage of
whatever openings history might present for declaring a constitutional right to
basic necessities. Liberals may disagree with the judicial judgment that persons
have no fundamental right to receive basic necessities from the State. They may
even think the Burger and Rehnquist Courts' priorities morally perverse.
Twenty-five years of precedent to the contrary have apparently closed, at least
temporarily, the constitutional opportunity that may have been present in 1970
for declaring or even defending constitutional welfare rights.
C. The Strategic Case for Abortion and Welfare Rights
Strategic considerations provide a related explanation and justification for
why liberal constitutional theory places far greater emphasis on abortion rights
than on welfare rights. Liberal lawyers are presently far more likely to persuade
federal courts that Roe should remain good law and be expanded than they are
to persuade federal courts that Dandridge, Rodriguez, and numerous other
cases should be narrowed or overruled. As welfare rights advocate Barbara
Sard sadly comments, "the potential for use of equal protection challenges to
aid welfare recipients is negligible, at least in federal courts."292 This real limit
on liberal advocacy before a conservative judiciary suggests that the recent
claim that no judicially enforceable constitutional right to welfare exists is more
tactical than heartfelt.293
Even if a constitutional case can be made that past precedent supports
constitutional entitlements to basic minimums (perhaps when government
292 Barbara Sard, The Role of Courts in Welfare Refonn, 22 CLEARmNGHOUSE REv. 367,
375 (1988); see also Romesh Ratnesar, Mock Trial, THE NEW REPUBic, Dec. 9, 1996, at 16
(addressing the limited role courts were expected to play in championing the rights of the poor
after the new welfare legislation was enacted); DAvis, supra note 53, at 3; Diller, supra note
84, at 1420; Braveman, supra note 231, at 591-93.
293 The tactical merits of emphasizing abortion may also explain why neither Tribe nor
Dworkin explain at any length why welfare rights do not follow from the broad constitutional
principles they believe should guide judicial decisionmaking.
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supplies the good in question to most citizens), 294 the present Supreme Court is
not likely to accept any doctrinal argument which concludes that poor people
have a constitutional right to certain goods (except, perhaps, in the context of a
judicial proceeding). 295 Hence, conceding that a guaranteed income is an
example of a just policy that is not constitutionally mandated may be an
effective rhetorical tactic to convince skeptics that liberals who defend the
constitutional right to legal abortion are not simply importing their views of
wise policy into the Constitution.
However, liberals may bear some responsibility for the present priorities of
the federal judiciary. President Clinton appointed two Justices previously on
record as supporting the result in Roe, but backed away from his commitment
to appoint Peter Edelman, a prominent advocate of welfare rights, to the
bench.296 On virtually every other civil liberties issue other than abortion,
Clinton's judicial appointees have demonstrated no special proclivities to adopt
liberal positions. 297 Justice Breyer, during his confirmation process, was
criticized by liberal activists for generally favoring business interests when he
served on the lower federal bench. Ralph Nader went so far as to label Breyer
"the corporate candidate for the Supreme Court. '298 Still, liberals seemed
disinterested in whether that nomination might presage a return to Warren
2 94 See Edelman, supra note 119, at 48-50 (suggesting advocating survival rights in a
state court).
295 See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996) (holding that a state cannot
constitutionally require poor people to pay a fee in order to appeal an adverse parental
termination ruling); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (holding that a defendant in a
capital case has the right to the funds necessary to hire a psychiatrist).
296 See Neil A. Lewis, A Friendship in Tatters Over Policy, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 13,
1996, at A26 (regarding Clinton's change of heart in reaction to conservative resistance to the
Edelman appointment).
297 See Ronald Stidham et al., The Voting Behavior of President Clinton's Judicial
Appointees, 80 JUDICATURE, July-Aug. 1996, at 16; Nat Hentoff, Bill Clinton's Judges:
Clinton's Nominees Are Less Liberal than Ford's and Nixon's, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Oct. 29,
1996, at 25; John Nichols, The Clinton Courts: Liberals Need Not Apply, 60 TM
PROGREssrvE, Sept. 1996, at 25. Court observers note that "Clinton has avoided potential
nominees with a record of defending the poorest Americans." Id. at 28; see also Jeffrey
Toobin, Clinton's Left-Hand Man, THE NEW YORKER, July 21, 1997, at 28-30. These
judicial appointment practices reflect broader Clinton administration priorities. Jeffrey Toobin
notes that "with the single important exception of abortion, where Clinton has remained
steadfastly pro-choice, the President's record on individual rights is distinguishable from that
of his Republican predecessors only in that he has been more conservative." Id. at 30
2 98 Ralph Nader quoted in Joan Biskopic, A Moderate Pragmatist: Nominee Widely
Admired in Legal Circles, WASH. Posr, May 14, 1994, at Al; see Nichols, supra note 297,
at 26.
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Court activism in many areas of constitutional law. The "assum[ption] that
Breyer would take a pro-choice stance," was, "for many
progressives ... sufficient justification for supporting his nomination." 299
Liberal interest groups and their political allies demonstrated similar
priorities when evaluating Republican judicial nominees. Pro-choice
constitutionalists fought hard to prevent Presidents Reagan and Bush from
packing the judiciary with jurists committed to overruling Roe.300 Few persons
active during the judicial confirmation battles of the 1980s exhibited any public
interest in how Republican judicial nominees would rule on the constitutional
rights of the poor and labor. Leading Senators and their political supporters
repeatedly reminded the public that Robert Bork had condemned constitutional
privacy rights. They did not inform the electorate that Bork also believed
"finding welfare rights in the Constitution [was] impossibl[e]." 301 Liberal
politicians and activists seemed contented when Republican Presidents
nominated judges willing to recognize some unenumerated privacy rights, even
though those judges gave no indication that they would also recognize some
unenumerated welfare rights. 302 Thus, the present Court's different treatment of
abortion and welfare rights is partly a consequence of President Clinton's
nominating practices and the campaigns against pro-life judicial nominees that
liberals waged during the Bush and Reagan administrations.
Liberal approaches to staffing the federal judiciary may reflect tactical
considerations rather than a heartfelt belief that justices should protect abortion
rights but not rights to basic necessities. The coalition of groups opposed to
Bork tested many issues when determining what arguments would most likely
sway Senators and their constituencies to oppose the Reagan Administration.
Privacy was chosen rather than welfare because studies showed that the public
was more interested in retaining privacy rights than in having the Court protect
299 Nichols, supra note 297, at 26.
300 See ETHAN BRONNER, BATrLE FOR JusrIcE: How THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK
AMERICA 20, 26, 98-99, 139 (1989); MIcHAEL PERTSCHUK & WENDY ScRFAE'IZ, THE
PEOPLE RISiNG: THE CAhMPvAIGN AGAiNsT THE BORK NOMINATION 24-25, 39, 127-28, 138-
39 (1989).
301 Bork, supra note 118, at 695; see BRONNER, supra note 300, at 208-76; PERSCHUK
& SCHAE L, supra note 300, at 221-26; see also Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian
Dficuty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, STUD. IN AM. POL. DEv., Spring 1993, at
35, 60-61 (discussing Democratic party political priorities during the Bork and Thomas
confirmation processes). The anti-Bork coalition was concerned with Bork's tendency to favor
business interests in conflicts with consumers and workers. See PERTSCHUK & SCHATZE,
supra note 300, at 70, 79, 137-38, 185.




rights to certain basic necessities. 30 3 Given public hostility to welfare, 304 at least
under that name, 305 public awareness that a judicial nominee found no welfare
rights in the Constitution would probably increase popular support for
confirmation. In the present political environment, liberals may not have a
practical choice between abortion and welfare rights when engaging in struggles
over the composition of the federal bench or fighting other political battles. To
the extent liberals in national political struggles insist that government provide
all poor persons with certain basic necessities, they lose. To the extent that
liberals in national political struggles fight to keep abortion legal, they may
win. 30
6
At this time, the best liberal constitutional arguments and the best liberal
strategic arguments for preferring abortion rights to welfare rights converge.
Tribe and Dworkin believe that persons have a fundamental human right to
abortion and a fundamental human right to have government provide them with
certain basic necessities. 30 7 Unfortunately, although the present judicial
majority and many Americans endorse some version of the liberal claim that
abortion is a fundamental right, the present judicial majority and most
Americans reject the liberal claim that persons have a fundamental right to be
provided with certain basic necessities. For these reasons, the federal judiciary
presently protects abortion rights but not welfare rights, and influential
politicians are staffing the federal judiciary with judges that are inclined to
maintain that status quo. Liberals may prefer a status quo sympathetic to both
abortion and welfare rights. Nevertheless, because they believe that precedents
are an important source of constitutional meaning and wish to secure as many
rights as possible, contemporary liberals follow more conservative inclinations
and insist that the Constitution protects the right to terminate a pregnancy but
not the right to be provided with certain basic necessities.
303 See PERTSCHuK& SaET , supra note 300, at 127-32, 144.
304 See NORMAN J. ORNSr Er AL., TIm PEOPLE, THE PREss & PoLmcs: THa NEw
PoLrrcALLANDSCAPE4, 129, 142-43, 153-55 (1994).
305 One survey found that "average support for more assistance for the poor is 39
percentage points higher than for welfare." Tom W. Smith, That Which We Call Welfare By
Any Other Name Would Smell Sweeter: An Analysis of the Impact of Question Wording on
Response Patterns, PUB. OPINION Q. Spring 1987, at 75, 76; see FAY LOMAX COOK & ED=n
J. BARREtr, SUPPORT FOR THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE: THE VIEwS OF CONGRESS AND
THE PUBUC 27 (1992). For a more general discussion of "response instability," see JOHN R.
ZALmER, Tha NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION 53-96 (1992).
306 Obviously, many local districts exist where liberals are better advised to emphasize
welfare rights than abortion rights.307 See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
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II. ABORTION AND WELFARE AS CONSTITUTIONAL PARADIGMS
A. The Rough Rule of Three
Liberal constitutional theory seems structured by a rough rule of three.
Liberal law professors construct constitutional justifications for those liberal
policies that they believe at least three Supreme Court Justices might
endorse.308 During the 1960s and 1970s, when at least three Justices seemed
willing to declare a constitutional right to livelihood, liberal law professors
eagerly provided those Justices with arguments that could be used towards that
end. During the 1980s and 1990s, when no Supreme Court Justice seemed
willing to declare a constitutional right to livelihood, liberal law professors
either dropped the subject or briefly stated that no constitutional right to
livelihood existed. Supreme Court majorities during the 1980s and 1990s have
been willing to defend abortion and other privacy rights. Hence, liberal
constitutional theorists presently spend their energies providing their judicial
allies with arguments that can be used to affirm Roe and to overrule or narrow
Bowers v. Hardwick.309 Contemporary liberal constitutional theory probably
highlights abortion, privacy, and gender rights because these are the areas of
constitutional law where Rehnquist Court majorities have been willing to
maintain, expand, and occasionally establish liberal precedent. 310
The rough rule of three, although rough, has much merit. Politics is partly
the art of the possible. Establishing priorities by multiplying the importance of a
right by the probability that constitutional authorities will recognize that right
seems to be a reasonable liberal tactic in a conservative age. Liberal
constitutional theorists who concentrate their efforts on keeping abortion legal
have hardly abandoned their concern for the poor. By the early 1970s, anyone
who could afford to travel to New York or California enjoyed a de facto right
to abortion on demand. The primary beneficiaries of Roe were poor persons
and persons of color who enjoyed access to safe and legal abortion for the first
time in American history.31' Should Roe be overruled, the burden will once
again fall on those poor people who live more than a short bus ride away from
a pro-choice state. 312 Although contemporary liberals no longer claim that
308 For a similar claim, see J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of
Our Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1703, 1732-35 (1997).
309 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a law prohibiting sodomy).
310 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct.
1620 (1996); United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (holding that women must be
admitted to a formerly all-male military school).
311 See GRABER, supra note 36, at 62, 65-72.
3 12 See id. at 72-75.
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restrictions on abortion violate the constitutional rights of poor people,313 their
defense of Roe, in practice, primarily secures abortion rights for poor
people.314 Less fortunate Americans will not benefit, however, if in a hopeless
quest to secure constitutional rights to basic necessities, liberal constitutional
theorists weaken the argument for keeping abortion legal.
Nevertheless, the rough rule of three is problematic, both strategically and
constitutionally. Obsessed with the Supreme Court's unwillingness to declare
rights to certain basic necessities, liberal constitutional theorists may be
overlooking the numerous ways in which federal and state courts might
promote the constitutional rights of poor people. The rough rule of three also
conflates efforts to describe the best vision of the American constitutional order
with efforts to get the best possible results out of a very conservative Court.
Too many basic constitutional aspirations are lost when constitutional theory is
limited to justifications for those rights that Justices Souter, O'Connor, and
Kennedy might be persuaded to protect. Finally, a constitutional theory tethered
to recent precedent threatens to be co-opted by a Rehnquist Court practice that
subverts a vital tenet of American constitutionalism. By emphasizing abortion
rather than welfare, because those are the rights a Republican Court might
recognize, liberal constitutional theorists are participating in practices that
threaten to convert an institution based on elite public values into an institution
that primarily services elite interests.
313 Liberal arguments for abortion rights during the 1950s and 1960s insisted that
malenforced restrictions on abortion violated the constitutional rights of poor people. "The
poor," Professors Alan Charles and Susan Alexander declared, "are being denied a service
which is lawfully available to others; the service is of great importance to their lives and
health; the denial is because of artificial barriers created by the state." Alan Charles & Susan
Alexander, Abortions for Poor and Nonwhite Women: A Denial of Equal Protection, 23
HAsT Gs L.J. 147, 168 (1971); see Roy Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the
Enforcement and Adninistration of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C. L. REv. 730, 763, 771-
73 (1968) (discussing the racial disparities in loss of life due to criminalized abortion); see
also GRABER, supra note 36, at 63-64 (discussing discriminatory impact of abortion law);
LEE EPSTIBN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE: ABORTION
AND ThE DEATH PENALTY 174-76, 179 (1992). These class disparities seemed to have made
some Justices more receptive to the more general argument for legal abortion. See GRABER,
supra note 36, at 64.
3 14 Significantly, restrictions on governmental funding and other state regulations
regarding abortion have little impact on the abortion rates of poor women. See Willard Cates,
Jr., The Hyde Amendment in Action: How Did the Restriction of Federal Funds for Abortion
Affect Low-Income Women?, 246 JAMA 1109 (1981) (discussing the surprising lack of effect
the Hyde Amendment had on abortion rates among low-income women); see also GRABER,
supra note 36, at 68-69 (citing numerous sources).
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13. Strategic Considerations
The strategic case for contemporary liberal priorities is more complicated
than a brief look at the present status of Dandridge and Roe initially suggests.
Rehnquist Court Justices do not favor constitutional rights to livelihood, but
many lesser constitutional claims to welfare benefits still satisfy the rough rule
of three. None of the precedents from the 1960s and early 1970s protecting the
constitutional rights of poor people have been explicitly overruled. 315 Many of
these precedents may continue to command judicial support when applied
narrowly. 316 Protecting existing entitlements is not as exciting as fashioning
creative arguments that, if adopted, will transform the constitutional universe.
Nonetheless, welfare advocates recognize that "even the sorely inadequate
status quo will often get worse without defensive actions." 317 Recent legislative
efforts to reduce benefits and control the lives of welfare recipients318 should
inspire liberal constitutional theorists to examine the resources in contemporary
case law that might prevent poor people from being deprived of those vital
goods and services that they presently enjoy. Liberal scholars can provide
justices with updated reasons for reaffirming such decisions as Shapiro and
Goldberg, as well as more explicit constitutional grounds for past judicial
decisions rejecting "employable mother" or "man in the house" restrictions on
welfare eligibility. 319
Dworkin, Tribe, and other liberal constitutionalists who purport to honor
recent precedent should place particular emphasis on previous Supreme Court
rulings which announced a constitutional presumption that welfare laws be
315 Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist do seem willing to
overrule the Griffin line of cases. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 557-67 (1996)
(Thomas, J., dissenting); see also supra note 260.
316 See id. at 562, 566 (ruling that the -tightly circumscribed category of parental status
termination cases" belongs to "a narrow category of civil cases in which the State must
provide access to its judicial processes without regard to a party's ability to pay court fees");
see generally Diller, supra note 84, at 1421-22 (emphasizing the importance of making
narrow claims in welfare rights cases).
317 Sard, supra note 292, at 367 n.2.
318 For examples of legislation that has been passed or proposed, see Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110
Stat. 2105 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 1305); CoNTRAcr wrrH AMERICA: THE BoLD PLAN
BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY AND THE HousE REPUBLICANs TO CHANGE THE
NATION 65-77 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994); JAMES G. GIMPEL, LEGISLATING
THE REVOLUTION: THE CONTRACr WITH AMERICA IN ITS FMsT 100 DAYS (1996); Appleton,
supra note 64, at 3-7.
319 See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
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interpreted liberally.320 Some Rehnquist Court Justices who will never endorse
the new property might prove willing to affirm past decisions that require state
and federal legislators to state clearly any intended limit on the persons eligible
for state assistance. Poor people will clearly benefit if the present judicial
majority treats as stare decisis a 1972 case which held that courts "cannot
assume ... that while Congress 'intended to provide programs for economic
security and protection of all children,' it also 'intended arbitrarily to leave one
class of destitute children entirely without meaningful protection.' 321 Given the
prominent role statutory interpretation plays in welfare litigation,322 justices
who broadly construe welfare laws will probably have almost as much impact
as justices who explicitly find welfare rights in the Constitution.
The strategic case against aggressive assertion of rights to basic necessities
overlooks how minor doctrinal victories in welfare cases often have major
impacts on the lives of poor people. Courts have a limited capacity to influence
public policy in many areas of law,323 but organizers of poor people's
movements believe that the litigation campaigns of the 1960s helped numerous
people receive aid or improved benefits. Relief rolls increased dramatically
almost immediately after courts struck down local welfare restrictions. Frances
Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward estimate that "at least 100,000 persons
annually had been denied aid because of [the] residenc[y] laws" declared
unconstitutional in Shapiro.324 They also state that "tens of thousands of
families were denied aid under [an] employable mother rule[ ]" that lower
federal courts in 1968 declared unconstitutional. 325 Edward Sparer maintains
that by striking down the "'substitute father' rule" in King v. Smith, the
Supreme Court "opened the welfare rolls to over half a million children." 326
One welfare rights advocate even suggests that "[a]s a direct result of judicial
320 For one such argument, see Sard, supra note 292, at 377-78.
321 Carlson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 604 (1972) (quoting King, 392 U.S. at 330);
see Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286 (1972) ("[I]n the absence of congressional
authorization for the exclusion clearly evidenced from the Social Security Act or its legislative
history, a state eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance under federal
AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act."). For a similar presumption in state
courts, see Hodge v. Ginsberg, 303 S.E.2d 245, 250 (W.Va. 1983); McGraw v. Hansbarger,
301 S.E.2d 848, 854 (W.Va. 1983).
322 See R. SHEP MoNcK, BmvrEN THE LNES: hiNRPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS
(1994) (addressing impact of judicial interpretation of federal laws on social programs).
323 See RosENBERG, supra note 188 (discussing courts' ability to produce changes).
32 4 FRANCES FOX PIvEN & PucHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE PooR: THE
FuNcnoNs OF Pumlic WEmAm 309 (1971).
325 Id.; see Anderson v. Burson, 300 F. Supp. 401 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
326 Sparer, Right, supra note 54, at 69 (discussing King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 330
(1968)).
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decisions, as well as the indirect effects of the publicity and increased
legitimacy stemming from such litigation and concurrent welfare rights
organizing, literally millions of needy families received welfare benefits." 327
Judicial decisions rejecting narrow readings of existing welfare laws have had
similarly strong impacts. Liberal "judicial interpretation[s] of entitlement
statutes," R. Shep Melnick's study demonstrates, have "substantially enlarged
programs for the poor. ' 328 Even the threat of constitutional litigation may
increase benefits. State officials in New York during the 1960s often avoided
litigation by providing or restoring benefits to persons who threatened
lawsuits. 329
Practitioners have experienced difficulties realizing benefits from favorable
poverty law decisions. 330 Still, such cases as King v. Smith, Shapiro, and
Goldberg have had a greater impact on government practices than such poorly
implemented decisions as Mapp v. Ohio.331 Gerald Rosenberg suggests a
possible reason why welfare rights litigation seems a more promising means for
realizing social change than litigation in other areas of the law. "Court orders,"
he notes, "give administrators who wish to make reforms an additional tool for
obtaining the necessary support and resources." 332 Social movements can
expect to reap the benefits of favorable judicial decisions to the extent that the
persons who must actually respond to court orders are sympathetic to the policy
made by the judiciary. 333 Welfare policies meet this standard. Many social
workers support higher benefits for their clients. 334 Hence, they are far more
likely to comply with court decisions granting those benefits than police officers
are likely to obey court decisions that they believe limit their capacity to
conduct criminal investigations.
Some major doctrinal victories in abortion cases, by comparison, have had
a minor impact on the reproductive choices open to American citizens. Whether
Roe dramatically changed American abortion practices is a subject of
327 Sard, supra note 292, at 367. See generally, GREE'ERG, supra note 52, at 29 ("A
measure of justice and civil liberty was brought to many recipients and many unjustly kept off
the rolls were put on or restored."); LAWRENCE, supra note 59, at 127; DAVIS, supra note
53, at 68, 76, 86.
32 8 MELNICK, supra note 322, at 7; see DUller, supra note 84, at 1423-24 (discussing
successful litigation efforts to prevent the Reagan Administration from cutting disability
benefits).329 See DAvIs, supra note 53, at 41, 68-69, 76; M.ELNiCK, supra note 322, at 100.
330 See DAVIs, supra note 53, at 136-37.
331 367 U.S. 643 (1961). For the difficulties implementing Mapp, see HoRowrnz, supra
note 183, at 220-54; ROSmBERG, supra note 188, at 316-24.
332 ROSENBERG, supra note 188, at 34.
3 3 3 Id. at 33-36.
334 See DAVIS, supra note 53, at 42-43, 46, 52-54, 123.
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controversy. 335 Had that decision been overruled in Casey, abortion would
have remained legal in a sufficient number of states so that most women would
have retained a de facto right to terminate unwanted pregnancies. 336 Studies by
the fervently pro-choice Guttmacher Institute demonstrate that judicial decisions
sustaining government bans on abortion funding and various abortion
regulations are not preventing most poor women from terminating unwanted
pregnancies safely and legally.337 These adverse judicial decisions are having
some consequences, and for the most part, have disproportionately burdened
poor persons.338 Still, impact studies indicate that liberals concerned with the
practical effect on the lives of the poor may not easily determine whether their
constitutional energies are best spent defending and expanding existing privacy
rights or defending existing welfare rights.
The rough rule of three fails to recognize that liberal constitutional claims
can be pitched to state judges, who are authorized to interpret equal protection,
due process, or similar clauses in the state constitution more liberally than the
present Supreme Court interprets the analogous passages in the federal
Constitution. 339 Litigation efforts to secure basic necessities seem particularly
promising in states whose constitutions contain more explicit textual protections
for poor people than the federal Constitution. 340 The New York Constitution,
for example, declares that "[t]he aid, care and support of the needy are public
concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and
in such manner and by such means, as the legislature may from time to time
determine." 341 The record of state courts in welfare cases is hardly sterling. 342
335 Compare ROSENBERG, supra note 188, at 175-201 (suggesting that the Court played
a lesser role in securing legal abortion than is ordinarily thought to be the case), with GRABER,
supra note 36, at 124-25 (suggesting that Roe may have had a greater impact than Rosenberg
acknowledges).
336 See GIAER, supra note 36, at 73-75.
337 For citation to relevant sources, see id.
338 See id. at 68-72.
339 See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977); Edelman, supra note 119, at 8, 55; Ramsey &
Braveman, supra note 231, at 1622, 1628-29. Proponents of the rough rule of three should
realize that, particularly on matters of statutory interpretation, lower federal courts often make
decisions that are not reviewed by the Supreme Court. See MEmCK, supra note 322, at 39-
40. 340 See Braveman, supra note 231, at 596 (noting that twelve state constitutions
"include[ ] provisions that... refer to a governmental obligation to care for the needy or
protect the health of all citizens").
341 N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1; see Tucker v. Toia, 371 N.E.2d 449, 452 (N.Y. 1977)
("[S]ection 1 of article XVII imposes upon the State an affirmative duty to aid the needy.");
Lee v. Smith, 373 N.E.2d 247, 250 (N.Y. 1977). For a sampling of how the New York
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bench has interpreted this duty, see infra notes 343, 347.
342 See Moore v. Ganim, 660 A.2d 742, 755-59 (Conn. 1995) (citing numerous state
opinions rejecting constitutional welfare rights); Tilden v. Hayward, No. 11297, 1990 LEXIS
140 (New Castle Sept. 10, 1990) (refusing housing entitlement rights); People v. Lyons, 30
N.E.2d 46 (11. 1940) (upholding a residency law that was unfavorable to indigents); Warrior
v. Thompson, 449 N.E.2d 53 (Il. 1983) (holding that elimination of hospital benefits to
recipients of general assistance was constitutional); Bullock v. Whiteman, 865 P.2d 197 (Kan.
1993) (rejecting claims that regulations restricting benefits for general assistance were
unconstitutional); North Dakota v. Perkins County, 9 N.W.2d 500 (N.D. 1943) (upholding
residency law that was unfavorable to indigents); Kratzer v. Commonwealth, 481 A.2d 1380
(Pa. 1984) (holding stepparents' income may be considered when determining child's aid
under AFDC); Conklin v. Shinpoch, 730 P.2d 643 (Wash. 1987) (rejecting claim that general
assistance program was unconstitutional); Diller, supra note 84, at 1421; Ramsey &
Braveman, supra note 231, at 1626-29.
Many state courts have announced in dicta that "there is no legal obligation upon the
state to support its poor at all." Beck v. Buena Park Hotel Corp., 196 N.E.2d 686, 688 (111.
1964); see also Newland v. Child, 254 P.2d 1066, 1070 (Idaho 1953) ("The theory of the
American political system is that the citizen supports the state, not the reverse. Even as
to... indigents, there is no constitutional or common law duty resting upon the state."); City
of Champaign v. City of Champaign Township, 156 N.E.2d 543, 545 (111. 1959) ("There is
neither a constitutional nor common law obligation upon any governmental unit to support the
poor and destitute."); Collins v. State Bd. of Social Welfare, 81 N.W.2d 4, 7 (Iowa 1957)
("[There is no common law or constitutional duty resting upon the state to provide support,
the obligation is a moral rather than mandatory one."); Inhabitants of Town of Orrington v.
City of Bangor, 46 A.2d 406, 407 (Me. 1946) ("At common law, public authorities were not
liable for the support of paupers."); Senior Citizens League v. Dep't of Soc. Sec., 228 P.2d
478, 483 (Wash. 1951), quoted in Ellis v. State Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 285 S.W.2d
634, 638 (Mo. 1955) ("'Recipients [of governmental aid] have no vested interest in the public
assistance they are receiving or desire to receive.'"); Elliot v. Ehrlich, 280 N.W.2d 637, 641
(Neb. 1979) ("Welfare benefits are not a fundamental right."); Mary Lanning Mem'l Hosp.
v. Clay County, 101 N.W.2d 510, 513 (Neb. 1960) (stating there was no constitutional duty
upon a county to pay for care of indigents, but state could impose such a duty); Division of
Aid for the Aged, Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Hogan, 54 N.E.2d 781, 782 (Ohio 1944)
("[There is no constitutional or common-law duty on the part of... any governmental unit
to support poor and destitute persons."); Multuomah County v. Luihn, 178 P.2d 159, 169
(Or. 1947) ("There is no obligation at common law upon the state or its political subdivisions
to furnish relief for the poor.").
Initial appearances to the contrary, most of the cases cited above do not foreclose state
constitutional claims for welfare rights. Some of these cases hold that some other
constitutional or statutory right of a poor person has been violated. See Collins, 81 N.W.2d at
8-9 (declaring unconstitutional under the state constitution a maximum on welfare payments
to any family); City of Champaign, 156 N.E.2d at 549 (declaring a city liable for hospital
costs of indigents under relevant code sections); Ellis, 285 S.W.2d at 636 (ruling that benefits
were terminated without adequate hearing); Elliot, 280 N.W.2d at 642 (declaring
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However, many local tribunals have accepted statutory and state constitutional
claims to basic necessities that were rejected by federal courts.343 Some
unconstitutional "an irrebuttable presumption that the income of maternal grandparents is
contributed to the needs of the unborn grandchild").
In other cases, the actual issue before the court was which branch of government was
legally obligated to pay welfare benefits or whether welfare benefits could be recouped from
an estate. See Beck, 196 N.E.2d at 687-89 (ruling public aid commission could recover
medical costs related to a personal injury judgment secured by recipient of aid); Inhabitants of
Town of Orrington, 46 A.2d at 407 (construing a statute as not relieving townspeople of cost
of assistance of an indigent); Mary Lanning Mem'l Hosp., 101 N.W.2d at 516 (ruling county
not liable to hospital for unapproved emergency treatment of an indigent); Hogan, 54 N.E.2d
at 782-83 (ruling wife not liable for aid received by husband).
Finally, several cases where the denial of welfare benefits was sustained contain
language suggesting that state courts would be more sympathetic to the rights of the poor in
other circumstances. See Moore, 660 A.2d at 747 (noting that petitioners were demanding aid
from the state "irrespective of the availability of food and shelter from family, friends,
charitable organizations, religious institutions, and other community sources"); Bullock, 865
P.2d 205 ("The result herein does not mean that there is no point at which reduction in
benefits and increases in eligibility requirements would ever be violative of... the Kansas
Constitution."); Conklin, 730 P.2d at 651 ("SSI-ineligible spouses' financial needs are already
addressed by the state supplement to SSI.").
343 Not surprisingly, given the language in the state constitution, the New York bench
has been particularly solicitous of welfare rights. See, e.g., Minino v. Perales, 589 N.E.2d
385 (N.Y. 1992) (holding that welfare programs cannot discriminate against aliens); Tucker,
371 N.E.2d at 452 (holding that the legislature cannot constitutionally "refusfe] to aid those
whom it has classified as needy"); Lee, 373 N.E.2d at 252 (holding that the state cannot
constitutionally adopt programs which result in "the aged, disabled and blind... surviv[ing]
on lesser amounts than are granted to other needy persons"); Palmer v. Cuomo, 503
N.Y.S.2d 20 (App. Div. 1986) (holding that children in foster care have a constitutional right
to the training necessary to function on their own as adults); Toia v. Schueler, 389 N.Y.S.2d
414, 414 (App. Div. 1976) ("A county may not evade its obligation to provide for the welfare
needs of its residents by the County Legislature's refusal to allocate funds therefor.").
The New York judiciary has asserted that elected officials have substantial, but not
absolute, discretion to determine who is needy and what benefits are adequate. See Bernstein
v. Toia, 373 N.E.2d 238, 244 (N.Y. 1977) (ruling that state officials need not consider
individual circumstances of each aid recipient); Lovelace v. Gross, 605 N.E.2d 339, 343
(N.Y. 1992) (ruling that grandparents' income may be considered in calculation of aid); see
also Ramsey & Braveman, supra note 231, at 1622-24 (discussing how the New York
judiciary has interpreted article XVII of the state constitution).
For a sample of cases protecting welfare rights in other states, see L.T. v. New Jersey
Dep't of Human Servs., 633 A.2d 964, 970 (N.J. 1993) (ruling that state agencies "have the
responsibility to see that the homeless receive shelter"); Williams v. Dep't of Human Servs.,
561 A.2d 244 (N.J. 1989) (addressing housing rights); Ellis, 285 S.W.2d at 634; Elliott, 280
N.W.2d at 637; Collins, 81 N.W.2d at 4; Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 712 P.2d 1309,
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optimistic commentators even think that "a new period of judicial [activism]
appears to be unfolding," one that "is based on state rather than federal law and
is taling place in state rather than federal courts." 344 Education has been a
particularly fruitful source of litigation. Numerous state courts have rejected
Rodriguez and found a requirement of equal educational funding in the state
constitution. 345 Courts in Massachusetts have ordered state officials to increase
welfare benefits substantially to ensure that persons on state assistance can
afford adequate housing. 346 At least one state judiciary may be moving towards
finding a state constitutional right to adequate shelter. 347 These examples
1311 (Mont. 1986) (ruling that "a classification which abridges welfare benefits" must be
subject to "heightened scrutiny under an equal protection analysis," and, on that ground,
striking down laws discriminating against younger persons needing assistance); Butte
Community Union v. Lewis, 745 P.2d 1128 (Mont. 1987) (holding that state welfare
programs cannot constitutionally discriminate against persons without dependent children).
Both Montana decisions were overturned by a state constitutional amendment. See MONT.
CONSr. art. XII § 3 ("The legislature may provide such economic assistance... for those
who ... are determined by the legislature to be in need."); Harper v. Greely, 763 P.2d 650,
651-53 (Mont. 1988) (upholding sufficiency of referendum to amend the Montana
Constitution); see also Ramsey & Braveman, supra note 231, at 1627-28 (discussing the
Montana experience).
344 Sard, supra note 292, at 367-68; see id. at 282-88; Edelman, supra note 119, at 55-
60; Ratnesar, supra note 292, at 17.
345 See Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993); Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist.
No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994); Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651
S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976); Sheff v. O'Neill, 678
A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ken.
1989); McDuffy v. Secretary of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993);
Helena Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Abbott v. Burke, 575
A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn.
1993); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991); Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va. 1979);
Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980).
The system of funding education in North Dakota survived judicial challenge only
because the state constitution required four of the five justices on the state supreme court to
support any ruling that strikes down a state law. Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511
N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994).
For the most recent scorecard on how state judiciaries have responded to attacks on how
public education is funded, see Roosevelt, 877 P.2d at 814; see also Edelman, supra note
119, at 57-60.
346 See Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless v. Secretary of Human Servs., 511
N.E.2d 603 (Mass. 1987) (directing the Department of Public Welfare to notify the legislature
when AFDC funds were insufficient to enable parents to raise children in their own home).
347 See Jiggetts v. Grinker, 553 N.E.2d 570, 572 (N.Y. 1990) (claiming that in light of
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demonstrate the practical importance of advancing constitutional arguments for
welfare rights, even when both federal precedent and federal politics indicate
that such claims will not be accepted by federal courts.
Present liberal constitutional priorities seem particularly questionable from
a strategic perspective if, as may seem appropriate, the rough rule of three is
supplemented with a rough rule of six. Liberal constitutional theorists who
abandon constitutional claims that will not appeal to at least three justices
should, for similar reasons, de-emphasize constitutional claims that have
already convinced at least six justices. This rough rule of six acquires special
force when the ranks of the dissenters are not likely to be augmented in the near
future. Given the present 6-3 Supreme Court majority in favor of retaining
Roe, and President Clinton's strong pro-choice sentiments, little danger exists
that abortion rights will be subject to federal judicial attack in the near future.
Therefore, the central strategic question liberal constitutional theorists should
presently ask is not which arguments will best retain Roe, because any
competent defense will probably do. Rather, pro-choice constitutionalists should
detail the other rights that a court committed to Roe might be persuaded to
protect. The rough rule of three may still rule out a renewed emphasis on
welfare rights. Nonetheless, liberals can hope that Justices Breyer, Ginsburg,
and at least one other Clinton appointee will engage in something more than a
mopping up operation that merely expands abortion rights further. The standard
defenses of Roe, unfortunately, suggest that the next frontiers for liberal
constitutional theory are other liberties associated with the sexual revolution and
the right to die348--causes of little interest to most poor people. 349
Liberal constitutional theorists might justify their continued emphasis on
abortion rights by correctly noting that the rough rule of six fails to recognize
the state constitution, the statute in question should be interpreted as requiring state officials
"to establish shelter allowances that bear a reasonable relation to the cost of housing");
McCain v. Koch, 511 N.E.2d 62, 63 (N.Y. 1987) (holding that courts in New York are
constitutionally authorized to order agencies providing "emergency housing for homeless
families with children, to provide housing which satisfies minimum standards of sanitation,
safety and decency"); see also Doe v. Dinkins, 600 N.Y.S.2d 939 (App. Div. 1993)
(invoking state constitution in support of a court ruling requiring state officials to improve
conditions at homeless shelters).
348 See TRIBE & DoRF, supra note 33, at 55-60, 117; DwoRKIN, supra note 25, at 179-
241. 349 The most popular defense of abortion rights during the 1960s, arguments
emphasizing how the law in practice was granting more affluent citizens a de facto right to
terminate pregnancies, could be applied to other situations where law enforcement officials
were systemically treating rich citizens better than the poor. See GRABER, supra note 36, at
116-17.
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how volatile American politics has become.350 The partisan composition of
each branch of government has changed in the recent past and may change
again in the near future. During the 1980s, pro-life presidents battled an
increasingly pro-choice Congress. Two years after installing a President who
favored legal abortion, Americans elected a mostly pro-life Congress. 351 This
situation is hardly stable. Prominent political scientists agree that "it's more
possible for a shock to flip control of the Congress today than it was 10 or 12
years ago," and, at present, these experts recognize, "there is not a [durable]
working majority for either party" in any branch of government. 352
Constitutional theorists concerned with future electoral trends should also
recognize that political prognosticators have had a particularly bad record
divining the course of American reproductive politics. Pundits pronounced Roe
dead immediately before Casey, and then prematurely buried the pro-life
movement after the 1992 election. Two years later, the Christian Coalition
demonstrated renewed political strength and prominent Republican strategists
began looking for opportunities to place the recriminalization of abortion back
on the political agenda. 353 Social conservatives did not fare as well in the 1996
election. Nevertheless, given how quickly pro-life forces have regrouped after
other defeats, liberal constitutional theorists are well advised to ignore the rough
rule of six and sharpen their defenses of Roe.
The same criticism of the rough rule of six, however, can be made of the
rough rule of three. Americans in the near future may witness a strengthened
Christian Coalition committed to banning abortion. The same future, however,
may witness the reemergence of a powerful political movement for national
health care or a strengthened union movement dedicated to reinvigorating the
350 Steve Rosenstone, Roy Behr, and Edward Lazarus provide a particularly compelling
example of how unstable American electoral politics has become. They note that:
[A] year before the primary season got rolling, few observers would have given much
credence to the idea that in 1992 a third party candidate would capture nearly 20 percent
of the presidential vote. In fact it is only a slight exaggeration to say that [in February
1991], few observers thought that any candidate other than President George Bush would
garner 20 percent of the vote.
STEvEN J. ROSENSTONEET AL., THIRD PARTES iN AMmECA233 (2d ed. 1996).
351 See Fred Barnes, Life of the Party, Thm NEw REPuBuc, Dec. 5, 1994, at 10.
352 Split Government Not Etpected to Get Much Done, Election Watchers Say, STAN.
RE., Nov. 13, 1996, at 5 (quoting David Brady, John Ferejohn, and Douglas Rivers).
353 See George Weigel & William Kristol, Prudence, Principle, and Abortion, WASH.
PoSn, Aug. 30, 1994, at A21 ("T'he goal of pro-life Republican action should be




welfare state. An administration in which labor and health care activists play a
major role might staff the federal courts with Rawlsian liberals predisposed to
be sympathetic to constitutional arguments on behalf of rights to certain basic
necessities. Hence, those political uncertainties which counsel liberals against
de-emphasizing abortion rights should also counsel liberals against taking
welfare rights off the constitutional table.
No one can determine with any degree of certainty which direction
American politics will take in the near future. Certainly, constitutional theorists
have had no better track record than most citizens making short term political
predictions. In relatively volatile political times, therefore, liberals (and
conservatives) should simply make the best arguments they can for those rights
they believe the Constitution protects, leaving to the future how receptive courts
will be to those claims. Attorneys considering how to frame appeals to the
present Supreme Court should, of course, keep the present composition of the
federal bench in mind. Such strategic concerns should play a much smaller role
for constitutional theorists committed to more long-term projects. "Lawyers
ought to try to avoid creating a new Plessy v. Ferguson," Jack Greenberg
reminds us, "[b]ut very often, there is no effective way to know how the Court
will decide certain issues without trying. 354
C. Constitutional Considerations
The last strategic failing of the rough rule of three (and six) highlights a
more fundamental constitutional problem with that practice: constitutional
theory as an intellectual enterprise focuses on those constitutional rights that
Americans have, and is relatively unconcerned with whether the Supreme
Court or any other constitutional authority is likely to protect those rights
tomorrow or the next day. Americans, proponents of aspirational methods of
constitutional exegesis realize, must "interpret and apply [constitutional]
provisions in light of our best understanding of an ideal state of affairs
adumbrated by those provisions." 355 Constitutional theories too tethered to
strategic considerations or recent precedent obliterate this aspirational
dimension of American constitutionalism by conflating the best vision of the
constitutional order with the best results that can be gotten out of the Rehnquist
Court. Liberal constitutional visions will remain vibrant, therefore, only if
theorists who believe that the American constitutional order, at its best, would
guarantee to all citizens the basic necessities of life, repeatedly say so.
Decisions concerning when, how, and where to press those constitutional
claims are questions best directed at political activists and litigators in the field,
354 GREENBERG, supra note 52, at 38.
355 SoTimos A. BABER, supra note 41, at vii.
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not constitutional theorists in the academy.
No sound reasons exist for fearing that the promotion of progressive
constitutional aspirations will result in the constitutionalization of novel, bizarre,
or unpopular rights. Constitutional and political arguments do not come from
out of nowhere. As numerous scholars recognize, successful claims of any sort
rely heavily on existing social practices and modes of justification. Broader
ideological forces inevitably limit the constitutional arguments liberals (and
conservatives) choose to make and the arguments they are capable of
choosing. 356 Persons making claims of constitutional right typically attempt to
demonstrate that their assertions are not novel or bizarre by providing evidence
that society already recognizes the liberty in question or recognizes some
closely analogous liberty. 357 Proponents of the constitutional right to abortion
sought to establish their mainstream credentials in Roe by claiming that the
common law recognized a right to an abortion, 358 that states were liberalizing
access to abortion,359 and that abortion rights were analogous to the right to
birth control that the Supreme Court had previously declared a constitutional
356 For a more detailed elaboration of this point, see Quentin Skinner, Some Problems in
the Analysis of Political Thought and Action, 2 POL. THEORY 277, 299 (1974); see also
JAMES BoYD WHrrE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSnroNS AND
RECONSrITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNrrY 6 (1984); SANFoRD
LEVINSON, CoNSTrmrUIONAL FAITH 156 (1988); MARK A. GRABtR, TRANSFORmiNG FREE
SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIvIL LIBERTARIANISM 219-20 (1991).
357 See, e.g., Zablocid v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978) (historical recognition
of the right to marriage); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500-01 (1977) (finding
that a grandmother's right to live with her grandchildren was sufficiently analogous to other
family rights the Court had recognized to warrant constitutional protection); Poe v. Uliman,
367 U.S. 497, 554 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("conclusive, in my view, is the utter
novelty of the enactment" banning the use of contraception by married people). Social
recognition of rights can be formal or informal. The Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), noted that most states had already adopted the exclusionary rule in criminal cases. Id.
at 651-52; see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (noting that "[t]wenty-
two states, as friends of the Court" supported claims that defendants in felony cases had a
constitutional right to state-appointed counsel). The concurring opinions in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), observed that although the laws of most states permitted juries
to impose capital punishment, that sanction was hardly ever inflicted. Id. at 291-95 (Brennan,
J., concurring); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 311-13 (White, J., concurring);
id. at 364-66 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 251-52, 255-56 (Douglas, J., concurring)
(noting that affluent citizens enjoy a de facto right not to be executed); see also Poe, 367 U.S.
at 533 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that most citizens had a de facto right to use birth
control).
358 See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
359 See 410 U.S. 113, 143-47, 154-55 (1973).
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liberty. 360 Opponents of Roe challenged these claims, particularly the analogy
between birth control and abortion.3 61 Still, the modalities of constitutional
argument ensure that debates over abortion, welfare, and other claims of
constitutional right are not over whether a concededly novel or bizarre liberty
should be accorded constitutional status, 362 but whether the right under debate
is sufficiently rooted in American political and legal practice to warrant
constitutional recognition. 363
Fears that the Supreme Court will protect novel, bizarre, or unpopular
rights are similarly groundless. Supreme Court justices do not come from out of
nowhere. They are nominated by elected executives and confirmed by elected
legislators. Because some citizens vote against representatives who previously
supported a controversial judicial nominee, 364 the mere perception that a jurist
is out of the mainstream, however mistaken, may be enough to prevent their
360 Id. at 152-53; see Transcript of Edited and Narrated Arguments in Roe v. Wade, in
MAY IT PLEAsE THE COURT: THE MosT SiGNFCAcT ORAL ARGUMENTS MADE BEFORE THE
SUPaEE COURT SINCE 1955, at 349 (Peter Irons et al. eds., 1993).
361 See, e.g., Ely, Crying Wolf, supra note 26, at 929-30 (1973); Richard A. Epstein,
Substantive Due Process By Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SuP. Cr. REv. 159,
170 (1974); MICHAE J. PERRY, MoRALrIr, POLnCS, AD LAW 174-75 (1988). Opponents
of Roe also challenge pro-choice claims that the common law recognized abortion rights. See,
e.g., John Finnis, "Shameless Acts" in Colorado: Abuse of Scholarship in Constitutional
Cases, 7 ACAD. QUmsToNs 10, 10-19 (1994); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A PRIVATE CHOICE:
ABORTION IN AMERICA IN TH SEvENTms 5-7 (1979).
362 See Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlanr, J., dissenting) ("A decision of this court which
radically departs from [tradition] could not long survive.").
363 Conservative and liberal justices in Fifth Amendment takings cases debate whether
the common law supports a constitutional rule requiring compensation whenever a state law
forbids "the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on... land." Lucas v.
South Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992). Compare the majority opinion in Lucas,
id., with its dissent, id. at 1055-56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("It is not clear from the
Court's opinion where our 'historical compact' or 'citizens['] understanding' comes from, but
it does not appear to be history."). In Fourteenth Amendment cases liberals and conservatives
reverse sides and debate whether engaging in sodomy is sufficiently analogous to other
privacy rights the Court has recognized to warrant constitutional protection. Compare the
majority opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) ("none of the rights
announced in those [past] cases bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of
homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy"), with its dissent, id. at 203-08 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (citing precedent in support of the claim that "the case before us implicates both
the decisional and spatial aspects of the right to privacy").
364 See L. Marvin Overby et al., Courting Constituents? An Analysis of the Senate
Confirmation Vote on Justice Clarence Thomas, 86 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 87 (1992); Robin M.
Wolpert & James G. Gimpel, Information, Recall, and Accountability: The Electorate's
Response to the Clarence Thomas Nomination, 22 LEGIS. STuD. Q. 4 (1997).
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appointment to the federal bench. The confirmation process set out in Article II
of the Constitution almost guarantees that federal judges will accept only those
claims of constitutional right that are supported by a substantial segment of the
(educated) population. Good reasons exist for objecting to the American
practice of judicial review.365 Both institutional structure and history, however,
should allay concerns that the federal bench will be out of touch with legislative
and popular majorities for any length of time. As Robert Dahl notes, it is
"unrealistic to suppose that a Court whose members are recruited in the fashion
of Supreme Court justices would long hold to norms of right or justice
substantially at odds with the rest of the political elite." 366 Whatever one may
think of Roe as an original matter, that decision would have been overruled had
the Democrats not recaptured the Senate in 1986 and the Presidency in 1992.
Should every present member of the federal bench suddenly convert to
socialism, the Supreme Court will continue protecting welfare rights only if
progressive forces gain the political strength necessary to block adverse judicial
appointments.3 67
Constitutional theorists who think recent precedent sharply limits the rights
that should receive constitutional sanction may, in a misguided effort to reduce
constitutional change, threaten more fundamental characteristics of the
American constitutional enterprise. Enduring constitutions must have some
mechanism that enables them to respond to political change. 368 Some texts stay
abreast of the times by providing undemanding conditions for formal
amendment. Constitutions that cannot easily-be amended formally are typically
interpreted loosely. "A relatively difficult amendment process," Donald Lutz
points out, "will tend to be associated with a broad theory of judicial
construction." 369 Given the extraordinary procedures for formal amendment set
out in Article VII, the Constitution of the United States has probably survived
365 See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 381, 412-15 (1997)
(defending an "anticonstitutionalist" position).
366 Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 291 (1957). For other works reaching similar
conclusions, see THOMAs MARSHALL, PuBLic OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT (1989);
Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MicH. L. REV. 578, 677-80 (1993);
Graber, supra note 301, at 35; William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court
as a Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court
Decisions, 87 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 87 (1993).
367 Moreover, judicial protection of welfare rights would influence policy only if elected
officials and their appointees choose to implement judicial decisions.
36 8 See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in
RESPONDiNG TO IMPERFECnON: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSITUTIONAL
AMeNmENT 242 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).369 Id. at 273; see id. at 265-67.
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more than two hundred years only because constitutional authorities have
adopted interpretive principles that enable "any political question [that] arises"
to be "resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question." 370 The constitutional
tradition we celebrate, in other words, is one that facilitates the expression of
basic political aspirations in constitutional terms. 37 1 A practical ban on efforts to
constitutionalize rights that prominent political movements believe fundamental
might well require the introduction of some novel, perhaps bizarre,
constitutional mechanism for accommodating political change. 372 Hard to
amend constitutions that are strictly construed may prosper in theoretical zoos,
but they do not appear to survive long in the political wilds.
Liberal (or conservative) constitutional theories less tethered to recent
precedent adjust rather than abandon traditional doctrinal arguments. Claims
that the Constitution protects the right to basic necessities (or any other right) do
not entail a judicial obligation to overrule, in one fell swoop, every hostile
constitutional ruling. When justices become convinced that a recent line of
decisions is constitutionally mistaken, institutional considerations and the
principle of stare decisis will typically indicate that the better course of action in
the short run is for justices to narrow the scope of cases now perceived as
erroneously decided while building an alternative body of precedent that points
in some other constitutional direction. In most cases, the Supreme Court should
announce the existence of a hithertofore judicially unrecognized constitutional
right, such as the right to be provided with basic necessities, only after a solid
precedential foundation for that right has been established. Such an incremental
process not only allows justices to see how their policies work, but gives a
polity committed to a different constitutional vision the time necessary to
appoint other jurists dedicated to reversing the judicial trend.
Constitutional theorists should regard precedent as firmly entrenched in the
constitutional order only when a broad social consensus exists that the judicial
decision was either constitutionally correct, morally just, or too embedded in
our present political regime to be abandoned. As Abraham Lincoln asserted
with respect to Dred Scott v. Sandford,373 judicial rulings should be granted
authoritative constitutional status only "when fully settled" both with respect to
370 1 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 114, at 290.
371 See SANFORD LEImNsON, supra note 356, at 191-94 (1988).
372 See STmriN M. GRuIN, AMERICAN CONSr ONAuSM 28-30, 41 (1996) ("The
experience of American constitutionalism shows that you can maintain the written quality of
the constitution only at the expense of abandoning the framework character of the document
and you can maintain the framework character of the constitution only by abandoning the idea
that all important constitutional change must occur through formal amendment.").
373 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
1997]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
"the particular cases decided" and "the general policy of the country." 374
Marbury v. Madison375 and Brown v. Board of Education376 meet this standard,
even if, as some scholars have suggested, Brown was wrong when handed
down.377 These decisions were extremely controversial for long periods of
time. Americans of almost all political persuasions, however, are now
persuaded that judicial review and racial equality are central to our
constitutional order. By comparison, no consensus exists that judicial decisions
protecting abortion rights or rejecting welfare rights are constitutionally correct,
morally just, or too embedded in the present political regime to be abandoned.
Hence, neither Roe nor Dandridge qualifies for the same constitutional status as
Marbury or Brown. Just as critics of Roe continue insisting that legal abortion is
not central to our constitutional order, so liberals should continue insisting that
welfare rights are central to our constitutional order.378 By conceding that the
Constitution does not guarantee all persons certain basic necessities, Dworkin,
Tribe, and other liberal constitutionalists are taking a crucial step in the process
that will result in Dandridge being accorded the same constitutional status as
Brown.379 Such a concession is warranted only if liberal constitutional theorists
have concluded that welfare rights are not central to our constitutional order.
Progressive commitments to the constitutional rights of the poor should not be
abandoned merely because the left is presently experiencing a run of adverse
decisions.
The original members of the movement for welfare rights knew that their
task was to alter some very entrenched attitudes towards poverty. Edward
Sparer and his allies did not expect to be successful in the immediate future.
They hoped to make the claim that the Constitution protected welfare rights
familiar and increasingly acceptable to Americans. For better or worse, their
political window of opportunity closed before the case for constitutional rights
374 2 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE CoLLECT WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 401 (Roy P.
Basler ed., 1953).
375 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
376 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
377 See ROGERS M. SMrrH, The Inherent Deceptiveness of Constitutional Discourse: A
Diagnosis and Prescription, in NOMOS XXXIX: INrEGRrrY AD CONSCIENCE (Ian Shapiro
ed., forthcoming 1997); Herbert Wechsler, Towards Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 31-35 (1959).
378 See 2 LINCOLN, supra note 374, at 401-10 (explaining why in 1857 the Dred Scott
decision should not be treated as an authoritative constitutional precedent).
379 The Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in Casey could not entrench Roe as a
constitutional precedent. A decision by the Republican party to abandon its pro-life platform,
however, would go a long way towards demonstrating that a broad consensus now exists that
legal abortion is a central feature of our constitutional order.
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disseminated among the constitutional elite. 380 "One factor in the failure of the
litigation strategy," Martha Davis notes, "was likely the short duration of the
organized welfare rights movement." 381 Samuel Krislov agrees that "[t]here
was not enough time for the necessary analysis, criticism and refinement of the
'right to life' doctrine. There was not enough time to permit a judicial
acceptance of a new constitutional doctrine[,]... nor was there time to obscure
the fine line between judicial and legislative rulemaking authority." 382 Still,
Krislov notes, "[e]ven within this short time frame.... a number of federal
district and courts of appeals judges accepted the right to life theory, suggesting
that a more measured approach-including law review articles and
simultaneous litigation based on state constitutions-might indeed have been
more successful. "383
Contemporary advocates for welfare rights recognize that constitutional
arguments cannot be confined to what is possible today. Peter Edelman publicly
admits that "the present Supreme Court will not adopt" his claim that "a
constitutional right to a 'survival' income" exists. 384 Nevertheless, he
maintains, "the intellectual groundwork for judicial participation should be laid
anyway against the day when a more amenable Court is in place." 385 By taking
constitutional welfare rights off the agenda in order to make abortion rights
arguments more palatable to conservative justices, liberal constitutional theorists
risk convincing future liberal justices that no judicially enforceable
constitutional rights to basic necessities exist. As a result, constitutional welfare
rights may not be on the judicial agenda when a window of opportunity
reopens. Whether time will permit welfare rights to get back on that agenda is
an open question.
D. Perpetuating Constitutional Injustice
Too rigid an adherence to recent precedent not only corrupts liberal
constitutional theory by prematurely taking certain rights off the table, but also
by conscripting liberal participation in practices for identifying constitutional
rights that may subvert the American constitutional order. The rough rule of
380 See GREENBERG, supra note 52, at 30 ("The tenor of political rhetoric has shifted all
too swiftly from solicitude for the poor in the 1960's to harsh calls for restricting eligibility
and winnowing welfare rolls.").
381 DAvis, supra note 53, at 143.
382 Samuel Krislov, The OEO Lawyers Fail to Constitutionalize a Right to Welfare: A
Study in the Uses and Limits of the Judicial Process, 58 MNN. L. REv. 211,245 (1975).
383 Id. at 239; see DAvIs, supra note 53, at 143.
384 Edelman, supra note 119, at 3.
385 Id.
19971
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
three purports to advance liberal constitutional goals by selecting from the full
universe of rights liberals believe the Constitution protects-rights that liberals
believe the present conservative Court might be persuaded to protect.
Constitutional justice, however, may not be so simply maximized. Decisions to
protect some liberties but not others create independent rights violations when
no principled distinction exists between protected and unprotected rights.
Ronald Dworkin properly condemns "checkerboard" laws-measures that
randomly allocate fundamental freedoms-because an arbitrary distribution of a
constitutional liberty is often worse than the blunt refusal to recognize the right
in question.386 For example, a state which gave only affluent white women the
right to terminate their pregnancies would protect more abortion rights than a
state which totally banned all abortions. Nonetheless, this increased protection
violates our social commitment to equality under law. Such arbitrary policies
are sometimes necessary, but no one thinks they are desirable. 387
Equality under law may also be violated by the total package of rights a
state recognizes. No principled distinction exists between protected and
unprotected freedoms when constitutional authorities cannot explain why they
rely on certain general principles and interpretive methods when adjudicating
some claims of constitutional right that they reject when adjudicating other
claims of constitutional right. A constitutional order is unjust, Dworkin properly
insists, when a state "must endorse principles to justify part of what it has done
that it must reject to justify the rest." 388 If the right to abortion and the right to
engage in homosexual sodomy both follow logically from a more general right
of privacy, then a society whose constitution is interpreted as protecting that
general right of privacy should not keep abortion legal and ban homosexual
sodomy.389 At the very least, Supreme Court justices in gay rights cases should
not reject general constitutional rights to privacy without explaining why they
are still protecting abortion. Unprincipled packages of constitutional rights are
particularly egregious when constitutional authorities recognize only those
rights of interest to more privileged citizens, turning a deaf ear to the equally
386 DwORKN, EMPIRE, supra note 80, at 178-84.
387 Dworin points out that persons who are convinced that abortion is murder might
support laws prohibiting women born in certain months from having abortions when legal
abortion is the only alternative. These opponents of legal abortion recognize, however, that
such laws violate constitutional integrity. See id. at 182-83.
388 Id. at 184 ("Integrity is flouted... whenever a community enacts and enforces
different laws each of which is coherent in itself, but which cannot be defended together as
expressing a coherent ranking of different principles of justice or fairness or procedural due
process.").
389 Unless, of course, constitutional authorities reject the claim that the right to
homosexual sodomy follows logically from that more general right of privacy.
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valid constitutional arguments of less fortunate individuals. One particularly
disturbing feature of Robert Bork's writings, for example, is that the originalist
doctrines that he insists refute the constitutional demands black Americans made
for desegregated schools in Washington, D.C., are instantly discarded when
white citizens challenge federal affirmative action programs. 39°
Liberal constitutional theorists committed to constitutional equality should
not settle for what, from a liberal perspective, may be an utterly random set of
rights merely because those are the only constitutional rights that sitting justices
might be persuaded to protect. Reliance on something like the rough rule of
three can be justified within liberal theory only if that standard yields a
coherent, if imperfect, vision of the constitutional order. "If there must be
compromise because people are divided about justice," Dworkin writes, "it
must be compromise about which scheme of justice to adopt rather than a
compromised scheme of justice." 391 Thus, constitutional commentators and
authorities (liberal or otherwise) who value consistency should not adjust their
theories to fit existing judicial preferences when doing so will either promote
the arbitrary collection of liberties that happen to appeal to those in power or,
worse, help legitimate discriminatory distinctions between constitutional rights.
This constitutional obligation to avoid unprincipled collections of rights
seems a particularly compelling reason for liberals to foreswear using the rough
rule of three at present. Many critics charge that a significant majority of sitting
justices are unwilling to protect the constitutional rights of the poor even when
those rights cannot be distinguished in principle from the constitutional rights of
more affluent citizens that federal courts presently protect.392 If this accusation
is correct, then any constitutional theory closely tied to recent precedent will
both mimic and perpetuate that injustice.
390 Bork insists there was "no way to justify the Warren Court's revision of the
Constitution" in Bolling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), because "the equal protection
clause ... applied only to the states; no similar clause applied to the federal government."
BoRK, supra note 117, at 83-84. He nevertheless concludes that the Court's failure in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constr., Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), to declare unconstitutional a federal law "giving preferences in
the award of broadcasting licenses to minorities" was "a disaster for constitutional law."
BoRK, supra note 117, at 359, 361. At no point in his diatribe against affirmative action does
Bork examine the intentions of the persons responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment. This
omission is particularly significant in light of the numerous racial preferences passed by the
Congress during Reconstruction. See Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative
History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REv. 753 (1985).
391 DwoRK!N, EMPIRE, supra note 80, at 179.
392 See infra Part III.D.1.
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1. Public Values and Elite Interests in Contemporary Law
Liberal commentators frequently complain that the present Court is only
sympathetic to rights claims that serve elite interests, that when examining
recent judicial decisions, "an asymmetric pattern strong suggestive of class
emerges. " 393 This bias seems most apparent in free speech cases. Steven
Loffredo notes that the Rehnquist and Burger Courts "[have] displayed
exceptional sensitivity toward elite communicative modes such as corporate
campaign financing, corporate speech, large scale political expenditures, and,
to a lesser extent, prerogatives of the mass media.394 The same Justices have
"been markedly inhospitable toward distinctive plebeian modes of political
expression and participation, like the public display of posters, picketing,
residential distribution of handbills and demonstrations in public parks." 395
Mark Tushnet's analysis of early Burger Court rulings on Fourteenth
Amendment issues observes a similar bias. The judicial majority, he charges,
"is willing to invoke the equal protection clause to invalidate legislation that
might harm its friends and neighbors but unwilling to strike down legislation
that harmed only the poor." 396 Privacy is a third area where the present Court
has been accused of "end[ing] at the boundary of their ... social class."397 For
example, abortion is protected, but not the right to a state funded abortion.398
393 Loffredo, supra note 85, at 1364. See generally ELY, THEORY, supra note 26, at 58-
59 (noting "a systematic bias in judicial choice of fundamental values, unsurprisingly in favor
of the values of the upper-middle, professional class").
394 Loffredo, supra note 85, at 1364.
395 Id. at 1364-65. Compare First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti; 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (finding a
criminal statutue prohibiting corporations from financing a campaign for a personal income
tax referendum to be in violation of the First Amendment), and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976) (invalidating provisions of Federal Elections Campaign Act that caps candidates'
personal campaign expenditures on grounds that such provisions abridge political expression),
and Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (overturning
decision of state utilities commission requiring public utilities to allocate advertising space on
billing envelopes), with Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789
(1984) (upholding local ordinance prohibiting the posting of campaign posters on public
property), and Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984)
(upholding regulation prohibiting overnight camping in Lafayette Square by political
demonstrators), and Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding "content neutral"
anti-picketing ordinance). See generally GRABER, supra note 356, at 189-96.
396 Tushnet, supra note 100, at 180.
397 Karst, supra note 55, at 59.
398 See id. at 59; Paul Brest, Who Decides, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 611, 668 (1985); see
also Thomas C. Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS.
83, 88-90 (1980); Mary Becker, Conservative Free Speech and the Uneasy Case for Judicial
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If the Rehmquist and Burger Courts are guilty as charged with exhibiting
special solicitude for class interests, then liberals who rely on the rough rule of
three are likely to become accomplices to this constitutional crime. At best, a
liberal constitutional theory closely attuned to recent precedent would protect a
different, perhaps more accurate, set of liberties that advance very much
remembered middle and upper-middle class concerns. Such biases may already
be infecting progressive legal thought. The rough rule of three probably
explains why liberal constitutional theorists continue to call on the federal
judiciary to sustain affirmative action programs and strike down laws banning
any consensual expression of adult sexuality. Good reasons exist for thinking
that judicial policy in these areas may change in the near future, particularly
should one of the more conservative justices on the Rehnquist Court be
replaced by a Clinton appointee. Four justices dissented when the Supreme
Court in 1995 declared unconstitutional a federal affirmative action policy. 399
Furthermore, the Court's 1996 decision in Romer v. Evans,4 ° striking down a
law directed at homosexuals, suggests that the judicial majority may already be
rethinking whether persons have a constitutional right to engage in private
sodomy with consenting adult partners.40 1 The main beneficiaries of decisions
overruling Adarand v. Pena402 and Bowers v. Hardwick,40 3 however, will be
minority business owners and a relatively affluent homosexual community. 0 4
Affirmative action does not touch the lives of most poor persons of color, who
frequently live in neighborhoods where there are few white persons and even
fewer jobs.405 Similarly, most poor people are far more concerned with putting
bread on the table than liberating their sexual energies. Unfortunately, given the
low level of interest in welfare rights among the more liberal members of the
present bench and the Clinton administration, 40 6 the poor are likely to remain
Review, 64 U. Coro. L. REv. 975, 975-76, 987-89 (1993) (claiming that courts protect
gender rights only when doing so advances the interests of white men).399 See Adarand Constr., Inc., v. Pena, 518 U.S. 200 (1995). The dissenters were
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Stevens.
400 116 S. Ct. 1620(1996).
401 Jeffrey Rosen, The Agonizer, THE NEw YoRKER, Nov. 11, 1996, at 90.
402 518 U.S. at 200.
403 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
404 See Stuart Elliott, Big Marketers Are Divided on Issue of Homosexuality, N.Y.
Tams, Feb. 23, 1994, at D1, D18 (noting "high education levels and relative affluence
among gay customers"); Kenneth Sherrill, On Gay People as a Politically Powerless Group,
in GAY AND THE MIL.TARY: JOSEPH STEAN VERSUS ThE UNIT STATES 105-09 (Marc
Wolinsky & Kenneth Sherrill eds., 1993).
405 See WILDAM JUIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW
URBAN PooR (1996).
406 See supra notes 1-9, 399-405 and accompanying text.
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unwanted orphans in the American constitutional universe. Until that blessed
day when several justices on the Court become more sympathetic to the rights
of poor people, all that liberal constitutional theories structured by the rough
rule of three will do is reproduce more progressive variations on the
constitutional rights of the well-to-do.
Middle and upper-middle class citizens do have constitutional rights that
should not be ignored by liberal constitutional theorists. The fact that gays and
lesbians seem on average as economically well-off as their heterosexual
counterparts40 7  provides no legitimate excuse for denying whatever
fundamental rights they have to express their sexuality. The main liberal
objection to the Burger and Rehnquist Courts' practices, however, is not that
the justices always protect the wrong rights.408 Tushnet enthusiastically supports
judicial decisions protecting the rights of women,40 9 even though he believes
the justices saw those cases as "particularly concem[ing] their wives and
friends." 410 Liberals object to the pattern of Rehnquist Court decisions. They
believe that no principled distinction exists between cases where the Supreme
Court protects rights that primarily advance elite interests and cases where the
Supreme Court fails to protect rights that primarily advance the interest of
poorer persons. The constitutional principles that justify protecting the rights of
women, in this view, should compel the present federal judiciary to exhibit far
greater judicial solicitude towards the rights of the poor.41 Unfortunately,
liberal constitutional theory structured by the rough rule of three exhibits the
same biases as Burger and Rehnquist Court practice. Again, the problem is not
that liberals insist that Roe be affirmed and Bowers be overruled. Tribe,
Dworkin, and others violate constitutional integrity by not providing a
principled distinction between the fundamental human rights-abortion and
homosexuality-they believe are also judicially enforceable constitutional rights
and the fundamental human rights-livelihood-they insist are not judicially
enforceable constitutional rights.
This failure has important institutional implications. Liberal theories
infected with the same class biases as Rehnquist Court jurisprudence risk
blurring the line between public values and elite interests that is at the heart of
American constitutionalism and the practice of judicial review. No
contemporary justification for the judicial power to declare laws
unconstitutional, liberal or conservative, legitimates an institution that primarily
407 See Sherrill, supra note 400, at 105.
408 Few liberals agree with the way that the Rehnquist and Burger Courts treat
affirmative action and interpret the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.
409 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
410 Tushnet, supra note 100, at 181.
411 See supra note 387 and accompanying text.
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supports the lifestyles of the (fairly) rich and famous.
2. Public Values and Elite Interests in American Constitutionalism
The founders of the American constitutional order believed that a public
good existed and that some persons were particularly well qualified to ascertain
that public good. Well designed republics, in their view, relied on electoral
schemes that facilitated the election of the best men (now people) and
representational schemes that, while retaining popular control in the long run,
permitted those men (now people) to exercise independent judgment on political
issues.412 Madison, in particular, endorsed a strong trustee theory of
representation. "The aim of every political constitution," he wrote, "is... first
to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue
to pursue, the common good of the society." 413 Fortunately, the American
Constitution seemed well designed from that perspective. Ratification, John Jay
declared, would guarantee that "the best men in the country will not only
consent to serve, but also will generally be appointed to manage [the
polity]." 414
The leading critics of Madisonian institutions either denied that a public
good existed or, more typically, that some class of people were particularly
well qualified to ascertain that public good. The anti-Federalists insisted that the
persons responsible for the Constitution were not disinterested republicans, but
interested landowners and speculators eager to form a national government that
would serve their class interest. Gordon Wood's influential study of late
eighteenth century American political culture notes how leading opponents of
ratification consistently charged that the proposed constitutional regime "was
aristocratically designed to 'arise the fortunes and respectability of the well-born
few and oppress the plebeian."' 415 In their view, "[t]here was ... no
412 GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 106, 180,
189-90, 230, 253 (1992); GRuiF, supra note 372, at 15; Mark A. Graber, Conflicting
Representations: Lani Guinier and James Madison on Electoral Systems, 13 CoNSr.
COMmENARY 291,299-303 (1996).
413 TM FEDERAU No. 57, at 350 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
4 14 Id. No. 3, at 43 (John Jay); see id. No. 4, at 47; id. No. 64, at 391 (explaining why
the presidential appointment system will secure "those men only who have become the most
distinguished by their abilities and virtue"); id. at Nos. 64, 68, at 396, 412 (John Jay,
Alexander Hamilton) (explaining why the presidential selection system will result in the
election of the best person); id. No. 76, at 455, 458-59 (Alexander Hamilton). See generally
EDMUND S. MORGAN, hnVENTING THE PEOILE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 237-306 (1988); GORDON S. WOOD, TIE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 499-518 (1969).
4 15 WOOD, supra note 412, at 255, quoting PRovIDENCE GAzfm-r, Jan. 5, 1788.
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disinterested gentlemanly elite that could feel 'sympathetically the wants of the
people"' and speak for their 'feelings, circumstances, and interests.'" 416
Rather, "[tihat elite had its own particular interests to promote." 417 Melancton
Smith informed his fellow New Yorkers, "I do not mean to declaim against the
great, and charge them indiscriminately from want of principle and
honesty." 418 Madisonian institutions were faulty, Smith claimed, because
Federalists failed to acknowledge that "[tlhe same passions and prejudices
govern all men. "
419
Progressive era critics of the Constitution shared these anti-Federalist
concerns with elites and the constitutional order. Charles Beard's An Economic
Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States rejected the traditional
view that "the struggle over the formation and adoption of the [Constitution]
[was] a contest between sections ending in a victory of straight-thinking
national-minded men over narrower and more local opponents." 420 Instead,
Beard claimed, "the men who favored the Constitution were affiliated with
certain types of property and economic interest, and that men who opposed it
were affiliated with other types." 421 Although Beard insisted that he "applie[d]
no moralistic epithets to either party," 422 the way in which he and other
Progressive era thinkers characterized the ratification debate privileged the anti-
Federalist interpretation of the Constitution as a vehicle for promoting elite
interests. Commentators who describe late eighteenth century American politics
as a "struggle between greater property and smaller property for control of the
state, ' 423 clearly reject the Federalist claim that constitutional institutions are
best understood as means for promoting the public good.
Significantly, both constitutional supporters and constitutional critics during
the ratification debates agreed that the constitutional order would privilege elite
opinion. Hence, contemporary claims that judicial opinions are likely to reflect
416 Id.
4 17 Id. (quoting Melancton Smith and General Heath); see id. at 255-59; 1 THE
COML=T Ani-FEDERAUSr, supra note 106, at 17-18.
418 Melancton Smith, Speeches by Melancton Smith, reprinted in 6 THE COMwL=
ANTI-FEDERALST, supra note 106, at 158.
419 Id.
420 CHARILS A. BEARD, AN EcoNoMIc INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSIT=ON OF THE
UNtrED STATES xliii (1986).
421 Id. at xlvi. For similar interpretations of the ratification debates, see J. ALLEN
SMrm, THE SPIRT OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 29-39 (1965); VERNON L. PARRiNGTON,
MAIN CuiRETrs iN AMmcAN THOUGHT: VOLUME ONE: 1620-1800: THE CoLoNIAL MIND
271-326 (1927).
422 BEARD, supra note 420, at xlvi.
423 PARRINGTON, supra note 421, at 278.
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"the values of the upper-middle, professional class" 424 fail to recognize that
constitutional institutions were designed to promote those values. From the
Framers' perspective, constitutional institutions are malfunctioning when
government outputs do not reflect the opinions of the best people. The more
basic issue underlying debates between constitutional proponents and opponents
is whether American constitutional institutions can be structured in ways that
insure that elites in power act on the basis of their public values rather than on
the basis of their class interests.
Whether best people in power promote their elite interests or their public
values is particularly vital when assessing the historical practice of judicial
review in the United States. The federal judiciary is the only branch of the
national government that presently bears even a dim resemblance to the
Framers' vision of institutions staffed by elites not responsive to immediate
public whim. As numerous scholars have observed, the natural-aristocratic,
republican vision of the Framers broke down from the beginning. "In the
generation following the formation of the Constitution," Wood comments, "the
anti-Federalist conception of actual or interest representation of
government... came to dominate the realities, if not the rhetoric, of American
political life."425 Ordinary people replaced best men as the ideal legislators in
this unforeseen political universe. Andrew Jackson clearly articulated the new
American constitutional creed when he informed his fellow citizens that "[tihe
duties of all public officers are, or at least admit of being made, so plain and
simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their
performance." 426 Both American political culture and American political
institutions have become even less republican and more democratic during the
twentieth century. Voting rights have expanded significantly and the permanent
campaign presently structures American political life.427 "No one," Stephen
Griffin points out, "today believes America should be ruled by a wealthy,
424 ELY, THEORY, supra note 26, at 59 (emphasis added); see Brest, supra note 398, at
664-65; Becker, supra note 398, at 1019.
4 2 5 WOOD, supra note 412, at 294; see id. at 230-31, 259-67; GRIFFIN, supra note
372, at 15. Many of the founding fathers were disgusted by the regime they spawned. See
WooD, supra note 412, at 365-66.
426 Andrew Jackson, First Annual Message, in A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1908, at 449 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896); see also A
Friend of the Republic, in 4 THE COMPLErM ANTI-FEDERAU=r, supra note 106, at 244
("[There are not such mighty tallents [sic], requisite for government as some who pretend to
them (without possessing them) would make us believe-Honest affection for the general
good and common qualifications are sufficient.").
4 2 7 See SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL, THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN: INSIDE THE WORLD OF
ELnE POLmCAL OPERATiES 7-10 (1980).
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propertied, classically educated, agrarian male elite" 42 8 -or any other elite for
that matter. Griffin concludes that "to the extent Madison's theory depends on
such an elite, it appears that his theory, along with much of Federalist thought,
is irrelevant to understanding the twentieth-century constitutional order." 429
Nonetheless, the federal bench has, for two hundred years, largely
withstood the democratic tide that engulfed other republican institutions. This
judicial resistance has been bolstered by a set of public understandings put in
place at the very moment when other republican institutions were undergoing
democratic transformations. By the early nineteenth century, Griffin observes,
"the Federalist conception of politics, a conception that emphasized the
importance of a guiding virtuous elite, was now seen as applicable only to the
judiciary." 430 Wood similarly recognizes that courts in Jeffersonian America
"seemed the only public place left in democratic America where a trace of
classical aristocracy and virtue could be found." 431 Little has changed.
Americans may want ordinary, even mediocre, citizens to represent them in
legislatures. President Nixon's failed effort to place Harold Carswell on the
Supreme Court suggests that we do not want such persons to sit on the federal
bench. 432
That the Court is the last republican bastion in our democratic society does
not mean that the justices generally act in a countermajoritarian fashion. Both
the appointments process and other political pressures ensure that judicial
preferences will remain within a general public consensus.433 Still, on matters
where there is no clear or durable public consensus, justices tend to support
those positions favored by elites in our society. Both, for example, favor broad
free speech rights and fewer public expressions of religion. 434 Such practices
are legitimate from a Madisonian perspective only if legal elites are protecting
the public good. Judicial review cannot be justified if legal elites are merely
advancing their class interests.
A court that protected rights to basic necessities would satisfy the
republican requirement that government institutions serve public values.
Charles Reich, Frank Michelman, Peter Edelman, and Charles Black will
receive few direct benefits should the federal judiciary eventually rule that all
persons have a constitutional right to a survival income. These proponents of
428 GRui, supra note 372, at 67.
429 Id.
430 Id. at 17.
431 WOOD, supra note 412, at 325; see also id. at 323-25.
432 See HNRY J. ABRAHAm, Jusincs AND PRESiDmNS 15-18 (3d ed. 1992).
433 See supra note 366 and accompanying text.
434 See Brest, supra note 398, at 65-66; GRABER, supra note 36, at 106; Gary Peller,
Creation, Evolution, and the New South, 2 TIIuWN 72 (1987).
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welfare rights probably think they will enjoy many indirect benefits from
policies they believe will decrease the underclass and poverty in the United
States. These benefits, however, cannot be distinguished from the general
benefits that accrue from living in a just society. 435 Hence, the best explanation
for liberal elite commitments to welfare rights during the 1960s seems to be a
sincere, perhaps mistaken, belief that welfare rights expressed the best
aspirations of the American constitutional order.
Determining whether justices who protect abortion are promoting public
values or elite interests is more complicated. Tenured law professors who do
not expect that they or close family members will need welfare in the near
future recognize that they, family members, or friends may wish to terminate
an unwanted pregnancy. Contrary to much evidence suggesting that statutory
bans on abortion have not and will not alter elite reproductive options
significantly, liberal theorists often write as if they expect to be affected directly
should Roe be overruled. "The answer to the question why is it so important
that abortion access be constitutionally protected is obvious:" an academic
lawyer proclaims, "because I or someone I care about may desperately need
one, and the vagaries of electoral politics do not guarantee access." 436
Significantly, the dominant defense of legal abortion focuses on how abortion
rights are necessary to help women achieve or maintain elite status. Pro-choice
feminists condemn pro-life policies that "integrally contribute[] to the
maintenance of an underclass or a deprived position because of gender
status." 437 Kristin Luker points out that abortion rights are also important to
elite men who prefer spouses that contribute a second income rather than
extensive childcare. 438 Not surprisingly, the most committed opponents of legal
abortion are women who do not wish to become political, economic, or
intellectual elites. 439
In short, a greater possibility exists that Dworkin, Tribe, and other
contemporary liberal supporters of abortion rights are confusing their class
435 Similarly, "the political advantages at home and abroad that would follow
abandonment of segregation," that Derrick Bell believes explain the Supreme Court's decision
in Brown were the advantages that result from doing justice. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown
v. Board of Education and the Interest-convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524
(1980). Brown provided "immediate credibility to American's straggle with Communist
countries to win the hearts and minds of emerging third world peoples" precisely because that
decision offered a measure of justice to persons of color. Id.
436 Jean Braucher, Tribal Conflict over Abortion, 25 GA. L. Rnv. 595, 609 (1991); see
Frances Olsen, Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARv. L. REV. 105, 105 (1989). For similar
comments, see GRABER, supra note 36, at 4, 19.
437 Law, supra note 146, at 1006; see supra note 64.
438 See LUKER, supra note 223, at 210.
439 See id. at 159-76.
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interests with public values than Michelman, Edelman, and other supporters of
welfare rights are confusing their class interests with public values. This is not
to say that the Constitution does or does not protect abortion rights. The point is
simply that the case for liberal elites acting as disinterested statespersons is
harder to make in the case of abortion than welfare. That contemporary liberal
constitutional theorists are confusing class interests with public values seems
particularly likely if, as I have argued, no principled distinction can be made
within liberal constitutional theory between abortion and welfare rights.440
Unless leading constitutional theorists can demonstrate more convincingly why
the right to livelihood is one of the few fundamental human rights they believe
is not also'a judicially enforceable constitutional right, the inference seems clear
that liberal elites will fight hard and extensively only for those rights that they
perceive as both just and serving their interests.
Great judicial decisions lack this ambivalence. No member of the Court
that decided Brown v. Board of Education expected to attend an inferior,
segregated school. No member of the Court that decided Gideon v. Wainwright
expected to go to trial without a lawyer. For that matter, neither Justice Holmes
nor Justice Brandeis expected to suffer the fate of Jacob Abrams should World
War I restrictions on free speech remain the law of the land. As Paul Murphy
has noted, such distinguished political actors as Theodore Roosevelt felt free to
make criticisms of World War I policies that were quite similar to those that
landed radical critics in prison.441 Brown, Gideon, and the dissenting opinion in
Abrams v. United States442 articulated what were then (and probably now) elite
values concerning civil rights, the rights of persons accused of crimes, and
rights to free speech. We celebrate these decisions today because their direct
beneficiaries were or would have been less fortunate Americans.
Liberal constitutional theorists insist that courts have a unique capacity to
"listen... for voices from the margins, '"443 a capacity they regard as crucial to
any justification of judicial review. This characterization of judicial
distinctiveness is clearly wrong in one sense. Given the way different governing
institutions are staffed, the federal judiciary, if anything, is likely to be the
national institution most attuned to elite values.444 Still, Brown and Gideon
demonstrate that elite values can advance the interests of less fortunate
Americans. Constitutional commentators and authorities who would have the
440 See supra Parts II.A.1-2.
441 PAUL L. MURPHY, WoRLD WAR I AND THE O~iGIN OF CiVIL LImERTES IN THE
UNrr=D STATES 84 (1979).
442 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
443 Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1537 (1988); see Owen M.
Fiss, The Law Regained, 74 CoRNELL L. REV. 245, 255 (1989).
444 See supra notes 430-35 and accompanying text.
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judiciary protect fundamental fights to abortion but not fundamental rights to
basic necessities, however, can lay no claim to either the unique republican
virtues or special capacities to speak for the underprivileged that might justify
maintaining judicial review in our increasingly democratic society. No theory of
judicial review purports to justify an institution that declares laws
unconstitutional only when government policies too severely trench on the
interests of the most fortunate Americans.
IV. A SECOND LooK?
Many leading constitutional theorists advocate doctrines that would require
elected officials to take a second look at constitutionally questionable practices.
Constitutional errors, in this view, frequently result from the pressures inherent
in the legislative process rather than from malevolence or interpretive mistakes.
Dean (now Judge) Guido Calabresi points out that "l]egislators often act hastily
or thoughtlessly with respect to fundamental rights because of panic or crises or
because, more often, they are simply pressed for time."445 The constitutional
harms that result from these legislative failings can be mitigated, however, if
courts assume that elected officials have authorized some action that may trench
on constitutional liberties only when that authorization is clearly stated on the
face of the legislation under constitutional attack. 446 Sandy Levinson, in 1989,
suggested that the courts use the Ninth Amendment to require legislatures to
take a second look at any government practice that may violate what the Court
believes to be fundamental human rights.447 Judicial review in these instances
does not proclaim to the world that elected officials have made a constitutional
mistake. Legislators retain the power to reenact the constitutionally
controversial policy, as long as they do so explicitly. 448 These commentators
simply insist that given the importance of the values at stake, courts should
make certain that legislative action is based on a more deliberate and self-
conscious weighing of important constitutional considerations than appears to
have taken place previously.449
445 Calabresi, supra note 26, at 103-04.
446 See id. at 103-07; Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virues, 75 HARV.
L. Rav. 40, 58-79 (1961); Alexander M. Bickel & Harry N. Wellington, The Legislative
Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1, 31-35
(1957); ELY, THEORY, supra note 26, at 169-70.
447 See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Rhetoric and the Ninth Amendment, 64 Cm.-
KENr L. Rav. 131, 157-59 (1988); see Becker, supra note 398, at 977-78.
448 See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 26, at 105 n.71 ("Type III review plainly leaves the
last word with the democratically elected legislature.").
449 See Bickel, supra note 446, at 77; Bickel & Wellington, supra note 446, at 27-28.
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This Article suggests that liberal constitutional theorists should take a
similar second look at their present constitutional commitments. Dworkin,
Tribe, and other pro-choice constitutionalists may have good justifications for
emphasizing abortion rights at the expense of welfare rights. The problem is
that too little public debate has taken place over the present priorities of liberal
theory. Some constitutional commentators may be "act[ing] hastily or
thoughtlessly with respect to fundamental [welfare] rights," particularly in light
of the reasons that might warrant a greater liberal concern with the
constitutional rights450 of poor people. Liberals committed to a "republic of
reasons" 451 owe impoverished citizens a more convincing explanation of why
the Constitution contains a judicially enforceable right to abortion, but no
judicially enforceable right to welfare, survival income, or basic necessities. At
the very least, liberal constitutional theorists should detail at greater length
whether they really believe that abortion has stronger textual, historical, or
precedential foundations (before and after 1970) than welfare rights, whether
they believe that tactical considerations presently compel liberals to concentrate
on abortion rather than welfare, or whether, at bottom, they believe that
abortion rights are more fundamental than welfare rights.
This second look may result in more explicit, superior justifications for
present liberal priorities. A fuller exegesis might demonstrate that abortion
rights have deeper roots than welfare rights in the American constitutional
tradition or that sound institutional reasons warrant federal judicial protection
for abortion rights but not welfare rights. Some liberal constitutional theorists
may even confess that they have rejected the philosophical tenets underlying the
Great Society, that although they think abortion is a fundamental human right,
they believe that no person in an affluent society has a fundamental human right
to basic necessities. This understanding of human rights may be terribly
mistaken.452 Still, such a moral distinction between abortion and welfare rights
would provide a principled justification for the present commitments of liberal
constitutional theory.
Liberal theorists who take a second look at their constitutional priorities
may also conclude that welfare rights are at least as fundamental as abortion
rights. No liberal philosopher thinks that abortion rights are more important
450 Calabresi, supra note 26, at 103-04.
451 SuNsrE , supra note 26, at 17.
452 Friends with some justification claim that I never met a progressive tax or spending
program that I did not like. My philosophical views on abortion, however, are weakly pro-
life. See GRABER, supra note 36, at 159-60. I strongly support legal abortion at present only
because I am convinced that abortion laws in practice discriminate horribly against poor
women and women of color. See id. at 39-117.
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than welfare fights.453 Welfare rights are at least as well grounded in the
American constitutional tradition as abortion rights.454 Judicial enforcement of a
right to livelihood would not require different constitutional remedies than those
liberals presently favor in other areas of constitutional law.455 Recent precedent
does provide far stronger constitutional grounds for abortion rights than welfare
rights. Constitutional theorists, however, should not adjust their more
fundamental principles to correspond with what they believe are erroneously
decided cases. Adherence to stare decisis is particularly unwarranted when the
mistaken rulings violate constitutional integrity by privileging rights that
advance elite interests at the expense of equally valid constitutional rights that
further the life prospects of less fortunate persons. Scholars who believe the
Constitution protects welfare rights should feel no more constrained by such
recent precedent as Dandridge and Rodriguez, than the Supreme Court in
Brown felt constrained by Plessy v. Ferguson456 and Gong Lum v. Rice.457
Given the recent run of judicial decisions adverse to welfare rights, liberal
constitutional commentators might urge the Supreme Court to develop a more
supportive line of precedent before explicitly declaring a constitutional right to
welfare. The Hughes, Stone, and Vinson Courts, after all, first established a
more supportive line of precedent before ruling that separate was not
constitutionally equal. 458 A truly liberal constitutional theory, however, would
not use present judicial hostility as an excuse for abandoning work on the
foundations of an American constitutional universe in which all persons are
guaranteed meaningful access to basic necessities.
The American law of fundamental constitutional rights is fast approaching a
normatively unstable impasse. On the one hand, the Supreme Court is
protecting a fundamental right to abortion and is not likely to abandon that
protection in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, the justices in every
area of law not closely associated with gender or the sexual revolution seem
increasingly unwilling to recognize any fundamental right not specifically
grounded in constitutional history or the constitutional text.459 Chief Justice
453 See supra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
454 See supra notes 207-243 and accompanying text.
455 See supra notes 176-84 and accompanying text.
456 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overnded by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
457 275 U.S. 78 (1927) (holding that Asian-Americans are not constitutionally entitled to
attend a white-only school).
458 See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950);
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948);
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
459 See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994) (finding no constitutional right to be
free from malicious prosecution); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) (holding that children
1997]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, and, somewhat surprisingly,
Justice Ginsberg, in 1994, explicitly asserted that they would be "'reluctant to
expand the concept of substantive due process because the guideposts for
responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-
ended." '460 "The protection of substantive due process," the Court continued,
"have for the most part been accorded to matters relating to marriage, family,
procreation, and the right to bodily integrity."'461 In short, liberal theories of
constitutional interpretation presently seem good only for the family of cases
closely associated with Roe. American law evaluates other claims of
fundamental constitutional rights using far more conservative methods of
constitutional interpretation. 46 2
This status quo violates constitutional integrity. If, properly interpreted, the
Constitution does not protect any fundamental right that lacks specific
constitutional roots, then the judiciary should move to overrule Roe or provide
some other grounding for the constitutionality of legal abortion.463 If, however,
of aliens have no constitutional right to have the state determine whether they would be better
off in public or private custody); Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992)
(holding that government employees have no constitutional right to be warned about
potentially fatal hazards in their workplace); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)
(holding that a natural father has no constitutional right to visit a child born to a mother
married at the time to another man); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
489 U.S. 189 (1989) (holding that children have no constitutional right to be protected against
private violence, even when government officials are aware or should be aware that child
abuse is taking place).
4 60 Albright, 510 U.S. at 271-72 (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 125).
4611Id. at 272.
462 See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 121-30; Collins, 503 U.S. at 124-30; Reno, 507 U.S.
at 301-05; Albright, 510 U.S. at 271-75; see also Raoul Berger, Liberty and the Constitution,
29 GA. L. REv. 585, 593-94 (1995) (discussing how "the Court... is putting the brakes on
fresh claims of rights unknown to the law").
The judicial majority in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), relied heavily on
conservative understandings of constitutional theory when rejecting a claim that persons had a
fundamental right to engage in sodomy. For reasons discussed above, Bowers may not be
long for this constitutional world. See supra note 401 and accompanying text.
46 3 Claims that bans on abortion violate the equal protection rights of women are likely
to prove equally problematic. The persons responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment did not
intend to prohibit laws discriminating against women. See Earl M. Maltz, The Constitution
and Nonracial Discrimination: Alienage, Sex, and the Framers' Ideal of Equality, 7 CoNsT.
COMMNTARY 251, 266-82 (1990). Moreover, flat bans on abortion do not violate equal
protection in a traditional sense because such measures do not give men legal rights denied to
women. Thus, feminists who oppose welfare rights must explain why equal protection should
be interpreted liberally in gender cases, but strictly construed when poor people claim
violations of constitutional equality.
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Roe was correctly decided, then the fundamental rights reasoning of that
decision cannot consistently be confined only to the constitutional law of
privacy. Constitutional commentators and authorities living in a constitutional
universe that considers Roe to be a valid precedent must ask what other
fundamental rights can be justified using the same constitutional modalities that
justify judicial solicitude for abortion rights. Liberals who believe welfare rights
enjoy the same philosophical and historical support as abortion rights,
therefore, should forthwith develop constitutional theories in which rights to
basic necessities play as central a role as abortion rights.
This normatively unstable status quo, unfortunately, may be a political
equilibrium point. In a political universe where money talks louder than
needs, 46 4 the polity is likely to recognize those rights that affluent Republicans
and affluent Democrats recognize, fight over those rights that affluent
Republicans and affluent Democrats fight over, and exhibit little interest in
those rights that fail to interest either affluent Republicans or affluent
Democrats. Pro-choice concerns (other than funding) may thrive in this political
culture because elites of all political persuasions tend to exhibit strong support
for abortion on demand. 465 Welfare rights are likely to receive little political
attention because such issues do not appeal to politically crucial voters or
investors.466 Constitutional theorists probably can do little to challenge this
dreary political climate. Nonetheless, by convincing liberal lawyers that a
commitment to Roe need not entail a commitment to a judicially enforceable
right to basic necessities, Dworkin, Tribe, and other pro-choice
constitutionalists provide a liberal veneer to a profoundly discriminatory
regime.
Law review essays that cannot change the world dramatically may
nevertheless influence legal consciousness. A greater focus on the rights of poor
people might persuade existing and potential liberal federal justices that their
464 For studies on the influence of money in contemporary politics, see THOMAS BRYNE
EDSALL, TBE NEw PorIis OF INEQUALTY (1984); THoMAs FERGUSON, GOLDE N RULE:
TH INvEmSENT THEORY OF PARTY CoMN ToN AND THE LOGIC OF MONEY-DRIVEN
PoLrncAL SYSTEMS (1995); THOMAS FERGUSON & JOEL ROGERS, RiGHT TURN: THE
DEcLiNE OF THE DEMOCRATS AND THE FUTURE OF AmERICAN POimCS (1986); KEvIN
PILLIPS, THE POLITcs OF THE RiCH AND POOR: WEALTH AND THE AmERICAN ELEC=rRATE
IN THE REAGAN AFTERMATH (1990).
465 See Robert Lemer et al., Abortion and Social Change in America, 37 Soc'y 8
(1990); GRABER, supra note 36, at 144-45.
466 See EDSALL, supra note 464, at 23-67 (discussing how the increasing need for
political contributions has weakened the influence of the poor on the Democratic party);
FERGUSON & ROGERS, supra note 464, at 138-61; STANLEY B. GREENBERG, MIDDLE CLASS
DREAMS: THE PoLrTcs AND PowER OF THE NEw AMERuCAN MAJORrrY 23-54 (2d ed. 1996)
(discussing middle class hostility to welfare rights).
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support for abortion rights entails support for rights to basic necessities.
Eisenhower justices, appointed to the Court because they supported the result in
Brown,467 proved willing to support numerous other claims that they believed
had equally valid constitutional foundations. Perhaps future justices appointed
because they support the result in Roe will prove more sympathetic to the
equally valid constitutional rights of the poor.
Constitutional theories concerned with the rights of impoverished
Americans might also inspire a second look at the too common practice in
much contemporary legal literature of establishing authority by declaring victim
status.468 Hierarchies exist in the legal academy as they do elsewhere.
"Untouchables" in the law professorate, however, enjoy privileges that the
overwhelming majority of persons on this planet cannot even dream of. Elite
law professors who pose as "outsiders" risk confusing the interests of the least
high-and-mighty with those who are truly low-and-powerless. Liberal abortion
policies and bans on hate speech or pornography, in their writings, tend to
replace food and shelter as basic needs. These priorities may be shared by
upwardly mobile law students, but probably seem perverse to those persons
who clean law offices and restrooms for a fraction of the pay that first year
lawyers and academics command. A constitutional theory that focused on the
rights of persons who live in the streets and beg for scraps of garbage to eat
might remind us that-contrary to what we sometimes read in our journals-
law professors, law students, and even political scientists are not the wretched
of the earth.
467 See Michael A. Kahn, Shattering the Myth About President Eisenhower's Supreme
Court Appointments, 22 PREIDmENnAL STuD. Q. 47, 47 (1992) (using "a discussion of each
of Eisenhower's five appointments to the Supreme Court" to demonstrate how "Eisenhower
[or, more accurately, the Eisenhower Justice Department] clearly and undeniably attempted to
influence the Supreme Court in the direction of entrenching Brown").
468 For a good collection of some leading works of so-called "outsider scholarship," see
MAz J. MATSuDA Er AL., WORDS THAT WouND: CRmCAL RACE THEoRY, ASSAULTIvE
SPEEC, AND THE Fnsr AMENDMEmr (1993).
[Vol. 58:731
